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ABSTRACT 
Under the Eye of Providence: Surveilling Religious Expression in the United States 
Kathryn A. Montalbano 
This dissertation analyzes how government agencies influenced the religious expression of 
Mormons of the Territory of Utah in the 1870s and 1880s, Quakers of the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, and Muslims of Brooklyn, 
New York, from 2002 to 2013. I argue that nineteenth-century federal marshals and judges in the 
Territory of Utah, mid-twentieth century FBI agents throughout the United States, and New York 
Police Department officers in post-September 11 New York were prompted to monitor each 
religious community by their concerns about polygamy, communism, and terrorism, respectively. 
The government agencies did not just observe the communities, but they probed precisely what 
constituted religion itself.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: United States Government Monitoring Systems 
I.  Introduction 
 United States government agencies at the municipal, territorial, state, and federal levels 
have long monitored religious expression, the union of religious belief and action, that they 
considered threatening to the American public. Religious groups, in turn, have claimed that 
government monitoring practices obstructed their religious expression. This dissertation 
examines how United States government agencies monitored three religious groups from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the present: Mormons in the Utah Territory, with a focus on the 1870s 
and 1880s; Quakers of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), with a focus on the 
late 1940s to the early 1960s; and Muslims in Brooklyn, New York, from 2002 to 2013. The 
backdrops of each of these three case studies distinguished them from other examples of 
government monitoring of religious institutions. In the first case study, the nineteenth-century 
federal and territorial governments perceived Mormon polygamists as threatening to state 
sovereignty. In the second case study, the Federal Bureau of Information (FBI) was preoccupied 
with international communist conspiracies permeating domestic networks, including the network 
of the AFSC Quakers. In the third case study, the NYPD applied the anti-terrorism platform of 
the federal government to its surveillance of Brooklyn Muslims. All three cases forced 
government agencies to reach some form of judgment about what constituted religion as 
byproducts of their monitoring systems. 
 I offer the following argument based on these case studies: government investigations of 
Mormonism, Quakerism, and Islam, prompted by the concerns about polygamy, communism, 
and terrorism, shaped the religious expression of these monitored groups in their specific 
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political and historical contexts. The Mormons were forced to abandon polygamy. The AFSC 
Quakers altered their institutional identity, veering away from their pacifist origins and toward a 
more radical, political, and legally-engaged organization. The Brooklyn-based Muslims, as well 
as many Muslims throughout the United States, altered their doctrinal and community practices 
in response to government surveillance. In other words, government officials probed not just 
whether subversion existed in these religious networks, but what constituted religion. A new 
perspective of religious surveillance in the United States emerges by analyzing how government 
officials have attempted to understand the religions of the communities they have monitored in 
response to the ideological threats of polygamy, communism, and terrorism, respectively. 
 The phrase, monitoring system, refers to the collection and ongoing analysis of 
information by government agencies about targeted subjects of interest. Monitoring system is 
intentionally used instead of surveillance to appropriately characterize the nineteenth-century 
historical case study, while surveillance system is used in the twentieth and twenty-first case 
studies, but definitions of surveillance are still helpful to understand this phenomenon. 
Sociologist David Lyon, who has written extensively on surveillance, has defined it as “any 
collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of 
influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered.”  I examine how, why, and what 1
kind of information different government agencies collected about religious communities within 
these distinct time periods, and how the three case studies shed light upon one another.   
The changing nature of the protection of religion depends on the distinction between legally 
protected activity and crime, and more subtly, on the evolving boundary of what government 
agents considered legitimate and illegitimate religious expression. This evolving boundary 
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affected how United States government agencies in distinctive temporal and spatial environments 
grappled with what beliefs and actions could and could not be protected under the rubric of 
religious expression. The diverse contexts of these case studies justified organizing the chapters 
around each individual religious community, rather than around comparisons of the monitoring 
methods utilized across the three case studies. 
 Given the complexity of these themes, I chose to employ a historical-comparative method 
to answer the following question: did events in the past shape the present condition of 
government surveillance of religious communities in the United States? The resulting importance 
of my research was not merely which media government agents used to collect information, but 
also how they collected that information. My project therefore transformed into a related but 
distinctive one: since we cannot explain the history of government monitoring of religious 
communities with a linear or monolithic narrative, what patterns emerge from these case studies? 
The answer, I found, was that government agencies in different periods of the United States 
determined what forms of religious expression were legitimate within American culture and what 
constituted religion through their monitoring systems. The three monitoring systems provided a 
window into the shifting role of the government in defining legitimate religious expression when 
confronted with ideological threats. 
 Understanding past episodes of religious monitoring can assist contemporary 
policymakers in refashioning surveillance policies to reconcile the civil liberties of surveilled 
groups with the public good. Government agencies in the past, despite their unique political and 
legal environments, shared the challenge of interpreting the unfamiliar religions that they were 
monitoring. In the case of the Mormons of the Utah Territory, territorial officials contemplated 
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how to collect information about polygamists who concealed their marriage ceremonies and 
spouses. Supreme Court justices ultimately acknowledged that polygamy was a religious belief, 
but they did not offer a legal protection for polygamy in their rulings. In the case of the Quakers 
of the American Friends Service Committee, Federal Bureau of Information (FBI) agents 
simultaneously pondered allegations of communism and the extent to which the AFSC 
subscribed to the beliefs of the Quaker religion. In the case of the Brooklyn Muslims, the New 
York Police Department (NPYD) admitted to surveilling Muslim New Yorkers in Raza v. City of 
New York, but it did not concede that its surveillance policy was predicated on Islamic affiliation. 
Yet NYPD officers oftentimes surveilled Muslims without evidence of criminal activity. 
 The monitoring of religious communities is distinctive from contemporary mass 
surveillance, whose critics tend to invoke the infringement of privacy. None of the protagonists 
of these case studies hinged their arguments for religious expression on privacy claims. The 
mutual protection of religion and public expression by the First Amendment places them, along 
with religious expression, in the public sphere. The Mormons explicitly framed their ability to 
practice polygamy as religious in the Supreme Court. Even though nineteenth-century Mormons 
generally conducted their polygamous affairs in their private homes, their marriages were not 
hidden from the public. By the end of the nineteenth century, Mormons of the Utah Territory 
sought the approval of the federal government to reap the benefits of statehood. Mormons had by 
then relinquished the legal argument for polygamy in the Supreme Court. 
 The AFSC Quakers, on the other hand, questioned their surveillance by the FBI. The 
AFSC, an organization committed to nonviolence and social justice, was founded by fourteen 
Quakers in Philadelphia in April 1917. Quaker beliefs shaped their actions, but they did not 
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always explicitly justify their actions with Quaker beliefs. AFSC Quakers were surveilled at 
public protests and lectures that attracted audiences beyond the purview of the AFSC. The FBI 
was troubled by the prospect of encroaching upon a religious community, even though the AFSC 
was not synonymous with the Society of Friends. The AFSC benefitted from its affiliation with 
the well-known Quaker religion that was respected by the broader public, including the FBI. The 
FBI office in Philadelphia, in fact, defended the AFSC and pushed back on J. Edgar Hoover’s 
surveillance program.  
 The FBI operated largely without constraints until the FBI surveillance program, 
COINTELPRO, was revealed by the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI. J. Edgar 
Hoover led the COINTELPRO program, which surveilled and infiltrated seemingly subversive 
domestic political groups. The range of organizations investigated under COINTELPRO was 
vast, including anti-racism civil rights groups such as the Black Panther Party and American 
Indian Movement; anti-Vietnam groups, including student demonstrators; feminist organizations; 
and Puerto Rican independence groups, such as the Young Lords. AFSC Quakers were but one of 
the suspected affiliates of the Communist Party targeted in Hoover’s program. The leader of the 
Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI, Haverford College professor William Davidon, was 
involved with the AFSC, and his wife, Ann Morrissett Davidon, commented on many of the FBI 
files on the AFSC analyzed in the second case study. 
 And third, the plaintiffs of Raza v. City of New York, filed in June 2013 in the Eastern 
District of New York and settled in January 2016, were under surveillance by the NYPD 
Intelligence Division since as far back as 2002. Plaintiffs included religious and community 
leaders in addition to mosques. In 2011, the Associated Press had released a sixty-page New 
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York Police Department report revealing photographs and notes dating back to 2002, which 
featured Muslim businesses, grade schools, student associations, websites, and mosques in the 
greater New York City area. Brooklyn-based Muslims argued they were severely limited in their 
abilities to practice their religion and discuss their beliefs. The NYPD refused to concede that the 
plaintiffs, which included mosques, were investigated based on their religious affiliations. 
 The ACLU and private counsel represented the plaintiffs, prevailing with reforms to the 
NYPD surveillance program in the January 2016 settlement. A handful of New York citizens 
convened in March 2016 to prepare for an April 2016 Fairness Hearing with the Raza judge 
about the settlement terms. This group included Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, political 
activists, and the lawyers from Handschu, the court case preceding Raza, who had filed a joint 
motion with the Raza lawyers when the Associated Press revealed in 2011 that the NYPD was 
spying on Muslim Americans. The Handschu lawyers acknowledged at this meeting that, while 
the settlement provided some protection of political and religious activities in the city, it did not 
completely solve the problem of unchecked power within the NYPD.  2
 All three case studies concern how United States government agencies addressed people 
perceived as detrimental to the nation during or after conflict: rebuilding the nation after the 
internal strife of the Civil War; fighting communism during the Cold War; and fighting uncertain 
enemies in the war on terror or, as it was renamed by the Obama administration in 2010 in an 
attempt to delink terrorism from Islam, the Countering Violent Extremism campaign.  Preserving 3
a cohesive citizenry during these times was an underlying motivation for United States 
government agencies, past and present, to monitor these religious groups.  
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 In the case of the Mormons, federal officials genuinely feared that polygamous marriages 
would unravel the moral threads of American society. Utah territorial officials did not have the 
means to combat polygamy on their own, but they might have done so with a more expansive 
and sophisticated monitoring network and greater state capacity. The courts prosecuted Mormon 
polygamists because of their actions, but the Supreme Court was forced to address the legal 
distinction between action and belief. The FBI investigated the AFSC because of the actions of 
its members, but its agents were restrained by the possibility that such actions had been inspired 
by religious beliefs that did not actually conflict with state interests. The NYPD surveilled 
certain Muslims because it believed, based on the actions of some radical Muslims, their beliefs 
could inspire other Muslims to act radically. By this point, the distinction between belief and 
action, in the mind of the NYPD, had dissipated significantly. 
 Scholars of history and religion have challenged the possibility of defining either 
religious belief or religious freedom, or of isolating religious activities from the outside world. 
Yet government agencies in all three case studies subscribed to the notion that there was a line 
between religious action and religious belief, as well as between religious and non-religious 
activity. Those lines factored into how they monitored the religious communities of interest. 
Though this distinction was arguably misinformed, it also showed that the monitoring agents of 
the Mormon and Quaker case studies tried to strike a balance between addressing threats to the 
nation and respecting religious expression. 
 The historical examples of varied government agencies and monitoring tactics that are 
analyzed in this research complements the narrative of surveillance in the digital age. Research 
on the topic of surveillance in the United States often focuses on the late twentieth century and 
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early twenty-first century, and it often employs the phrases “surveillance society” or 
“surveillance state” to examine the largely twenty-first-century phenomenon of the blurred line 
between governmental and commercial surveillance. There are many benefits to these 
approaches to surveillance research, but I demonstrate the significance of pushing back the study 
of surveillance to periods in which monitoring systems did not rely on big data collection. 
Federal marshals who collected information on Mormon polygamists, for instance, relied on the 
testimonies and eavesdropping of Mormon neighbors to collect information. Federal marshals, 
given the difficulties they faced in gathering evidence of polygamous marriages, eventually 
narrowed their monitoring to Mormon leaders. FBI agents who surveilled the AFSC Quakers in 
the twentieth century were able to focus on both minor and major members of the AFSC, but 
they also surveilled specific members based on leads from other government agencies, or based 
on surveying large gatherings. Even the NYPD targeted specific mosques and community leaders 
in its surveillance of Brooklyn Muslims, but the instructional manual it provided its officers to 
detect terrorism among the general Muslim population encouraged a form of mass surveillance.  
 To delineate a broader lesson for contemporary policymakers, these findings emphasize 
the need to examine specific communities entangled in government surveillance programs as 
opposed to offering generalizations about the impact of surveillance on all citizens. This point 
does not mark members of surveilled religious communities as unequal to their fellow citizens, 
but it emphasizes the disproportionate impact of government surveillance on certain individuals. 
 Two key foci of this dissertation, in summary, are the changing norms of governmental 
monitoring in response to looming ideological threats, and the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate kinds of religious expression, as determined by government agencies across time. 
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The second, third, and fourth chapters are dedicated to these three case studies, respectively, 
while the fifth chapter discusses the larger themes across the three case studies and provides 
concluding thoughts on future research on surveillance, religion, and media in the United States.  
II.  Three Case Studies  
 The nineteenth-century Mormons of the Utah Territory, twentieth-century AFSC Quakers, 
and twenty-first-century Muslims of Brooklyn, New York, clashed with American culture in 
distinctive ways. Mormons in the territories were physically separated from citizens in the states, 
which augmented the unfamiliarity between territorial Mormons and the rest of the United 
States. After the 1846 military invasion of Mexico, the United States expanded its scope by 
acquiring territories of the West. Following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in February 1848, 
Mexico lost almost half of its territory, turning the Mexican North into the American Southwest. 
The United States agreed to respect Spanish and Mexican land grants, but it removed a provision 
in the treaty that mandated the United States recognize all preexisting property rights in the 
region.  The United States acquired what became its territories, including the Territory of Utah, 4
which was organized in 1850 and converted into a state in 1896. 
 The practice of polygamy by some Mormons cast them as social outsiders. To add to its 
foreignness, the Church of Latter-day Saints did not embrace mainline Protestantism as part of its 
identity, nor did many nineteenth-century mainline Protestant denominations embrace the Saints. 
Historian Philip L. Barlow has explained that since the antebellum era, Mormons interpreted the 
King James Version of the Bible through a unique, radical lens that reflected their distinctive 
worldview. The Saints remained committed to the King James translation, but they inherited it 
from the Protestantism they rejected, marking Mormonism as a different kind of Protestantism 
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that was incongruent with the mainstream culture.  Historian Patrick Mason has argued that 5
nineteenth-century Mormons not only sought to distinguish themselves from mainstream 
Protestantism, but they embraced their interpretation of religion as a marker of their outsider 
status.  Historian W. Paul Reeve expanded the scholarship on Mormons as social outsiders by 6
adding that the Protestant white majority of nineteenth-century America believed Mormonism 
represented a racial departure from mainstream society, in addition to a religious departure.  7
Historian William R. Hutchison has placed the Church of Latter-day Saints among the unique 
Protestant denominations which took no part in the mainline Protestant establishment, usually by 
choice, but managed to attract large numbers of followers and maintain regional authority.  8
 The Mormons’ self-construction as peripherally Protestant shaped how court and 
territorial officials discussed polygamy. Federal government officials perceived the Mormons as 
a problem when they moved westward in 1848, troubling a nation already torn in its opinion 
about the West.  As legal historian Sarah Gordon has written, the reaction of the country to 9
polygamy was shaped by mid-nineteenth-century politics, law, religion, and most significantly, a 
growing divide in national opinion of slavery. Polygamy was seen, particularly by northern 
evangelicals, as a new form of slavery that entrapped women. It was not until 1879 that the 
Supreme Court faced the question of polygamy and interpreted the religion clause of the First 
Amendment.  And it was not until the 1870s that the widespread prosecution of polygamy 10
occurred, preceding the official end of the practice in 1890.  The fact that Mormon polygamy 11
gave rise to the constitutional investigation of religious expression merited its inclusion as a case 
study in this dissertation. 
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 Twentieth-century Quakers, principled by pacifism, inadvertently challenged the federal 
campaign against communism. Sociologist E. Digby Baltzell has written that twentieth-century 
Quakers occupied a central role in the elite of Philadelphia,  where the AFSC headquarters 12
remain to this day. Although the AFSC was founded by fourteen Quakers in 1917, it never 
claimed to be a mouthpiece for the Society of Friends. FBI agents’ investigations of the AFSC 
were complicated by the uncertain boundary between its official Quaker or Quaker-influenced 
commitment to social justice through AFSC projects. The compatibility of the AFSC with 
mainstream United States culture further exacerbated FBI investigations. 
 The FBI tracked members of the AFSC, but FBI agents debated the legitimacy of this 
surveillance. They questioned whether the AFSC was a Quaker organization, and if so, to what 
extent Quakerism shaped the actions of the organization. FBI agents’ rhetorical and literal 
conflation of communism with religion indicated their uncertainty about the definition of religion 
itself. FBI agents faced a challenging problem: if the AFSC, built on domestic and international 
social justice, was not officially aligned with Quakerism but drew its membership from Quakers 
and those who sympathized with Quaker beliefs, the FBI needed to define the AFSC when 
crafting its surveillance system. The documents revealed how this uncertainty dictated certain 
FBI practices concerning the AFSC. 
 Furthermore, Quakers disagreed about the extent to which they associated with 
mainstream Protestantism, just as they disagreed about most aspects of social and political life, 
according to historian Gerald Jones. Similar to the Mormons, some Friends sought to build their 
identities against mainstream Protestant culture.  Historian William R. Hutchison has phrased 13
this phenomenon slightly differently, suggesting that Quakers were among a handful of 
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Protestant groups that were “destined to maintain a separate identity” from the Protestant 
establishment.  Historian Patricia Appelbaum has contended that twentieth-century Quakers 14
both shaped and were part of a minority Protestant pacifist culture that dissented from the 
warlike Protestant mainstream without completely separating from it.  Part of Quakers’ insider 15
status was attributed to well-known Quakers and AFSC members, such as the historian Rufus 
Jones, but Appelbaum has argued that Quakers were more theologically flexible than other 
pacifist-oriented Protestant denominations, such as the Mennonites and Church of Brethren, 
thereby allowing the Quakers to attract more converts and outsiders.  Appelbaum also specified 16
that many prominent Quakers were “former mainline Protestants.”  This characterization unites 17
our Quaker and Mormon protagonists outside of mainstream Protestantism, with the main 
difference between the two as insiders and outsiders, respectively. 
 This characterization also helps to explain how twentieth-century Quakers of the 
American Friends Service Committee reconciled an insider and dissenting identity in American 
culture. Unlike late nineteenth-century Mormons or contemporary Muslims, mid-twentieth 
century Quakers were not constrained by negative public opinion. Although many organizations 
and groups were subjected to governmental surveillance around the same time, I chose this case 
study because J. Edgar Hoover’s preoccupation with communism, which extended to the 
respected AFSC Quakers, demonstrated the extent to which government officials were willing to 
combat that threat. 
 The FBI did not primarily surveil the AFSC because of the Quaker practice of 
conscientious objection. However, the Supreme Court did address conscription in the mid-
twentieth century in determining the limits of religious expression.  Scholars have argued that 18
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religions of lesser known faiths hold restricted claims to religious liberties in their respective 
historical contexts.  While the AFSC Quakers were certainly not of an unknown faith, the early 19
FBI documents attempted to outline the basic tenets of Quakerism, and its relevance to the 
organization, when determining which AFSC activities did or did not cross a line of acceptable 
behavior. 
 Unlike the organizational conflation of the Society of Friends and the AFSC, the post-
September 11 NYPD surveillance program ideologically conflated Islam with terrorism, most 
evidently in its report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, which the NYPD 
used to train counterterrorism police officers. Unlike the cultures in which the Utah Mormons 
and AFSC Quakers lived, however, the Muslim Americans of the third case study lived in a 
comparatively more pluralistic American society. From 2002 until the 2016 settlement of Raza v. 
City of New York, the NYPD operated under severely weakened guidelines that emerged from the 
Handschu 1985 settlement, which limited the surveillance of political activities in New York 
City. In all three cases, no external authority moderated how the government agencies collected 
information. The NYPD autonomously investigated Muslim Americans during the time frame of 
its surveillance program. I chose this case because it was the most recent, large-scale example of 
governmental surveillance of religion. It was, simply put, my initial motivation to examine 
government monitoring of religious institutions in the United States. 
 Finally, all three case studies featured government authorities, members of the Supreme 
Court, the FBI, and the NYPD, who attempted to distinguish between religious and non-religious 
beliefs in the Mormon case study, religious and non-religious actions in the AFSC Quaker case 
study, and both dualities in the Muslim case study, all of which sculpted the malleable definition 
!13
of religion. This remolding was evident in the Supreme Court decision of the first major 
polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States (1878), in the FBI files on the AFSC, and in the 
curtailing of Muslim Americans’ civil liberties in the NYPD surveillance program. Angela C. 
Carmella has succinctly outlined this paradox: “[T]he state is incompetent to act in matters of 
religion, but the state defines what conduct is religious and therefore outside its jurisdiction, and 
what conduct is secular and therefore within its jurisdiction.”  In all three case studies, none of 20
the government agencies attempted to explicitly define religion. They circumvented this complex 
question by defining what actions were or were not religious. Consequently, state governance 
over the missions of religious organizations has altered the way that communities define 
themselves.  Mormon polygamy, for example, was eradicated through the dual effort of federal 21
territorial officials and the courts. Eventually, polygamy was no longer central to the definition of 
being a Mormon. 
 The Mormon problem, a phrase some nineteenth-century members of Congress used to 
discuss the Utah Territory, exemplified the difficulty the courts faced in identifying religious 
conduct. The Constitution does not define religion in order to permit a diversity of religions to 
coexist, rather than a hierarchy of preferred faiths.  The justices in the first major polygamy case 22
in the United States Supreme Court, Reynolds, not only first interpreted the First Amendment, 
but they also formally examined the constitutional meaning of religion.  The Court 23
acknowledged in Reynolds: “The word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution. We must go 
elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to 
the history of the times in which the provision was adopted.”  It was the Mormons, in other 24
words, who compelled Supreme Court justices to decide on protecting religious action, but not 
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religious belief, in the Reynolds opinion. This is a widely accepted interpretation among legal 
scholars.  However, most disputes concerning religious expression occurred at the local or state 25
levels until the federal government acquired power during the New Deal, when the federal courts 
expanded the range of Bill of Rights protections to include all levels of government.  26
 It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the United States Supreme Court 
established two standards for regulating actions derived from religious beliefs. The first standard, 
“compelling state interest,” marked government actions permissible if there was a significant 
state interest to regulate a particular matter. This standard was a product of litigation over First 
Amendment freedoms, including speech, religion, and association, during the Cold War fears of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.  The idea that the government needed a “compelling state 27
interest” first appeared in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), in which the Court overturned the 
conviction of the socialist professor, Paul Sweezy, for not answering questions from the New 
Hampshire Attorney General about his lectures or involvement with the Progressive Party.  The 28
“compelling interest” standard held true until Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990), 
when the Court ruled that the government no longer needed to demonstrate a “compelling 
interest” to enforce a law, even in matters regarding the free exercise of religion.  The second 29
standard was the “alternate means” test, first invoked by the Supreme Court in Sherbet v. Verner 
(1963), to rule against the denial of unemployment compensation by South Carolina to a 
Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays. Under this standard, the state had to 
offer an “alternate means” to any conflict in order to respect an individual’s religious obligations. 
 The distinction between religion and non-religion in the United States did not occur 
solely within the courts. The FBI preserved certain boundaries in order to respect the religious 
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expression of individual Quakers. For example, FBI agents did not report on Quaker meetings, 
which they distinguished from AFSC-sponsored gatherings. Their perhaps unintentional effort to 
separate religious from political activity was a challenging feat that they acknowledged in their 
notes on AFSC members. Nineteenth-century government officials, as far as the evidence shows, 
did not infiltrate Mormon religious services. This restraint was likely attributed to the fact that 
Mormon marriages operated under relative secrecy, as they were not even recorded on paper, and 
polygamy was more easily detectable in social interactions than during formal religious rituals. 
 The case of post-September 11 Brooklyn Muslims was distinctive from the first two cases 
in that, although Raza reached a settlement in January 2016, the scope of ongoing government 
surveillance of Muslim Americans remains undetermined. Moreover, the NYPD did not attempt 
to understand Islam through its surveillance program. The Radicalization in the West report 
utilized by the NYPD to surveil Muslim New Yorkers documented this omission. The 
identification of legitimate religious expression in this case study was determined in advance by 
the NYPD report, offering little room for the same kind of deliberation about religion with which 
government agents of the Mormon and Quaker case studies engaged. Federal pressure on the 
NYPD to defend United States national security likely undermined any desire among NYPD 
officers to probe whether the surveillance program respected Islamic religious expression.  
III.  Assessing the Collection of Information  
 Surveillance across historical periods can be characterized by religious themes: the 
vigilant eye, the tracking of movement and actions, and the use of visible and invisible sanctions, 
all of which highlight the connection between religion and observatory media.  Another 30
commonality of monitoring across time is that contemporary surveillance tactics, such as those 
!16
used by the NYPD, are derived from earlier tactics, such as gossiping in the case of the Mormons 
and eavesdropping in the case of the AFSC Quakers. However, monographs dedicated explicitly 
to the history of surveillance of religious organizations in the United States do not exist, nor is 
this analysis a comprehensive history of government surveillance of religious expression. The 
most well-known aspect of governmental surveillance of organizations in the twentieth century 
concerns those subversive groups surveilled under the COINTELPRO program.  Governmental 31
monitoring that occurred during the nineteenth century is less conducive to summary, given that 
government agencies created specifically to surveil individuals and organizations did not emerge 
until the twentieth century. 
 The variance across the three cases showed that the monitoring strategies and objectives 
of the agencies differed. For example, the NYPD operated autonomously in its surveillance 
program, while the FBI collaborated with a network of agencies that collected information of 
interest to them, and then forwarded that intelligence to the FBI. In each of the three cases, the 
government agencies deliberated how to balance the objectives of their monitoring systems with 
their understandings of the three religions.  
 The Mormon case study examines how territorial officials collected information about 
Mormon polygamists, when systematic governmental monitoring commenced and polygamy 
cases entered the United States Supreme Court. The Mormons viewed federally appointed judges 
and other officers situated in the territory with contempt. Working from tip-offs or rumors, 
officials investigated Mormon men they suspected were polygamists. They tried to implicate 
polygamists by observing their living situations or eavesdropping on conversations. Mormon 
leaders were early targets of polygamy investigations by the federal government, but when 
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leaders attempted to evade arrest, federal prosecutors searched for any polygamist they could 
find. 
 Documents discussing the collection of information about polygamy dated from the 
1870s to the 1880s. They included United States Supreme Court polygamy cases, which I 
selected for the detail they provided about how information was collected. The federal 
government began to systematically monitor Mormons in the 1880s. Congress began to more 
actively discuss the Mormon problem, and Mormons appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court from the Supreme Court of the Utah Territory. The overarching concern in the first 
Supreme Court case was the legitimacy of polygamy as a form of religious expression, and after 
that notion was quickly squashed, the legitimacy of the prosecutions of Mormon polygamists 
became the prevailing concern. Federally appointed officials in the Utah Territory, and judges at 
the various levels of the polygamy cases, grappled with an enigmatic culture. They sought to 
preserve sovereignty, which included a moral order characterized by monogamy. 
 Mormons, in turn, argued that marriage was a sacrament rather than a contract, and that 
polygamy was the Mormon sacrament for marriage. This claim about marriage suggested that 
Mormonism was not Protestant, whether or not that was their intention. One Mormon claimed 
that his religion was congruent with Christianity despite the practice of polygamy, but the 
Protestant majority public largely rejected this sort of claim. As Mormon historian Richard 
Bushman has written, “The Protestant establishment in the United States considered plural 
marriage an unpardonable offense against Christian morality and civilized behavior.”  Yet the 32
nineteenth-century Mormons were persistent. In the first Supreme Court case, when polygamy 
had already started to decline among the Mormon population, Mormon leaders unsuccessfully 
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encouraged Reynolds to argue that polygamy was a form of religious expression. Mormons later 
reframed their polygamy arguments in the Supreme Court around topics such as the fairness of 
juries in the original trials, and the legality of the evidence used against them. 
 The second case study on the American Friends Service Committee, which was briefly 
named the Friends National Service Committee during its first month, examines the contents of 
FBI reports on the AFSC from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. I examined the trove of FBI 
documents in the AFSC archives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The first meeting of the AFSC 
united diverse Quaker groups to address pressing global emergencies. The United States had just 
declared war on Germany and its allies, and the Society of Friends anticipated a conflict of 
interest for young Quakers facing the draft. Consequently, the initial objective of the AFSC was 
to provide Quakers with alternatives to compulsory military service. Some members tried to 
locate, visit, and support individuals whose principles conflicted with the mandates of the draft.  33
Within a year, the AFSC amassed enough public support, financial contributions, and volunteers 
to sustain its operations on a larger scale. Today, the AFSC refers to itself as a movement of 
cross-generational individuals committed to a broad range of projects on poverty, inequality, 
injustice, and international relations.   34
 In 1921, the FBI began surveilling the AFSC for its commitment to peace and social 
justice, which allegedly linked its members to communist networks. The first document was 
produced by a New York-based FBI agent who traveled to Philadelphia to investigate possible 
AFSC cooperation with a Russian relief committee. AFSC members actively engaged in relief 
work and intellectual collaboration with people and communities from around the world, 
regardless of the political landscape. While the particularities of AFSC projects varied 
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throughout the twentieth century, the FBI feared that AFSC activities would encourage the 
growth of communism within the country. 
 Throughout the period during which the FBI surveilled the AFSC, the FBI relied on 
information from other government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Navy, National Security Agency (NSA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which 
transmitted information to the FBI. Undercover FBI agents attended protests, academic 
conferences, and public lectures featuring or hosted by prominent AFSC leaders. Some of these 
intelligence agencies relayed clips from mass media publications to the FBI, many of which were 
sent to them by fearful citizens inquiring about the alleged communist nature of the AFSC. The 
FBI often answered these citizen letters, some of which came from non-east coast members of 
the Society of Friends who disagreed with the projects of the AFSC. 
 The extent to which the AFSC represented the Society of Friends appeared in the 
documents under J. Edgar Hoover’s supervision, shaping how the FBI approached AFSC 
activities. The case of the AFSC Quakers constituted a crucial example of how the federal 
government determined whether AFSC subversive actions were based on Quakerism, and what 
the implications were of such a correlation. The uncertainty of the FBI about the religious nature 
of the AFSC reminds us that the conditions for protecting religious expression has changed 
through time. 
  Government agents who deliberated protecting Mormon and Quaker expression 
contrasted with the NYPD officers, who did not readily consider Islamic expression. The 
Radicalization in the West NYPD report outlined how to detect a Muslim terrorist, which lacked 
both credible evidence and insight into the mind of a terrorist, Muslim or otherwise. The 2011 
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Associated Press release had also instigated a related federal lawsuit in New Jersey, Hassan v. 
City of New York, based on NYPD surveillance of Muslim Americans. District Judge William 
Martini of Hassan claimed that the plaintiffs’ injuries stemmed not from surveillance itself, but 
from the exposure of the surveillance program by the Associated Press.  Judge Martini wrote in 35
the Hassan decision: “None of the Plaintiffs’ injuries arose until after the Associated Press 
released unredacted [sic], confidential NYPD documents and articles expressing its own 
interpretation of those documents. Nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that they 
suffered harm prior to the unauthorized release of the documents by the Associated Press. This 
confirms that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries flow from the Associated Press's unauthorized disclosure 
of the documents. The harms are not ‘fairly traceable’ to any act of surveillance.”  The 36
statement would have been less surprising had it been offered by a representative of the NYPD, 
but this strategy of blaming the press for harms done by illegal government surveillance was not 
original. 
 The FBI of the mid-twentieth century avoided contact with journalists of certain 
newspapers in fear of criticism about FBI surveillance practices. J. Edgar Hoover placed the New 
York Times and the Washington Post on a “Do Not Contact” list when the newspapers refused to 
write bad reviews of the first critical book about Hoover and the FBI.  The NYPD, unlike the 37
FBI, is a municipal institution, but its Muslim surveillance program mirrored FBI and CIA 
surveillance policies. The NYPD of post-September 11 New York also embraced the secretive, 
unchecked surveillance that the FBI had once utilized in the days of J. Edgar Hoover. What was 
original about the blaming of the press in Raza, on the other hand, was that Muslims themselves 
claimed the Associated Press revelations stigmatized their mosques and non-profit organizations.  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 The primary means for collecting information in the Raza case were the efforts of NYPD 
plainclothes officers and a nineteen-year-old informant. In order to gain the trust of the 
communities the informant was infiltrating, he showed interest in their mosques and community 
groups. The informant was instructed, among other tasks, to listen to conversations in mosques 
and among Muslim youths outside of the mosques; listen for buzzwords such as jihad or 
revolution; report radical rhetoric; photograph imams and congregants in mosques; collect cell 
phone numbers of congregants; and photograph the names of people who attended study groups 
and classes on Islam. Surveillance cameras provided supplemental information to the NYPD. 
 The Muslim case study was, in some ways, more straightforward than the first two case 
studies. The NYPD admitted to its surveillance program in the Raza case, but refused to agree 
with the plaintiffs that it based its investigations on Islamic affiliation. The NYPD operated as an 
autonomous agent, as opposed to the network of surveilling agents involved in combatting 
nineteenth-century polygamy. The cameras surveilling the plaintiffs of Raza were easily located, 
in contrast to the rumors and social networks used as sources of information in the Mormon case. 
 However, it was also more difficult to analyze the recent past. The impact of the recent 
Raza decision on Muslim American communities in New York was impossible to confirm 
conclusively, as surveillance continues to exist in the city. But the fact that the NYPD produced 
the Radicalization in the West report, which was different in that it explicitly taught police 
officers how to detect a terrorist through a four-phase checklist, starkly contrasted with the first 
two case studies, in which there were no definitive models for predicting subversion.  
 Despite the distinctive challenges to analyzing each case study, a commonality emerged 
in the boundaries drawn by government agents within all three of them. In the case of the 
!22
Mormons, for instance, domestic networks and spaces were targeted, but the questions that 
judges and congressmen posed about Mormon theology suggested they were more inquisitive 
about Mormon culture than were NYPD officers about Islamic customs. The primary undercover 
NYPD informant asked pointed questions about political opinions rather than nuanced questions 
about what it meant to be a Muslim, or how various tenants of Islamic faith shaped the actions of 
Muslims. In the case of the AFSC Quakers, the majority of face-to-face surveillance occurred 
neither in domestic nor worship spaces, but in open, public gatherings. The FBI also consulted 
AFSC publications, newspaper articles, and mail correspondence, and agents at times challenged 
the authority of J. Edgar Hoover. Post-September 11 NYPD officers utilized a predetermined 
framework for detecting Islamic terrorism without challenging the authority from which the 
report came. The revelation that NYPD informants and undercover agents had permeated 
Muslim communities deterred Muslim Americans from attending mosques and community 
events, as they feared being incriminated in crimes with which they had no association. 
 This chilling effect described by Muslim Americans, or the effect of state actions on 
public expression, was first invoked in the Supreme Court in 1952 in Wieman v. Updegraff, when 
the Court unanimously struck down a state statute that mandated people applying to state jobs to 
swear an oath that they had not affiliated with designated subversive organizations within the 
past five years. From then on, judicial opinions referenced the chilling effect when discussing 
free expression.  At this time, government officials rescinded offers of employment from 38
suspicious individuals, or placed them on banned or investigative lists.  Courts began 39
responding to governmental censorship by creating First Amendment protections against state 
stifling of speech, especially speech pertaining to communism or the civil rights movement. Such 
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methods of suppressing expression in the mid-twentieth century were far more subtle than the 
surveillance of Muslims in Brooklyn, where the NYPD infiltrated mosques and surveilled 
individuals who were not directly suspected of terrorism. But the legacy of political surveillance 
in the United States undoubtedly shaped the discussions about the surveillance of AFSC and 
Muslim communities. The preoccupation by FBI agents about whether the AFSC was a Quaker 
organization reflected this uncertain boundary between political and religious activity, as did the 
fact that the legal precedent for Raza was the 1985 Handschu settlement, which resolved illegal 
political surveillance in New York. 
 Finally, the ethical dilemma at the core of each of these case studies was that government 
monitoring of a handful of leaders within each community prompted the unchecked 
investigations of others sharing that religious or institutional affiliation. The Mormon case study 
was a bit different in that officials first focused on entire communities, followed by Mormon 
leaders, and then communities once again when polygamy had already started to decline. The 
unproven communist ties of some prominent AFSC Quakers instigated broad surveillance of 
AFSC personnel. The actions of a handful of radical Islamic terrorists implicated entire Muslim 
communities across the greater New York City area, not to mention the United States. By 
focusing on the monitoring of individuals who share a religious affiliation, historically and today, 
we can assess broader patterns about the evolving thresholds and circumstances for surveillance. 
Assessing the historical protection of religious expression in the face of polygamy, communism, 
and terrorism provides a small but significant step toward understanding, and ideally minimizing,  
unbounded government surveillance in the United States.  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Chapter 2. The Mormons of the Territory of Utah: Distinguishing Between Belief and Action 
“From the start, Latter-day Saints have maintained a relatively high but usually manageable level 
of tension with their surrounding society.”  — Rodney Stark, The Rise of Mormonism (2005)  40
I.  Introduction  
 Nineteenth-century Mormon leaders struggled with United States territorial and federal 
lawmakers over the autonomy of the Church of Latter-day Saints. Utah was granted statehood in 
1896, marking the culmination of that struggle. The Territory of Utah, created in 1850, extended 
east to the Rocky Mountains, west to the Sierra Nevada Mountains, north to the forty-second 
parallel, and south to the thirty-seventh parallel. The size of the Territory of Utah was reduced in 
1861, when the western Rockies were transferred to the Colorado Territory, and the northeastern 
corner was transferred to the Wyoming Territory.  When placed on a contemporary map of the 41
United States, the northern and southern boundaries spanned modern-day Nevada, Utah, 
southwestern Wyoming, and western Colorado. 
 Federal officers, judges, and congressmen launched a comprehensive strategic campaign 
against the Utah Mormons by monitoring suspected polygamists and questioning their ability to 
adapt to American society. This chapter examines the rationale for such monitoring practices and 
the court cases that ensued, which both directly and indirectly considered the monitoring 
practices in the Mormons’ varied arguments about the freedom of religious expression or unfair 
trials and juries. Individual authors in the early to mid-nineteenth century expressed similar 
skepticism about the Mormons in mass media publications. Nationwide anti-Mormon sentiment 
encompassed concerns about women’s rights and slavery. It was in this environment of pervasive 
anti-Mormonism that the United States Supreme Court first distinguished between faith and 
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action, and interpreted the extent of the free exercise of religion in the First Amendment. This 
distinction resulted in an important legal precedent for years to follow. Sovereignty over the 
Territory of Utah formed the core of the polygamy debates, particularly in the event that the 
territory was granted statehood. Polygamy was a non-democratic institution that would have 
clashed with the rest of the nation, and was therefore not just a threat to the family structure of 
the United States, but to United States governance. 
 Federal officers collected information in the territories, lawmakers advocated anti-
polygamy legislation, and members of the judiciary ironed out the distinction between belief and 
action in the First Amendment. Mormon leaders, in turn, believed that characterizing polygamy 
as a religious practice granted them the best defense against judicial and legislative interference. 
Cultural bias and opposition to polygamy emanated from many networks, including those of 
writers, women’s groups, religious leaders, and politicians, but legislative and judicial 
enforcement did not effectively combat polygamy until the early 1880s. The three case studies of 
this dissertation constitute a broader narrative about the shifting constitutional guarantee of 
religious freedom, in which the distinction between belief and action regarding polygamy in the 
Supreme Court cases is a key theme.  One of the surprising findings from this case study was the 
willingness of non-Mormons to seriously consider the Mormon argument about polygamy. 
However, this consideration did not match the reliance of federal officials on spying and gossip 
to monitor polygamists in the Territory of Utah. 
 The authors of an 1842 editorial published in a New Orleans newspaper, The Daily 
Picayune, contemplated the future of Mormonism. It was likely penned by a combination of the 
founders of the Picayune, F. A. Lumsden and General George Wilkins Kendall, partners in 
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Lumsden, Kendall & Co., and the manager of the paper, Colonel A. M. Holbrook, all of whose 
names were listed on the front page where the editorial was printed. Frederic Hudson, a leading 
American journalist and longtime editor for the New York Herald, known for his innovative use 
of horses, trains, and the telegraph to expedite the transferral of information to the Herald,  42
wrote that the Picayune quickly became popular due to Kendall’s pleasant, terse writing style.  43
After pondering the role of religious liberty in the United States since the Constitution, the 
authors stated that constraints mitigated the impact of outlandish religious beliefs: “But happily 
the freedom of religious opinion, like the freedom of the press, always carries an antidote with it 
which is of crushing the bane that the fraud, folly, or licentiousness of either might engender.”   44
 They further raised the possibility of “new fangled sects and outré religious associations,” 
which “start up in the greatest numbers, and thrive, for a time, at least, with most luxurious 
growth,”  categorizing Mormonism as unusual and peripheral to the Christian center of the 45
United States. Despite having no firsthand interaction with the Mormon people, the article 
offered a glimpse into the mindset of how the above-educated American citizen might have 
viewed Mormonism: as an odd, deplorable, distant religion that would deteriorate with time. The 
authors also mused on the distinction between Mormons’ “mere religious opinions” and the 
ongoing continuation of their doctrinal practices, a distinction that mirrored the belief-action 
dichotomy that would later feature prominently in the first polygamy case in the United States 
Supreme Court: 
If the stories of the Mormons be true, they are a dissolute, profligate, abandoned set; and 
while we would have them visited with the most strict surveillance of the civil law, in 
every instance in which they violate it, we would be opposed to interfering with their 
mere religious opinions, however absurd and unscriptural they may be, as we would also 
be against inflicting on them any penal disability for the profession of them. But late 
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accounts show that their detestable doctrines—for detestable they seem to be—are 
destined to be short-lived, and to prematurely fall before the genius of unfettered liberty 
of conscience and universal intelligence.  46
Journalists and writers of the mid-nineteenth century sometimes used the term surveillance to 
refer to the monitoring of Mormons by other Mormons: “No man in Utah escapes the 
surveillance of the secret police, unless it be Brigham Young himself.”  The Springfield 47
Republican newspaper editor, Samuel Bowles, observed from traveling through the American 
West that Mormons were under “such strict surveillance and authority that most of them would 
not even dare to disobey or protest” the autocratic authority under which they lived.  48
 The authors of the Picayune article, however, used the term surveillance to characterize a 
legal framework for assessing the social norms of the Mormons. They predicted the controversial 
tenets of Mormonism would dwindle through time and, consequently, that Mormon culture was 
not threatening to civil society. The credibility of this assertion might have been perceived as 
tenuous. The authors admitted upfront that their knowledge of Mormons relied purely on stories. 
Moreover, the “unfettered liberty of conscience and universal intelligence” of fellow citizens, 
rather than the hand of the law, would prevent polygamy from permeating the states. All that 
being said, they advised against violating Mormons’ religious beliefs, regardless of how odd 
such beliefs might seem. 
 Theodore Schroeder, the prominent non-Mormon lawyer and free speech advocate who 
was integral to the early foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), defended 
polygamy more explicitly. Schroeder has been regarded as having accomplished more for free 
expression in America than any single person.  His collection of books and pamphlets on the 49
Saints was also one of the most complete outside of official Church circles.  He became 50
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skeptical of religion when his Catholic mother was disowned by her family for marrying a 
Lutheran. While traveling through Utah, he connected his mother’s experience with religion to 
the persecution of the Mormons. Schroeder’s sympathy for the Mormons initiated his legal 
career in Salt Lake City. 
 Despite his initial defense of the Mormons, he changed his mind upon seeing how they 
treated their apostates, as well as how sexuality factored into the religion. As historian David 
Brudnoy mused, Schroeder’s pro-Mormon and subsequent anti-polygamy stance culminated with 
his legal assistance to Utah statehood: “Mormonism puzzled him. . . . Certain Mormon beliefs 
and practices disturbed him; against these he waged his warfare . . . [H]e discerned nothing of the 
scientific temper or method in polygamy, which seemed to him the outstanding feature of the 
faith.”  He began writing anti-Mormon diatribes and founded his journal, Lucifer’s Lantern, to 51
publish them from 1898 to 1900.  52
 Schroeder’s later legal career, in which he focused on defending free speech, followed his 
circulation of an anti-Mormon pamphlet that was marked as obscene literature. Schroeder most 
prominently took part in Mormon affairs by blocking the polygamist Brigham Roberts from 
taking his seat in Congress.  Uniquely, however, Brudnoy remarked that while most anti-53
Mormons fought Mormonism with the support of a specific Christian denomination, “Schroeder 
crusaded against Mormonism without benefit of clergy,”  attacking them from an “agnostic, 54
rather than a traditional perspective.”  Schroeder’s underlying concern was the relationship 55
between church and state, rather than the perils specific to Mormonism. 
 Schroeder advocated judicial activism to defend free speech through this non-religious 
approach. He believed that expression was an individual liberty protected by the First 
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Amendment.  He, however, considered polygamy as a form of action. Defending a free speech 56
appeal on behalf of the Free Speech League, an organization founded in 1902, Schroeder placed 
Mormonism alongside other American religions, seemingly protecting Mormons’ right to beliefs 
that he personally found detestable: “All stand equal before the law, the Protestant, Catholic, 
Mormon, Mohammedan, the Jew, the Free Thinker, the Atheist. Whatever may be the view of the 
majority of the people the court has no right and the majority has no right to force that view upon 
the minority, however small.”  57
 Mormons themselves never cited free speech as a legal recourse, but they were angered 
by the judicial interpretations of the law and by what they professed to be legislative violations 
of their religious expression. Children were questioned about their parents, families were coerced 
to testify against each other, and spies peered into men’s family relations.  The 1886 diary of a 58
young Mormon man recounted the arrest of his father who answered the door expecting a friend, 
but instead was greeted by an officer: “Imagine his surprise when a stranger accosted him by 
saying, ‘I arrest you in the name of the law.’”  However, as Utah prisons increasingly filled with 59
Mormons, polygamy sentences became a mark of honor. Mormon wards organized gatherings in 
honor of those departing or returning. Newly imprisoned polygamists were initiated into the 
jailed brotherhood by entertaining fellow Mormon prisoners with songs, dances, speeches, or 
other performances.  By resisting obedience to the law, according to historian David Bitton, 60
Mormons believed they were defending polygamy as a form of religious expression, and as 
martyrs and true defenders of the Constitution.   61
 Information collection has played a crucial role in the historical relationship between 
individuals and their governing realms.  Philip H. J. Davies has written that the problem of 62
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organizing large-scale governmental intelligence is that multiple agencies necessarily piece 
together “fragmentary and incomplete information into as coherent a picture as possible.”  The 63
nineteenth-century system for monitoring the Mormons in the Territory of Utah worked to 
articulate a concept of what it meant and what it would mean to be an American by eradicating 
polygamy prior to Utah statehood. Meanwhile, the Mormons attempted to forge their own 
distinctive American path.  
II.  Overview of the Legislative and Judicial Campaign 
 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was founded in 1830 in western New 
York by Joseph Smith. Mormonism remained largely unmentioned in government publications 
and newspaper articles until the 1840s, when the Latter-day Saints started practicing polygamy. 
John C. Bennett, one of Joseph Smith’s former trusted advisers who left the Church after serving 
as city mayor of Nauvoo, Illinois, published Smith’s polygamous doctrine in newspapers and 
magazines in 1842.  The details of polygamy and other information about Mormonism from 64
Bennett’s four-letter series later developed into his exposé, the History of the Saints.  The book 65
was widely circulated, claiming to reveal the secret polygamy practices of Nauvoo.  This exposé 66
of Mormonism and its founder depicted an otherwise mysterious culture to the American public. 
Most Mormons believed Smith’s denial in the exposé that he was a polygamist.  Though 67
Bennett’s depiction of polygamy was generally accurate, he offered little support to his claim that 
Mormons were planning a “territorial conquest.”  Nonetheless, the federal government sensed 68
the threat of Mormon political, cultural, and economic autonomy that prompted its legislative 
and judicial campaign against polygamy. 
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 In July 1847, the Latter-day Saints arrived in the Salt Lake Valley, a few months before 
the area of Utah and much of the American Southwest was transferred from Mexico to the 
United States. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo finalized this transfer on February 2, 1848. The 
Saints of the Utah area petitioned the United States for statehood in 1849, but their petition was 
denied. However, a portion of the Compromise of 1850 created the Territory of Utah, signed into 
law by President Millard Fillmore on September 9, 1850. The act established a territorial 
legislature and delegate to Congress, as well as major offices appointed by the president, 
including territorial governor, secretary of the territory, United States marshal, United States 
attorney, chief justice, associate justice, and superintendent of Indian affairs. Residents of the 
territories often resented this policy, since they were unable to elect their own government 
officials. In particular, conflicts arose between territorial judges and locally elected county 
officials.  69
 Federal troops invaded the Territory of Utah in 1857 under President Buchanan’s orders. 
President Buchanan, in an address to Congress the following year, claimed there was reason to 
believe, based on a report from the non-Mormon Governor Alfred Cumming, that the Mormon 
problem had ended and laws had been restored in Utah. The culmination of the Mormon 
problem, he claimed, would “afford some relief to the treasury at a time demanding from us the 
strictest economy” because they would be able to tax Mormons.  Some anti-polygamists held 70
the view that dismantling the perceived monopoly of the economy of Utah would weaken 
Mormons’ autonomy from the United States and, consequently, unravel the institution of 
polygamy.  71
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 The first law to explicitly target polygamy was the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act. By 
reining in polygamy, the act was a departure from the conventions of organizing territorial 
governments. Sponsored by Representative Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont, the act banned 
bigamy, the marriage of one person while already married to another. Additionally, religious 
institutions could not hold real estate worth more than fifty thousand dollars. Little debate 
preceded the passing of the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, as it had previously been debated when 
first introduced by Morrill during Buchanan’s administration. Morrill compared Mormonism to 
Islam while debunking the rationale that the First Amendment protected polygamy, claiming: 
“Under the guise of religion, this people has established, and seek to maintain and perpetuate, a 
Mohammedan barbarism revolting to the civilized world.”  These kinds of statements by white 72
Protestants, published in Senate proceedings and medical reports, suggested that Mormonism 
both theologically and racially deviated from mainstream culture.  73
 Race factored into the Mormon debates not just in comparisons of Mormons to Muslims, 
or Mohammedans, but also in comparisons of polygamy to slavery. Congressmen disagreed on 
whether polygamy and slavery similarly obstructed state sovereignty and religious freedom. 
Southern slaveholders attempted to show the compatibility of slavery with Christian morality, 
while some Mormons claimed polygamy protected women from spinsterhood, prostitution, or 
inferior marriages.  President Lincoln consulted Thomas Jefferson’s writings on religious 74
freedom and The Book of the Mormon to assess the complexity of polygamy. He also consulted 
ex-Mormon John Hyde about the economic and emotional struggles of polygamous families.  
 Lincoln eventually signed the bill but did not enforce it. Abraham Lincoln, according to 
historian Richard S. Van Wagoner, wanted to destroy polygamy, not the Mormon people.  He 75
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needed the cooperation of Mormons in Utah for the Civil War to, in particular, protect the 
telegraph and mail companies. The link between the Mormons and the telegraph was 
multifaceted. The Deseret Telegraph Line was the only documented major regional line to be 
built and run by a church.  Moreover, the Mormons promoted the economic welfare and 76
preserved the cultural unity of their commonwealth through the telegraph.   77
 Lincoln responded to a Mormon journalist and missionary, Thomas Brown Holmes 
Stenhouse,  about this mutual cooperation in the context of clearing timber from a field: 78
“Occasionally we would come to a log that had fallen down. It was too hard to split, too wet to 
burn, and too heavy to move, so we ploughed around it. That’s what I intend to do with the 
Mormons. Tell Brigham Young that if he will let me alone, I will let him alone.”  Lincoln 79
allowed Brigham Young to ignore the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act in exchange for the Mormons’ 
cooperation in the war effort. Consequently, the act was largely ineffective.  
 As a result of these kinds of exchanges, Utah functioned as a buffer for the Mormons 
from tension with the moral establishment until after the Civil War.  After the Civil War, as legal 80
historian Sarah Barringer Gordon has written, federally appointed officials actively complained 
to Washington about polygamy and the Saints’ control of law and politics.  Lincoln’s restraint 81
from curtailing polygamy was a form of strategic governance. Federal policies carried out by 
states and localities supplemented what seemingly lack of federal constraint existed in the 
territories of the growing nation.  82
 In the twenty years following the passing of the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, only two 
Mormon polygamists were indicted, rendering the act largely ineffective during this time. In 
response to its ineffectiveness, the Territory of Utah legislature petitioned Congress in 1867 to 
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repeal the act. Congressmen interpreted this petition as an attempt to legitimize polygamy. When 
House Judiciary Committee investigated the matter, it revealed that judges in Utah were not 
enforcing the act.  Mormons would continue to control local courts in Utah until the early 83
1870s. 
 Despite this discovery of legal inefficacy, the federal government would not fully revamp 
the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act until the 1882 Edmunds Act reinforced it. However, in the 
meantime, President Grant removed control of the Utah courts from territorial and federal 
judicial officers through the 1874 Poland Act, which was sponsored by Senator Luke P. Poland 
from Vermont. This act transferred jurisdiction over all cases in the Territory of Utah exclusively 
to the United States federal district courts, while revoking territorial judicial office positions held 
by Saints. The Poland Act also replaced the territorial marshal and attorney positions with United 
States Marshals and United States Attorneys. This shift in power in the Territory of Utah, in 
conjunction with the Edmunds Act, allowed for the upsurge in polygamy indictments in the 
1880s. 
 The 1882 Edmunds Act, authored by Senator George F. Edmunds from Vermont and 
signed into law by President Chester Arthur, fined or imprisoned individuals found guilty of 
polygamy and unlawful cohabitation. Most significantly, the act removed the burden of needing 
to prove that multiple marriages actually occurred, which was crucial to the federal campaign 
against polygamy since so little written evidence of polygamy actually existed within Mormon 
communities. It also made it impossible for convicted polygamists to vote, participate in a jury, 
or hold public office. The number of polygamy convictions increased drastically in 1882. Four 
polygamists were convicted in 1884, followed by fifty-five in 1885, one hundred and thirty-two 
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in 1886, and two hundred and twenty in 1887. By the end of 1888, nearly six hundred Mormons 
had been fined or imprisoned.  Polygamists were increasingly convicted during these years 84
because the Civil War was over, which removed the political protections that the Mormons had 
once possessed. The longterm objective of culturally remolding Utah reemerged as a viable 
possibility. 
 The 1882 Edmunds Act also established the Utah Commission, a five-person board that 
developed, administered, and enforced laws in the territory. Edmunds anticipated the 
Commission would only last a year, but it lasted for fourteen years until Utah became a state in 
1896. The power of the Commission expanded with the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, which 
transferred much of the property of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to the United 
States federal government. Moreover, witnesses were forced to attend polygamy trials, while 
Mormons were blocked from voting, serving on juries, or holding public office until they signed 
oaths stating they abided to anti-polygamy laws. Women’s suffrage in Utah was voided, and 
children born to plural marriages after a year of the act were disinherited. It was, finally, this 
commission that, as formally acknowledged in the Utah state archives today, secured funds to 
allow United States marshals and “spotters,” or spies, to work together to locate “cohabs,” or 
polygamist Mormons living in cohabitation.  With the new law as well as supervisory power of 85
the Utah Commission, “federal judges in Utah launched the first sustained offensive against 
polygamists,” while marshals chased “cohabs” across the territory.  86
 When the 1882 Edmunds Act was passed, James Wells Stillman, a lawyer and Rhode 
Island state legislator, spoke in Boston in defense of Mormon polygamy even though he himself 
was not a polygamist: “I will defend their right to believe and practice it, as firmly as I will 
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defend the right of one who believes in monogamy to adopt and practice that form of domestic 
life.”  Stillman did not believe that polygamy was a moral issue, but rather a “question of taste 87
or expediency.”  He questioned how the Utah Commission collected information. The mission 88
of the board was to determine who was a polygamist, but according to Stillman, such 
determinations were based on hearsay evidence or no evidence at all, “thus overriding this 
provision of the Constitution which guarantees every man the right of trial by jury.”  His point 89
is indicative of a larger problem of the system for monitoring the Mormons: credible evidence 
was hard to find. 
 The first version of Senator Edmunds’s bill, prior to the 1882 Edmunds Act, had been 
“reported favorably to the Senate from the Judiciary Committee,” and depicted an internal 
monitoring system in which the wives of charged polygamists would testify against their 
husbands “as to all matters except confidential communications made by him to her.”  Charles 90
William Bennett, who was likely the same non-Mormon Grand Master of the Wasatch Lodge, of 
the Grand Lodge of Ancient, Free, and Accepted Masons of Utah,  argued that monogamy 91
should be protected. Yet, like Stillman, Bennett critiqued the evidence used against Mormons in 
court. He explained that legal enforcement should preserve the trust between husbands and 
wives, and between Mormons and the federal marshals: “In prosecuting polygamists our aim 
should be to conserve the sacredness of wedlock between one man and one woman—to protect 
monogamous households. […] The common—the sacred law of that household is that neither 
member shall be compelled to testify against the other, and thus introduce discord into that 
sacred precinct. But by this provision it is proposed to remove this protection, to invade that 
lawful home, which is the very thing we so much wish to protect. It is cruel because, deny it as 
!41
they may, lawful wives of polygamists are wronged heart-broken women.”  Bennett, despite his 92
defense of Mormon women, portrayed them as passive and ignorant: “They will tell you with all 
the religious enthusiasm, that they believe in polygamy, that it is their cross, which they must 
bear as the price of eternal exaltation. Could a woman’s heart more emphatically proclaim that 
her woman’s instincts were violated.”  Mormon women spoke directly on polygamy when 93
solicited as witnesses to their husbands’ trials. Yet as noted, they actually benefitted from 
significant agency in their communities, despite their alternative marital roles. For instance, they 
assembled at great mass meetings to address the systemic oppression of their Mormon 
communities.  94
 The Springfield Republican newspaper editor and women’s rights advocate, Samuel 
Bowles, referred to direct conversations with women about polygamy during his three thousand-
mile journey west in 1865.  Through his interrogations, he was likely trying to draw out the 95
connection between the concurrent women’s rights, anti-slavery, and anti-polygamy movements. 
Bowles wrote, “Many, perhaps most of both sexes really believe in it as a religious duty; but I 
find this part of their religion much easier and more acceptable to the men than to the women. 
The former go to the sacrifice with a certain brutal joy; the latter with a hard, sad resignation.”  96
According to Bowles, one Mormon woman claimed: “‘Lord Jesus has laid a heavy trail upon 
me . . . but I mean to bear it for His sake, and for the glory He will grant me in His kingdom.’”  97
Ultimately, Bowles admitted, “we had little direct communication with the women of the Saints; 
but their testimony came to us in a hundred ways, sad, tragic, heart-rending.”  One woman 98
claimed, “with bated breath: ‘Polygamy is tolerable enough for the men, but it is hell for the 
women.’”  99
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 Mormon leaders, who were early targets of the federal investigations of polygamy, tried 
to evade arrest. Other Mormon leaders diligently defended their indicted community members. 
Prominent Mormon leaders started hiding in the Underground, a network of secret houses they 
built to avoid arrest. Church leaders slept in hay ricks, hid under floorboards, and conducted their 
business away from Salt Lake City. According to one polygamist’s diary, Mormon leaders in the 
Underground developed a code to communicate with aboveground helpers about deputies and 
ongoing charges against their fellow Mormons. Federal prosecutors complained that since 
Mormons controlled the railroad and the Deseret Telegraph Company in the Territory of Utah, 
polygamists in hiding knew the prosecutors’ moves in advance. For example, polygamist George 
Q. Cannon once escaped officials by jumping from a train traveling from Nevada to Utah. Fellow 
polygamist Lorenzo Snow was found hiding in a secret room below his living room floor.  100
 Prominent Mormons such as Cannon and Snow would hide for days at a time in Mormon 
houses and barns. Others even left the country, seeking asylum in Mexico, Canada, and 
Hawaii.  Mormon historians have observed that the daily affairs of the church were left to the 101
non-polygamist majority, who communicated with Mormon leaders in the Underground through 
letters and nighttime visits, moving freely as intermediaries and guards of the hidden 
polygamists.  Mormon leaders’ withdrawal to the Underground was a reference to pre-Civil 102
War understandings of freedom and slavery.  The sociologist and grandson of Brigham Young, 103
Kimball Young, has added that many polygamists used false names, disguises, and ruses while 
partaking in a “whole system of information gathering, signaling, and spotting informers.”  104
Newspapers like the Salt Lake Tribune reported on the Underground system, surmising in an 
1885 article that the Mormons had organized their own “Bureau of Information” intelligence 
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system through which they would “collect information and report the same to the church 
authorities touching on the prosecution of polygamists, and to enter the names of all informers on 
polygamists in a black book, to spot such grand jurors and witnesses as in any way aid in the 
prosecution of saints.”  105
 In November 1885, United States Marshal Edwin Ireland wrote to the Attorney General 
in Washington that the Mormon counterintelligence system impeded arrest and convictions, 
warning people in advance about the presence of deputy marshals on trains, and instructing 
Mormon sheriffs and deputies to watch federal officers. Occasionally, first wives reported their 
husbands as revenge for marital conflicts, and neighbors volunteered as informants. To 
complicate matters further, local Mormon policemen, including town constables, marshals, or 
deputy marshals, sometimes double-crossed their colleagues and impeded the arrests of 
polygamists.  106
 The federal government switched its strategy in the second half of the 1880s, from 
targeting Mormon leaders who hid in the Underground to arresting any polygamist man, 
regardless of his status within the Church hierarchy. As a result, Mormons began lying or 
concealing certain truths. Some Mormon men lied about their relationships, frustrating federal 
officials who were stationed in the Territory of Utah. Mormon women at times also lied in court, 
or they were actively forgetful. These strategies did not necessarily relieve their husbands from 
punishment, but they did salvage many women, and by default their children, from dealing with 
the judicial rulings against polygamists. Women were, nonetheless, prosecuted for perjury.  The 107
combination of Mormon leaders hiding in the Underground along with uncooperative witnesses 
coerced federal marshals to search for polygamy in more remote settlements of the territories.  108
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Non-elite Mormons, who did not have the economic freedom to abandon their public lives and 
hide, became primary targets. This system was slow, expensive, and often ineffective. 
 Moreover, it was hard to prove multiple marriages due to the lack of written or printed 
documentation of Mormon marriages. As a result, prosecutors rephrased the charge they used 
against Mormons from marriage to living situations. Instead of charging Mormons with 
polygamy, they charged them with unlawful cohabitation, the act of living with more than one 
woman. Officers gathered testimonial evidence that suggested Mormon men cohabited with 
more than one woman. By segregating the charge of polygamy into multiple offenses, they were 
able to increase the number of charges and expand the sentencing. Religious and legal scholar 
Catharine Cookson has succinctly summarized the process: “Prosecutors proposed, and courts 
adopted, clever practices and theories aimed at hastening ‘justice’ (i.e. convictions) and 
harshening penalties.”  While this strategy was used to indict polygamist Lorenzo Snow, for 109
instance, Mormon leaders eventually persuaded the Supreme Court in 1887 to stop dividing 
offenses into multiple ones.  110
 The frustration of federal officials and the courts in dealing with the Underground system 
reached anti-polygamists in Congress, who began to introduce harsher legislation. In the 1860 
report to the House Judiciary Committee, congressman Thomas Nelson proclaimed that when the 
Founders crafted the free exercise of religion ideal, “they did not mean to dignify with the name 
of religion a tribe of Latter Day Saints disgracing that hallowed name, and wickedly imposing 
upon the credulity of mankind.”  However, another congressman, Representative Thayer, 111
predicted that passing the original anti-polygamy bill of 1860 that prohibited polygamy could 
provoke claims of civil rights abuses against Mormons: “[I]t would give the Mormons reason to 
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charge that we have made use of persecution against them, driving them to the mountains and 
hunting them like partridges, or that it would inevitably prolong the existence of the institution 
which it proposes to abolish.”  As it became known that some Mormon women were not 112
victims of polygamy but instead willing participators, anti-polygamists on the east coast became 
increasingly critical of Mormonism.  113
 Mormon men from Utah, Idaho, and Arizona assembled in 1885 to appeal for 
constitutional and religious liberty due to what they perceived as abusive treatment by federal 
officials.  Mormons were subjected to a variety of abuses, including the spotters who followed 114
them around and peered through their windows; children who were questioned about their 
parents’ marital relations; forced testimonies of families to commissioners and grand juries; 
Mormon women whose personal, sexual lives were exposed; and men who were bribed to work 
up cases against their neighbors. The writings of Mormon bishop John D. Lee, published after 
his death, corroborated the accounts that some Mormons suspected they were monitored: “When 
a Gentile came into town he was looked upon with suspicion, and most of the people considered 
every stranger a spy from the United States army.”  Mormons responded with their own system 115
of spying on officers and Mormon apostates: “They were not only on the track of officers, but all 
suspected characters who might come on to spy out what was going on.”  Orson Ferguson 116
Whitney, a historian, politician, and member of the governing Mormon body, the Quorum of 
Twelve Apostles, proclaimed in an address at the mass meeting that Mormons accused of 
polygamy were guilty until they proved themselves innocent.  Whitney’s previous experiences 117
of reporting and editing for Utah’s oldest daily newspaper, the Deseret News, suggested he likely 
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understood the power of effective communication through mass media. His proclamation to the 
President of the United States was a late and unsuccessful attempt to save polygamy. 
 Polygamy formally disappeared from the United States in 1890. The Mormon Church, by 
this point, could not conduct its affairs with most of its leaders disenfranchised, imprisoned, or in 
hiding. On September 25, 1890, the President of the Mormon Church, Wilford Woodruff, issued 
a Manifesto declaring that the Mormon Church had stopped teaching polygamy and prohibited 
its practice among its members.   118
 With the legislative support of the 1882 Edmunds Act and its subsequent revised form, 
the 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act, federal judges and justices collaborated in a systemic campaign 
against polygamy. More than twelve thousand Mormons in the Territory of Utah were 
disenfranchised as a result of the Edmunds-Tucker Act, including those who practiced polygamy, 
those who refused to swear against polygamy, and all Mormon women. Government officials had 
to balance religious tolerance with their information gathering practices. Congressmen and 
Supreme Court justices made a concerted effort to treat the Mormons fairly in the midst of a 
monumental legal decision, but ultimately, polygamy was considered irreconcilable with 
American society. 
III.  Spotting and Securing the Nation 
 The Mormon family structure challenged the separation of female public and private 
spheres in American culture, since Mormon women occupied distinctive maternal roles.  The 119
demands placed on Mormon husbands to embark on church missions or attend to other families 
elevated wives to leadership positions. Within the network of Latter-day Saints auxiliary 
organizations, women had more opportunities to assume leadership roles in public spaces.  Yet 120
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federal concern about the Mormons focused less on the contentiousness of Mormon marital 
norms than on the possibility of Mormon citizenship. The long retreat of the Church of Latter-
day Saints from polygamy, as well as from economic and political autonomy, has been 
characterized by historian Gustive Larson as the “Americanization of Utah.”  Preparing Utah 121
and its inhabitants for statehood was the underlying concern about Mormon polygamy. 
 Mormons and United States marshals, who were responsible for daily law enforcement in 
the territories and often the officials who collected information on polygamists, became 
increasingly distrustful of one another by the late 1860s. Federal officers traveled to Camp 
Douglas, a military garrison that protected the mail route and telegraph lines of the Overland 
Mail Route, numbering as high as five thousand soldiers.  The New York Herald reported from 122
Salt Lake City that the reinforcement of federal troops assumed a “warlike aspect,” and that there 
was “certainly a great deal of bad feeling exhibited and no end of inflammatory talk and threats,” 
suggesting an unfavorable ending for Utah interests.  In his final annual message to Congress 123
on December 7, 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant presented the following recommendation about 
the Mormons, or the “scandalous condition of affairs existing in the Territory of Utah,” for which 
he reprimanded Congress. President Grant had previously asked for legislation to combat the 
“licensed immorality” of polygamy, even though no United States law permitted polygamy 
either: “That polygamy should exist in a free, enlightened, and Christian country, without the 
power to punish so flagrant a crime against decency and morality, seems preposterous. True, 
there is no law to sustain this unnatural vice, but what is needed is a law to punish it as a crime, 
and at the same time to fix the status of the innocent children–the offspring of the system, and of 
the possibly innocent plural wives; but, as an institution, polygamy should be banished from the 
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land, while this is being done.”  Grant framed polygamy as an institution that enslaved 124
Mormon women to lifestyles that subjected them to dishonorable relationships with men. His 
proposal for legislation to outlaw polygamy would have directly and quickly addressed the 
Mormon practice, or “unnatural vice,” but the campaign against polygamy assumed the form of a 
long, nuanced battle occurring in the territories, the courts, Congress, and printed media. 
Notably, the call for systematic law to curtail polygamy emerged right before the polygamy cases 
reached the United States Supreme Court. President Grant promised to request in his annual 
message that Congress “drive out licensed immorality, such as polygamy and the importation of 
women for illegitimate purposes.”  125
 At an 1885 Mormon general conference, one speaker, Mr. Whitney, alluded to explicit 
monitoring of Mormons in the Utah, Idaho, and Arizona territories: “Spotters and spies dog their 
footsteps. Delators [informers] thrust themselves into bedchambers and watch at windows. […] 
Attempts are made to bribe men to work up cases against their neighbors. Notoriously 
disreputable characters are employed to spy into men’s family relations.”  He alleged that 126
marshals employed “spies and spotters” who questioned children on the streets, and concluded 
that such monitoring affected innocent and guilty citizens alike, disturbing businesses, 
neighborhoods, and personal properties.  127
 There were other avenues through which the federal government monitored the 
Mormons. The 1884 “Special Report of the Utah Commission” indicated that government 
officials also considered statistical data when evaluating the Mormon threat, and that the Utah 
Commission was a third source for monitoring the Mormons.  When the Board of the Utah 128
Commission first started registering people for Utah elections in 1882, polygamists held the 
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majority of offices in Utah. Part of the mission of the Utah Commission was to take control of 
governance in the territory. None of the thirteen hundred and fifty-one elected officers in the 
territory were polygamists after the establishment of the Commission. The “Special Report” 
estimated that Utah consisted of twelve thousand non-polygamist male and female Mormons 
whose voting rights were not revoked.  129
 The “Special Report” further indicated that government officials were monitoring how 
Mormons responded to the Edmunds Act in diatribes against the law in newspapers and at 
religious gatherings, while Mormon leaders advocated for polygamy in speeches in Salt Lake 
City. The Utah Commission recorded how Mormons mobilized for religious and political 
gatherings: “All were invited [to the speeches] by public notices in the newspapers, and the 
meetings were largely attended. . . . [T]he discrimination of the act of Congress in favor of non-
polygamous Mormons is producing such results upon the masses as to alarm their leading 
men.”  The Commission also predicted the future of polygamy in Utah, implying it was 130
actively monitoring activities throughout the Territory: “[W]e are of the opinion that in the more 
rural districts, chiefly in the southern part of the Territory, there has not been much decrease [in 
polygamy], while in Salt Lake County and other counties where there are considerable cities and 
towns there has been a decided decrease.”  They likely conjured these estimates and 131
predictions through gathering information for the census: “The present population is estimated at 
160,000, about four-fifths being Mormons. The people are generally engaged in agricultural 
pursuits.”  132
 The census data included not just how many Mormons there were, but what proportion of 
jailed and arrested people were Mormon.  Such data was collected on all inhabitants of the 133
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United States. But paradoxically, data collected for the census revealed that Mormon arrests fell 
in the minority of total arrests in the Territory of Utah: “[W]e find the vastly preponderating 
number of Mormons contributing but one-eighth of the cases recorded, and the non-Mormons 
seven-eighths!”  A journalist for the Chicago Times reported on this data. He defended the 134
morality of the Mormons after visiting Salt Lake City in early 1884: “If those practicing 
polygamy are, as a class, actuated by the licentious motives with which they are charged, why is 
it that the affiliated crimes of prostitution, brothel-keeping, lewd conduct, insulting women, 
exposing person, attempting rape, and obscene and profane language . . . are so nearly 
monopolized by the non-Mormon element?”  The efforts of United States marshals, spotters, 135
and the Utah Commission through physical and statistical monitoring constituted the broader 
campaign to prepare Utah for statehood. Federal concern extended to the economic and 
education sectors of the Territory of Utah, both of which functioned as additional lenses through 
which the federal government monitored the Mormons. 
 The “Special Report” of the Commission suggested that non-Mormon schools and 
churches molded Mormons into good citizens by pushing “the obnoxious features of 
‘Mormonism’ in a condition of gradual declension and final extinction.”  Henry Randall Wait, 136
the Statistician of the Tenth United States Census, accused the Mormons of constructing a public 
education system that dissuaded non-Mormons from becoming teachers, and that the textbooks 
provided religious instruction in a secular system.  The efficacy of the public school system in 137
the Territory of Utah denoted the larger concern of the federal government about sovereignty and  
cultural uniformity. However, the illiteracy average in the Territory of Utah in 1880 was less than 
the national average.  138
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 Some non-Mormon businessmen in Utah complained of the “clannishness of the 
Mormons in trading with each other rather than the Gentiles,  indicating that the economy 139
needed to be examined. Many Mormon industries were profitable, increasing the anger of non-
Mormon businessmen who were excluded from those networks. An 1886 pamphlet authored by 
Dyer D. Lum, an American labor activist and anarchist,  questioned what he perceived as 140
Mormon control of cheap labor in Utah, driven by an “antagonistic system of social and 
commercial activity.”  For Lum, economics, and not polygamy, was the core problem of the 141
Mormons.  142
 Polygamy instigated domestic unrest within a nation seeking to establish its authority on 
the global scale. Questions about the Mormons, such as their willingness to contribute to the 
national economy, augmented this concern up until Utah was granted statehood in 1896. The 
1890s, historian William O. Walker III has written, was a time of “passionate conflict about what 
it meant to be an American and the critical importance of basic values to the conduct of public 
affairs.”  Historian Gary Gerstle has traced the buildup of military and surveillance power in 143
the United States to the earliest days of the republic. Government monitoring increased 
throughout the nineteenth century in correlation with the federal government increasingly 
regulating various sectors of American society.  The states complied because they prioritized 144
the public good over private rights,  a concession that resonates with surveillance in the 145
contemporary United States. In pre-1860 municipal and state laws, those most frequently 
monitored in the states were single women living outside of patriarchal families, poor people, 
blacks, migrants, and immigrants. Mormons living outside of traditional families complemented 
this framework, exposing their families to government “spotters" seeking out “cohabs.”  146
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IV.  The Path to Statehood 
 This section will examine the path to statehood from 1870 to 1896, with a focus on the 
legal discussions about the polygamy convictions in six United States Supreme Court cases, in 
which the central premise related to polygamy and the means of collecting information. This 
section also includes a selection of other documents presented to Congress and to the Mormon 
community in this time period that complement the legal debates. The purpose of examining how 
information about polygamists fared in court is to show whether the justices considered the 
monitoring practices valid and legal, as well as to what extent the justices attempted to 
understand Mormonism as a religion. The following two chapters on the AFSC Quakers and 
Brooklyn Muslims are also structured around how and when monitoring agents considered the 
religion of the surveilled group, as well as to what extent the legality of the monitoring systems 
was challenged once the government monitoring systems were publicly revealed. I suggest that 
the rulings in the Supreme Court were critical to monitoring the Mormons. 
 From 1870 until 1890, when the Church of Latter-day Saints formally abandoned 
polygamy, conflict between Mormons and non-Mormons intensified. As sociologist and 
grandson of Brigham Young, Kimball Young, characterized the period, “What had started out as 
a local and somewhat tangential issue had become a central problem for the entire American 
public. This whole period provides an excellent illustration of the interplay of the public 
sentiment and judicial action.”  In this period, the judiciary increased its role in the campaign 147
against polygamy, propelling Utah forward to statehood. The federal government prosecuted 
Mormons in about twenty-five hundred cases from 1871 to 1896, mostly polygamy cases.  148
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Some of the defendants in these cases appealed to territorial Supreme Courts, including the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
 In 1871, journalist and novelist George Alfred Townsend, known for his war 
correspondence covering the Civil War, implored William Henry Hooper, a Mormon convert and 
United States Congressional delegate from the Territory of Utah, to eradicate polygamy from 
Hooper’s Mormon communities in Utah: “Be rid of polygamy, cast out by this course the Federal 
officials who prey upon you, and become an American State in good faith, represented among us, 
and blessed by neighborhood rule.”   149
 Hooper had delivered a plea for religious liberty to the House of Representatives one year 
prior, asking lawmakers to investigate polygamy as a theological issue.  He compared the 150
Mormon justification for polygamy to stances on marriage held by people of other religious 
denominations. Emphasizing the centrality of mainstream Christianity to American culture and 
how Mormonism was considered to be far left of that Christian center, Hooper argued that 
Mormonism and Christianity could coincide: “[B]y numerous leading writers of the Christian 
church, the doctrine of polygamy is justified and approved.” He argued that since the Catholic 
Church and some Christian churches, “among the most powerful in numbers,” would agree that 
marriage is a sacrament rather than a civil contract, the Mormon polygamist stance on marriage 
should similarly be respected.  Hooper, however, erred in this argument since Protestants 151
would not have considered marriage a sacrament.  Mormon historian Davis Bitton has written 152
that Mormons to this day are not part of mainstream Christianity, but do identify as Christian 
since they believe in the resurrection and atonement of Jesus Christ.  However, to preserve 153
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polygamy, it was important for advocates of polygamy to align Mormonism with the Christian 
center, and not just Christianity more broadly. 
 Hooper insisted that polygamy was a religious belief after mentioning that Mormon civil 
society existed because of sanctions internal to the community: “Now, sir, far be it from me to 
undertake to teach this learned House, and above all, the Hon. Chairman of the Committee on 
Territories, great theological truths. If there be any subject with which this honorable body is 
especially conversant, it is theology.”  Hooper’s attempt to align Mormon theology with 154
Christianity was part of a strategy to salvage polygamy as a religious liberty. He reinforced this 
point at the end of his plea: “That in considering the cognizance of the marriage relation as 
within the province of church regulations, we are practically in accord with all other Christian 
denominations.”  The Mormon justification of practicing polygamy since it was a religious 155
belief was not seriously considered in Congress. A speaker in Congress averred that Mormons 
were never called before the Committee on the Territories to represent themselves in the defense 
of polygamy.   156
 Mormons’ efforts to claim polygamy as a religious belief failed most concretely in the 
United States Supreme Court cases related to polygamy that would begin one year later. Ninety-
five percent of the twenty-five hundred federal trials of Mormons centered on sexual crimes, 
which were mainly crimes of polygamy. A portion of these sexual crimes included fornication 
and unlawful cohabitation, crimes which eventually became the legal focus in the federal 
campaign to suppress polygamy. The volume of prosecutions pertaining to sexual offense was, 
according to legal historian Sarah Gordon, “literally, unique in American legal history.”  157
During this period, otherwise known as “the Raid,” Mormon leaders and ordinary folks alike 
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were “hunted as common criminals, separated from families and from freedom itself,”  a 158
history that is remembered well by the Mormon Church today.  
 The court records from trials that did not reach the United States Supreme Court, 
according to Gordon, are oblique, but often they included appeals for mercy from the courts, 
“evidence of the devastation wrought by the legal reconstruction of society.”  Records from the 159
trials generally contained a complaint, an arrest warrant, a bail record, and an indictment 
including the names and residences of the wives and the witnesses for the government. Some 
court clerks would write the results of the prosecutions on the back of the indictments. Other 
records included testimonies of witnesses, about half of which documented the results of the 
trials. There are, of course, limits to focusing on those polygamy cases that reached the United 
States Supreme Court in a study of monitoring Mormon polygamy since, as noted in section 
three, monitoring also occurred in indirect ways, such as by examining the illiteracy average in 
the territories. But given the elusive nature in which federal marshals and other officers collected 
information, it was necessary to narrow the analysis to evidence that was documented in a 
courtroom as having been used by the federal government to prosecute polygamists, and then 
supplement the analysis with additional sources referencing the spotters and spies who 
permeated Mormon networks. 
 Even more, it was necessary to narrow the focus on only those Supreme Court cases that 
addressed how information was collected in order to consider at what point government officials, 
if at all, examined the meaning of the Mormon religion during these practices, and if that 
examination shaped whether they believed their monitoring practices were legitimate. Since the 
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lower court discussions are often cited in the higher court transcripts and documents, focusing on 
even just these selected cases provided more than enough material for this chapter. 
 That being said, a few of the smaller polygamy trials or trials that reached the Utah 
Supreme Court are worth highlighting briefly. A man by the name of Thomas Hawkins was 
brought to trial for committing adultery against one wife, Elizabeth Mears, based on a complaint 
from his other wife, Harriet Hawkins. The trial record showed that monitoring of Mormon 
communities occurred in order to identify polygamists, since Harriet’s private complaint was the 
basis from which the accusation was launched. The trial also showed that not all Mormon 
women were unanimous in their opinions about engaging in polygamous relationships: “I have 
told him [my husband] that it was a damned bad trick, and that I did not believe in any such 
damned doctrine.”  The trial, finally, investigated whether marriage was a civil or ecclesiastical 160
rite in Utah. The Mormon defense posited that marriage was ecclesiastical since polygamy was 
established prior to the formation of American government in Utah. 
 In 1874, the legality of polygamy in the Territory of Utah was unclear to the justices of 
the Utah Supreme Court. In one case, Edward Friel appealed a judgment from the lower court, 
but not about whether he was a polygamist. Friel appealed the denial of the trial court to use his 
plural wife as a witness in his case, in which he was trying to recover payment on a promissory 
note from the defendant. The territorial statute excluded wives from testifying for or against their 
husbands unless the action occurred exclusively between them. One justice noted in his 
dissenting opinion that the implication of the final decision, which denied the plural wife the 
right to testify, was that she was in fact his wife and therefore part of a lawful, polygamous 
marriage. While the Utah statute neither voided nor endorsed legal polygamy, the judge noted 
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that the decision should have excluded only lawful husbands or wives from testimony in order to 
sustain the illegality of polygamy.  161
 The details of this case in the Territory of Utah Supreme Court provided a few important 
insights about governmental perception of polygamy leading up to the United States Supreme 
Court appeals. The first insight was that Mormons were not hiding their polygamous 
relationships. The second point was that the judges of the Utah Supreme Court, though not 
advocating polygamy, understood there were contradictions in their decisions that complicated 
the argument for monogamy in Utah. They required legal assistance from the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 Mormons in twelve polygamy cases appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the nineteenth century.  The Mormons’ inclination that they might win at the national level 162
when they lost so many cases at the territorial level might be explained by their ample claims, 
including those articulated in the Supreme Court, that the jury selections for polygamy cases 
were rigged, and therefore the territorial justice system was corrupt. This chapter will 
thematically explore six of these cases, some more thoroughly than others, based on their unique 
contributions to the monitoring system of polygamy in the mid-nineteenth century. These cases 
were significant because they initiated the legal distinction between religious belief and action, 
effectively establishing that religious interests could not “be extended to make the professed 
doctrines [of any faith] superior to the law of the land and in effect permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”  This meant, in other words, that no religion could be privileged 163
over another in the court of law. During this period, the Gilded Age, political institutions and in 
particular the Supreme Court of the United States “made a self-conscious and, ultimately, 
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unsuccessful effort to establish strict boundaries between the public and private spheres.”  164
While Utah would eventually pass through these trials in the Supreme Court and onto statehood, 
national policy in the territories influenced the nature of citizenship in the rest of the country,  165
helping to explain why the government was so concerned about what occurred inside the private 
homes of Mormons in the Territory of Utah. 
 A. Belief Cannot Excuse Crime 
 Reynolds v. United States (1878) was the first of the polygamy cases that reached the 
United States Supreme Court. Reynolds was previously an indictment in the District Court for 
the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah, and then an appeal in the Utah Supreme Court. 
Mormon leaders encouraged George Reynolds, a simple man with two wives, to appeal his case 
to the Supreme Court as a challenge the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act.  The Mormons, testing their 166
case for polygamy in Reynolds, believed the act violated the First Amendment. The ruling, 
however, ended their claim that polygamy was a form of religious expression. The Mormons 
would have to utilize alternative legal arguments in subsequent cases. The Court reinforced the 
evangelical claim that plural marriage could not be protected because it was irreligion, “opinions 
contrary to the nature of religion,”  quoting Robert Baird, the Presbyterian missionary and 167
author who provided some of the most comprehensive histories of major Protestant 
denominations of the nineteenth century.  Baird’s tautologous definition indicated how even the 168
language of the Supreme Court at this time was rooted in Protestant Christianity. Arguing against 
the common narrative that the Reynolds decision was a secular opinion, historian David Sehat 
has argued the Court embraced a secular rationale while sustaining Protestant control over the 
definitions of social order.  169
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 In the original trial, the judge instructed the jury to determine whether or not the evidence 
proved that Reynolds had married more than one woman. Reynolds explained that the dual 
marriage was part of his religious obligations. Nonetheless, the judge encouraged the jury to 
consider the women and children who were involved. George Reynolds, who pled not guilty of 
bigamy, was the personal secretary to Brigham Young. He was indicted in October 1874 and 
convicted after first being relieved of one conviction in the Utah Supreme Court in June 1875. 
Acknowledging he was polygamous in his case in the Utah Supreme Court, he instead appealed 
on the argument that the district court unlawfully and incorrectly drew the grand jury for his trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the decision of the district court to reject jurors who refused to 
answer whether they were “living in polygamy,” as it did not see fault with removing such partial 
jurors from the jury. It also maintained the decision of the lower court that religious convictions 
could not excuse crime: “On the trial of Defendant for the crime of Polygamy [sic], evidence was 
offered to him to show that polygamous marriage was a part of his religion; held, such evidence 
not admissible and has no foundation for its admission in either justice, reason or law.”  170
 Reynolds appealed to the United States Supreme Court. His defense team argued that the 
indictment was found by an illegal grand jury of fifteen people, rather than the legally required 
size of sixteen people. What is interesting in this case, and what we will keep in mind for each of 
the polygamy cases, is how information was collected both to indict and to convict Reynolds. 
The deputy marshal, referred to as Pratt, did not recall informing Reynolds about the nature of 
his business at Reynolds’s private home. Pratt was in fact searching for one of Reynold’s two 
wives, Mary Jane Tuddenham, to establish evidence that Reynolds was a polygamist.  The next 171
day, Pratt, who held the subpoena for the second wife, Amelia Jane Schofield, spoke to Mary 
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Jane Tuddenham at the Reynolds residence. There was no sight of Amelia Jane in the residence 
during this encounter, but Pratt claimed he found Amelia Jane there before, “at the same 
place.”  Pratt could not remember Mr. Reynolds’s exact words when returning to the house 172
without a search warrant to find Amelia Jane. Despite the various holes in Pratt’s narrative, he 
was able to arrest Reynolds and initiate the trial process. Additionally, despite Reynolds’s 
objection, the district court in Utah had allowed Amelia Jane’s testimony from a different trial 
against Reynolds to be used in the most current trial, thereby questioning the ethics and legality 
of court procedures in the Territory of Utah. Amelia Jane Schofield was not in court to prove the 
second marriage, but the district attorney claimed her testimony was usable because she had been 
kept away from court by George Reynolds. The district attorney offered no proof to sustain this 
claim.  173
 Questionable evidence also surfaced in a discussion centered on whether the original 
copy of the notice indicating the time and place for drawing jurors for Reynolds’s case was 
presented in court. A. K. Smith, on behalf of the United States, testified that he had “seen the 
original notice, in the judge’s own handwriting, and, being asked by the district attorney if he 
knew this to be a copy of that original, answered, ‘I do not, but that an order of that kind was 
made—was written out—from which this was made, I know.’”  This tenuous description of 174
events mirrored the similarly weak testimony of Pratt arresting Reynolds. 
 The Court in Reynolds conceded that polygamy was a religious obligation. But Reynolds 
did not triumph with the right to practice polygamy. The Court, drawing from the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, reconciled this paradox they encountered by defining religion based on its use 
in the First Amendment rather than on a general understanding of free exercise. By citing 
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Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he had written that 
man had “no natural right in opposition to his social duties,” the Court deduced that while it 
could not make judgments based on an opinion from a letter, it could judge actions deemed 
subversive to the common good.  In short, obligations to society trumped individual, moral 175
beliefs.  The Constitution protected individual beliefs, but it did not protect criminal activities 176
sanctioned by individual beliefs.  Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite summarized the core of the 177
decision in the following sentence: “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”  The 178
Reynolds decision also revived the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, which the federal government had 
not yet begun to enforce, to strengthen polygamy prosecutions. By invoking the tenets of the 
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, Reynolds not only undermined the Mormon case for polygamy by 
distinguishing belief from action, but it also revived the legislative campaign against polygamy. 
 More broadly, Reynolds highlighted federal control over Mormon culture and family 
structure, offering definitive judicial action on the Mormon question. The crucial distinction 
between religious belief and action proved necessary to protect the majority from the potentially 
dangerous actions of polygamists. The Court articulated an operative framework for determining 
when to protect religious expression. 
 While legal historians generally agree on the distinction between religious belief and 
action in Reynolds, other scholars have critiqued the implications of the decision. Catharine 
Cookson has argued that the Supreme Court in Reynolds lost sight of its constitutional obligation 
to protect the minority from the desires of the majority.  The opinion, Sarah Gordon has added, 179
bolstered monogamy as a pillar of democracy in the eyes of congressmen, lobbyists, journalists, 
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and civilians.  Mormon historian J. Spencer Fluhman has suggested the opinion simply avoided 180
the question of whether polygamy was religious “by asserting that government could suppress 
acts, religious or not, that stood in the way of civilization’s progress,”  but was nonetheless a 181
monumental legal decision that accepted Mormonism as a religion by acknowledging polygamy 
as a religious belief.  In other words, the United States Supreme Court understood that 182
polygamy was part of Mormon religion, but maintained that polygamists did not have the right to 
practice that belief.  183
 The Court did not reach the decision lightly. It worried that protecting the religiously 
motivated conduct of polygamy would result in having to protect each and every action allegedly 
motivated by religion, such as human sacrifices in Hinduism. Journalists drew comparisons 
between Mormons and unfamiliar foreign cultures, including Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, in 
determining how to define the Mormon religion as one that was true, false, or some other 
indistinct category.  Journalists’ alignment of Mormonism with non-Christian religions 184
strategically framed the Mormons as outside of the Protestant establishment, to quote E. Digby 
Baltzell,  which he defines as holding tradition and authority without being coercive or 185
authoritarian, dominated by members of the upper-class while constantly refreshed by new 
members of the elite class.  186
 The justices were not without cultural prejudice, either.  They pondered over the 187
relationship between Mormonism and race, analogizing the Mormons to “the Asiatic and . . . 
African peoples,”  whom they associated with sexual immorality and anti-democratic laziness. 188
Mormons, though white, were categorized as outsiders not only religiously, but also racially. This 
strategic aligning of purity and whiteness symbolized the greater campaign against the Mormons 
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in the legislative and judicial branches. Fluhman has demonstrated that the shift in Mormon 
criticism, from focusing on polygamy to foreignness, coincided with the conclusion of the Civil 
War: “‘Celestial marriage’ moved Mormonism further from the discursive middle, but the new 
antagonisms’ aggressive exoticism ultimately hijacked anti-Mormonism. Most postbellum critics 
esteemed polygamy as the undeniable marker of Mormonism’s fakery or Oriental foreignness. 
What real religion could recommend something so utterly outside nineteenth-century norms?”  189
It follows that, while anti-polygamy arguments drew from the antislavery sentiment that shaped 
post-Civil War America, a desire for national cohesiveness undergirded the Reynolds decision, 
driving an American-born religion not only from the white Christian center, but outside of the 
geographic and identity-based boundaries of the nation. Polygamy that was previously associated 
with primitive cultures in Asia and Africa was far less disconcerting to Americans than polygamy 
practiced in their own territories. American polygamy threatened monogamy, democracy, and the 
social order.  The Reynolds decision consequently surpassed theological and national 190
categorization of what was and was not acceptable. 
 After the decision was released, members of the public developed their own opinions on 
Reynolds. An Indiana-based Mormon farmer and businessman, J. Horatio Nichols, penned a 
letter to Congress that commented on the opinion. He lamented: “Judging from items in 
newspapers and somewhat irritating articles in religious journals, one might at first glance infer 
that the whole nation was inflamed, with good reason, against the Mormons. But closer 
observation has led me to think that the excitement is a manufactured one; kindled and kept alive 
in the cities and larger towns, mostly by ministers, priests, and zealous members of sectarian 
churches.”  Whether Nichols’s argument was considered persuasive is uncertain, but his 191
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testimony of religious figures publicly opposing the Mormons was substantiated in other 
publications. The disapproval of Mormonism by leading Protestant clergymen, in effect, 
contributed to the governmental system of monitoring the Mormons by shaping public opinion 
and, indirectly, preventing citizens from protesting against that system. Nichols elaborated that 
“within the last few weeks, the persistent, universal, and vigorous efforts of ministers, priests, 
and church-people, to instigate persecution . . . against the Mormons and polygamy” occurred.  192
As leaders of various Christian denominations preached against the immorality of polygamy, he 
wanted to debunk the alleged evilness “charged upon it by zealous ministers of Christian 
sects.”  Outsiders, according to Nichols, were welcome to visit the Mormon communities and 193
form their own opinions, since the Mormons did not attempt to shield their lives from outsiders: 
“[M]any intelligent and unprejudiced persons who have visited and dwelt among the Mormons, 
for the special purpose of observing their social and religious institutions, their morals, 
industries, habits, and manner of life, have published the results of their observations, and their 
testimony is before the world.”   194
 One such outside observer, Captain John Codman, in a small volume called “The 
Mormon Country,” attested to having not met as honest and industrious of a community as the 
Mormons. Nonetheless, despite the fact that outsiders visited Mormon communities and 
produced relatively favorable reviews in texts and oral stories, Nichols emphasized that Mormon 
biases prevailed: “It may not be to my taste, nor to your taste: but we are not parties to it; our 
tastes ought not to control other independent persons’ marriages preferences. It certainly is 
against our prejudices. But prejudices are subtle enemies.”  Not only did biases prevail, but the 195
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lasting effect of the Reynolds decision would prove too important to the relatively 
inconsequential opinions of Nichols or Codman.  
 Nichols, nonetheless, declared in a letter to Congress that Reynolds was not only relevant 
to Mormons, but to “the American, the human right of all men to the free exercise of religion.”  196
How the Court defined religion in Reynolds, and its impact on all Americans, was the unspoken 
legacy of the decision, since freedom of religious belief was preserved, but it was not certain 
how religion itself would be assessed. Nichols saw the decision as a “subtle and enormous 
absorption of undelegated [sic] power.”  He interpreted the Supreme Court’s justification for 197
restricting religious freedom as problematic: “Not less unconstitutional and indefensible is the 
Supreme Court’s selection of the words ‘good order,’ as a criterion of the legislative power of 
Congress over the actions and natural rights of the people,” since, he continued, it was evident 
that good order did in fact exist among the Mormons.  Nichols inferred that public opinion 198
affected the legal fate of the Mormons: “Whether a matter or an institution is odious or not 
odious, is a question of taste, and not of natural rights.”  More accurately, Nichols may have 199
added that whether or not an institution was religious or not, and accordingly protected from 
unwarranted monitoring or intrusion, was dependent on its congruence with the mainstream 
Protestant culture of the nation. 
 B. Conversation as Evidence 
 Following the momentous Reynolds decision and defeat to the Mormons’ plan, Miles v. 
United States (1880) also examined a polygamy indictment.  In the Utah Supreme Court, John 200
Miles appealed his district court conviction of marriage to both Emily Spencer and Caroline 
Owens. Miles argued that the district court had allowed the United States attorney to ask jurors if 
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they believed in polygamy or belonged to the Mormon Church, and if Miles belonged to the 
Church. Miles objected to the attorney interrogating the religious beliefs of the jurors.  In 201
Miles, the jury selection process was the site of government monitoring of polygamy. Jurors were 
asked by the United States District Attorney, Philip T. Zile, whether they were a member of the 
Mormon Church, and about their beliefs within the Church, including: “Do you believe in its 
doctrines and ordinances?”; “How long have you been a member of that church?”; “Do you 
believe that he [Joseph Smith] received a revelation concerning plural marriages?”; “Do you 
believe that the revelation received by Joseph Smith was from God?”   202
 Zile interrogated the religious beliefs of the jurors to dismiss all polygamists from the 
case.  He also asked John Taylor, then president of the Mormon Church, whether certain 203
ordinances of the church were printed or written, to which Taylor replied they were not. Zile 
continued: “Why, don’t you know, as president of the church, whether certain ordinances of the 
church are printed or written?”  This exchange indicated that the government did not know 204
whether ordinances existed, meaning the government was unable to rely on textual evidence to 
examine the religiously-motivated actions of the jury members and Miles.  
 The district court opinion suggested that Zile was wrong to ask the jurors if they believed 
in polygamy. While agreeing that polygamist jurors were biased in convicting polygamist, it 
criticized the manner in which that information was collected from the remaining jurors, who 
had already passed the bias test: “But all of the jurors to whom these questions were asked, and 
who were excluded, were in the first place challenged for actual bias and the challenge submitted 
to triers appointed by the court. These triers in each instance found the challenge true, and their 
decision was final. These questions therefore were not material or important.”  Exploring the 205
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question of how to build a fair jury in Reynolds, Justice Boreman of the Utah Supreme Court 
responded that, while selecting a jury was not an overt form of monitoring in which federal 
marshals watched Mormons walk in and out of homes, the jury selection process allowed the 
federal government to detect new polygamists in the jury selection process and to remove 
sympathy for polygamy among the juries. He asserted it was right to dismiss jurors who believed 
in polygamy since they would be reticent to convict polygamists.  
 Nonetheless, Justice Boreman included in his opinion an explanation of Mormon 
theology. The opinion was noteworthy because it indicated the justice explored the theological 
underpinnings of polygamy. Justice Boreman first explained that he did not see any problem with 
appointing new jurors when the polygamist ones were dismissed for bias. He added that the 
divine appointment of polygamy was one of the leading doctrines of the Mormon Church: “It is 
likewise one of the cardinal teachings of the church that as it is God’s law it is above man’s law, 
and that when the practice comes in conflict with the laws of the land, the law of the church must 
be obeyed, and the law of the land disobeyed.”  Following Reynolds, this statement validated 206
the Mormon religion, however far askew from the Protestant culture it veered.  
 Government monitoring also occurred in Miles through the use of citizen witnesses, 
largely by asking witnesses whether Miles and his two wives were seen in the same place at the 
same time. One such interrogation asked the witness about a conversation between Miles and 
one wife at a wedding.  Judge Hagan raised the issue of whether the interrogation was relevant 207
to proving bigamy in the case, based on the assumption that any revelation from such a 
conversation would be irrelevant in proving a dual marriage: “We object. In the first place, on the 
grounds that we suppose the object of this is to prove the marriage with Emily Spencer. We 
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object to it as being incompetent and insufficient to prove a marriage in any event, and the 
admission of the defendant cannot be received to prove such a marriage, and are irrelevant and 
immaterial.”  Nonetheless, the objection was overruled, and the discussion continued. The 208
witness explained that Miles had asked Caroline Owens to play the piano, to which she had 
refused by saying she would not play for Miles’s wife, Emily Spencer. Judge Hagan attempted to 
extract a more precise statement from the witnesses who incriminated Miles by admitting both 
women were his wives: “Didn’t he say to Miss Owens in answer to that, ‘Well, you are my wife 
too’?”  Another witness recounted a dispute between the two wives: “He says, ‘No you won’t, 209
she is my wife.’ Then [sic] turned to the lady on the stool, and says, ‘Sit right where you are, you 
are my wife.’”  Witnesses continued to provide evidence from alleged exchanges with John 210
Miles in this manner. 
 Caroline Owens, the second wife, also served as a witness.  The defense objected to her 211
testimony on the grounds that the first marriage to Emily Spencer had not yet been proven. The 
Court overruled the defense’s objection but intervened by asking the jury to determine what 
evidence could in fact be used to prove a polygamous marriage. The Court asserted that the jury 
needed to weigh in on whether Emily Spencer was effectively proven to be his first wife. 
 When Caroline Owens took the stand, she narrated the beginning of her relationship with 
Miles. She was aware he had already married Emily Spencer, but he assured her he would leave 
Emily.  Owens insisted that, after realizing there was a chance Miles would enter into a 212
polygamous relationship with both herself and Emily, she tried to become the primary wife. 
Owens testified that Miles eventually married her first, and then married Emily Spencer. Owens 
published a letter expressing her frustrations with the situation in the Salt Lake Herald, which 
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was subsequently presented to court as evidence.  The information used to convict Miles, in 213
summary, came from informants and witnesses to conversations; Miles’s first wife, Emily; and 
Caroline Owens, along with her published newspaper article. 
 In the Utah Supreme Court appeal, Justice Boreman attested to the difficulty of collecting 
marriage information in the Endowment House in Utah, where Mormon marriages were 
performed. The absence of physical Mormon marriage records inadvertently coerced government 
officials to rely on citizen witnesses’ testimonies, such as those described above, and 
questionable jury selection processes to monitor and control Mormon polygamy. Justice 
Boreman commented: “All marriages in the endowment house, as shown by the testimony, are 
clandestine and performed under cover of sworn secrecy. Direct testimony is therefore extremely 
difficult to access, and hence every fact going to show the object of the party’s visit becomes 
material.”  Justice Boreman was justifying the questions posed to Caroline Owens about her 214
dress in the Endowment House, as he believed the questions were necessary to determine 
whether or not Caroline Owens was present in the house to be married: “If she were not dressed 
in the mode required, the presumption would be that she was not there for the purpose of 
marriage.”   215
 Ultimately, what the Utah Supreme Court had set out to determine was whether Miles 
and Emily Spencer were ever married, and if that was the case, whether that marriage occurred 
before the marriage between Miles and Caroline Owens. Boreman argued that proving the 
existence of the first marriage, between Miles and Owens, could be inferred from Miles’s oral 
confessions, particularly given the absence of tangible marriage records. A final point of 
contention in the collection of evidence in Miles centered on whether Caroline’s surname was 
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‘Owen” or “Owens.” The following excerpt from Boreman documented the challenge that judges 
and justices would have faced in determining whether Mormons were polygamists given the 
dearth of Mormon marriage records: “The defendant on numerous occasions deliberately 
admitted and declared that Emily Spencer was his wife. He introduced her (Emily) to various 
persons as ‘his wife.’ […] Going back a little, we find that immediately after coming out of the 
Endowment House, on the occasion of the marriage, of himself and Carrie Owen, defendant 
declared to Carrie Owen that the marriage between himself and Emily had already taken place. 
[…] He afterwards said to Carrie Owen, ‘I have never admitted to you before that Emily Spencer 
is my first wife, you are my second. But there is not witness about to hear what I am telling 
you.’”  Informants, and possibly even Mormons at the party, relayed similar kinds of anecdotes 216
and conversations to territorial officers. The fact that Justice Boreman considered these 
admissions as credible evidence highlighted the otherwise lack of evidence denoting polygamy 
in the Territory of Utah. 
 Nonetheless, he determined they were deliberate and factual statements. Justice Boreman 
praised the informants who repeated conversations for their commitment to the law, and 
reprimanded those who chose to protect polygamists: “The public demonstrations and the 
general condition of society here, show the praise that is awarded to such as shrink from their 
duty to uphold and obey the law and divulge these secrets, and such things also point unerringly 
to the ignominy and ostracism which the friends of this crime of polygamy seek to visit upon 
those who are honorable enough and brave enough to expose those hidden criminalities. […] 
Polygamy is no more sacred than any other crime and other crimes are daily in courts of justice 
established by circumstantial evidence and admissions.”  Justice Boreman did not clearly 217
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identify the informants, but the political implications of his praise surpassed the need for such 
identification. His characterization of polygamy as “no more sacred than any other crime” 
effectively discredited the religiousness of belief in polygamy previously granted to the 
Mormons in the Reynolds decision. This point demonstrates that, even if we narrow our focus on 
government monitoring of the Mormons to the discussion of evidence in the Supreme Court 
cases, justices within the various cases also differed in their opinions and individual viewpoints. 
 After this detailed description of Miles’s alleged confessions, Justice Boreman added that 
the verdict of the jury was corroborated by a “variety of circumstances,” and not based solely on 
confessions or declarations of the defendant. Boreman provided the example of how the 
defendant’s conduct showed that his marriage to Emily Spencer was contemplated for a long 
time as a first marriage. Miles, his two wives, and a third woman, Julia Spencer, asked a man by 
the name of John Taylor whether the three women should marry Miles. Justice Boreman 
interestingly referred to John Taylor here as “the head of the so-called ‘Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints,’” insinuating his personal opinion that Mormonism was an inauthentic 
religion. Justice Boreman declared that this information functioned as evidence against Miles 
since it indicated Miles had considered entering into a polygamous marriage with the women 
prior to going to the Endowment House. Daniel H. Wells, a counsellor to the Mormon president 
in charge of performing marriage ceremonies at the Endowment House, briefly addressed the 
documentation of Mormon marriages.  Wells claimed that he was unaware of whether any of 218
the marriages he performed were plural marriages, but he did not deny the possibility that some 
marriages were plural in nature.  219
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 According to Wells’s account, he had informed Miles that it was the right of his first wife 
to hand off the second wife to Miles in a Mormon marriage ceremony. Miles inadvertently 
admitted to having two wives at this point. When Caroline Owens tried to renege on the marriage 
due to contempt for the first wife, Miles told Wells to “never mind” the tradition of the first wife 
handing off the second wife.  Miles then led Caroline and Emily to a reception party at the 220
house of Angus Cannon, and, according to the account, treated Carrie Owens as less of a wife.  221
After Miles was arrested and Caroline Owens left him, Miles promised her that if she returned, 
he would leave his first wife, Emily Spencer.  Wells’s anecdote was comprised of facts 222
combined with circumstances to prove that Miles was a polygamist.   223
 Similar evidence sustained a conviction in another 1885 Utah Supreme Court case that 
cited Miles by asserting it was not necessary to produce eye witnesses or a marriage certificate to 
prove polygamy. Instead, one justice averred in the case: “Marriage may be proven by the 
declarations and admissions of the accused, and such declarations are proper to be considered by 
the jury as tending to prove an actual marriage.”  The opinion of a yet another case stated, 224
“Conversations with the accused, if they contain voluntary admissions or confessions tending to 
prove his guilt, are admissible against him.”  This monitoring system for identifying 225
polygamists, however, offered no means to ensure witnesses’ claims about conversations were 
true. 
 Unlike the decision in Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court reversed Miles’s 
conviction for bigamy. Miles appealed on the grounds that his second wife’s testimony was 
nullified by a law that a husband should not be a witness against his wife, and vice versa.  The 226
Court averred that “no first marriage or other marriage of defendant Miles was proven to the 
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court or jury; that admissions or decorations alone cannot prove a marriage in a case such as the 
one at bar,”  thereby reversing Miles’s conviction. In short, the Court reversed the conviction 227
due to doubtful evidence used to prove Miles’s first marriage to Emily Spencer. Once Caroline 
Owens became Miles’s only proven wife, she was unable to testify against her legal husband in 
court. While the Miles decision could not save polygamy, it pointed to the questionable system 
used to collect information on polygamists. The decision also pressured federal officers, 
marshals, and district attorneys to become more accountable in their monitoring methods.  
 C. Mormon Americanness Revisited 
 A few years after the Miles decision, Charles William Bennett who, as mentioned earlier, 
was likely the same non-Mormon Grand Master of the Wasatch Lodge, of the Grand Lodge of 
Ancient, Free, and Accepted Masons of Utah,  addressed Congress in 1883 about whether the 228
Mormon problem was correctly understood.  His argument was important because, by this 229
time, there were far fewer defenders of Mormonism. Bennett recommended that the Masonic 
library, “the largest and best regulated library . . . in the Territory,” add general interest books to 
the Masonic collection to benefit anyone who wished to learn.  This recommendation indicated 230
Bennett’s commitment to improving the social conditions of Mormons and non-Mormons alike. 
The people of Utah, according to Bennett, were “simple minded, impressionable, ignorant, and in 
rude form, deeply religious.”  This characterization rhetorically removed blame from the 231
Mormons by attributing their flaws to ignorance, and simultaneously redeemed them by 
spotlighting their religiosity. Yet he then transitioned to demographic data, and in one fell swoop, 
suggested that “[w]ith few exceptions they are uneducated, unintelligent, common people.”   232
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 At this point, approximately one hundred and fifty thousand people lived in Utah and the 
neighboring territories, eight-tenths of whom were born in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England, 
and Wales, subtly adducing the Mormons’ foreignness. He also indicated they were of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds, as the Scandinavians were mostly of the peasant class, and the 
English and Welsh were mostly from manufacturing, mining, farming, and generally poor 
backgrounds. Bennett’s emphasis on the lower socioeconomic status of the Mormons 
strategically minimized their accountability due to poor judgment, including judgment on the 
validity of polygamy as a religious belief.  
 Bennett nonetheless praised the religiosity of the Mormons, implying that zealousness 
was a point in favor of Utah statehood: “Having received this new religion, they cherish it as the 
very will of God. They religiously believe that Smith was a prophet . . . It need hardly be said 
that with these ignorant people these beliefs engender fanatical zeal.”  Missouri House 233
Representative James Blair responded by questioning the Christian framework for evaluating 
what was or was not religious, and wondered how Mormonism or polygamy might be considered 
nonreligious based on the Webster definition of religion as “any system of faith or worship…true 
or false religion.”  234
 Bennett did not recommend against the Mormon possibility of citizenship, but he did 
claim that their nuanced interpretation of religious liberty legitimized polygamy: “The person 
charged with and convicted of polygamy, in their view, therefore, suffers for their religion.”  If 235
polygamy was a legitimate practice, he argued, punishment would be ineffective: “[T]he 
principal object of punishment fails in these cases. . . . [It] does not reform the people, or 
eradicate the spirit which leads to the commission of the crime.”  The implication of Bennett’s 236
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statement was that the federal government could have devised a better system for teaching the 
Mormon people the law, as they possessed the potential for becoming good citizens: “Looking to 
their bone and sinew and habits of industry, they are good stock for producing American citizens 
as the years roll on. Many, perhaps most, of the adults who have been here long enough have 
been naturalized. Most of them, therefore, and certainly their children are ours—are fellow 
citizens with us.”  The goal of tailoring Utah for statehood was far more than an implied 237
possibility at this point, as demonstrated by Bennett’s emphasis on citizenship. His call to 
produce Americans, the underlining narrative of the federal monitoring system, would eliminate 
the need for governmental monitoring, since proper citizens would ideally conduct their affairs 
within societal norms.  
 Yet Bennett’s testimony suggested that in 1883, Congress was still unsure about whether 
to accept the Mormon people. Despite Mormons’ potential, the federal government needed to 
“make good citizens of them,” as they were still, according to Bennett, “almost without 
exception un-American. Worse, they were hostile to the government and wrapped up in their 
fanaticism.”  For Bennett, the Church of Latter-day Saints continually dictated the politics of 238
Mormons: “While the crime of polygamy is most offensive, perhaps the fact that the priesthood 
absolutely dictates the political action of the Mormon masses is, according to our ideas of free 
government, the most serious and threatening.”  Polygamy may have been gradually losing in 239
the courts, but Mormon political activity was the next area to regulate. In other words, polygamy 
was the focal point within the government monitoring system, but preparing Utah for statehood 
was the longterm objective. 
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 In a larger effort to suggest how and when the Territory of Utah would be suitable for 
statehood, Bennett lamented the failed impact of the Edmunds Act and, in particular, the Utah 
Commission. The Utah Commission determined whether evidence was sufficient to bring a 
suspected polygamist to trial. Bennett characterized the Commission as ineffective: “These 
provisions were designed to strike at the political power of the Church; but the blow was a very 
weak one and the mode was puerile.”  The President, under advisory of the Senate, appointed 240
five commissioners, and the Senate appointed the registration officers and judges who would 
oversee elections and solicit votes. But this monitoring board did not seamlessly weave into the 
fabrics of Mormon life: “At present the commissioners are all nonresidents of the Territory, and 
consequently know few of the people and cannot be very conversant with the Mormon 
system.”  Bennett surmised that the Commission was on the right track in solving the Mormon 241
problem by registering non-polygamist voters, prosecuting polygamists, and offering numerical 
data about the Mormons to the federal government. Yet he added that it was losing money by 
offering jobs to strangers rather than adding to the salaries of existing employees. At the time, 
approximately one hundred polygamists had been convicted of cohabiting with more than one 
wife.  242
 Ultimately, though, Bennett asserted that the Territory of Utah should be directly 
governed by or under the supervision of Congress and its thoughtful, methodical measures.  243
His recommendation required increased supervision to identify crimes: “The appropriations for 
judicial expenses, secret service, paying witnesses, etc., should be largely increased, so that 
efficient work could be done in discovering offenders and bringing them to trial.”  Yet he 244
mused over the possibility of a government penitentiary in Salt Lake City to “demonstrate to the 
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Mormons that it is here to stay . . . and the enforcement of republican ideas instead of mock-
religious mummery.”  To attain statehood, the Mormons needed to comply with national 245
culture. 
 D. Belief Can Obstruct Objectivity and Americanness 
 In the early months of 1885, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah in another polygamy case, Clawson v. United States 
(1885).  The defense of Clawson posited that the grand jury of the Utah Supreme Court was 246
not legally constituted, and that the jury had been improperly assembled by illegally excluding 
fifteen qualified jurors and then selecting five grand jurors without any notice of the drawing, 
which was required by law. In other words, this was another case centered on the jury selection 
process.  Rudger Clawson was tracked down by marshals and found with one of his wives. The 247
case provided insight into the comprehensiveness with which the federal government monitored 
Mormons in its battle against polygamy: by interrogating the beliefs of the individuals who were 
called to jury duty. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Utah Supreme 
Court, noting that once the list of original jurors was exhausted, it was legal to retrieve new ones 
in an open call.  248
 Similar to the jurors of Miles, potential jurors of Clawson were asked under oath by the 
United States attorneys whether they practiced polygamy. Mormons who were removed from the 
jury willingly stated that polygamy was a fundamental doctrine of their church, and that it did 
not equate to adultery. Jury duty was contentious because Mormons wanted a fair representation 
of their community in trials pertaining in particular to polygamy. The United States attorneys saw 
polygamists as incompetent to sit on the jury since polygamy was seen as mutually exclusive 
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with federal institutions and the Constitution.  In other words, serving on the jury was a symbol 249
of citizenship, and polygamy was a symbol of an obfuscated Mormon worldview. After Clawson, 
there were over fourteen hundred indictments, with a heavy concentration of prosecutions in the 
years 1886-1889.  Mormons, as explained earlier, largely escaped prosecution until the Morrill 250
Anti-Bigamy Act was revived as the 1882 Edmunds Act. 
  A few months later, Murphy v. Ramsey (1885) redirected the focus on how polygamy 
affected the home to whether polygamists should have had the right to vote. In the Supreme 
Court of the Territory of Utah, Mormon plaintiffs claimed they had been damaged by the five-
member Utah Commission that regulated the voting process, as well as by deputy registrars 
appointed by the Commission.  They furthered that the defendants required them to sign illegal 251
statements stating they were neither bigamists nor polygamists. When the Mormon plaintiffs 
refused to sign written statements, they were denied the right to vote. Yet again the 
commissioners, who represented the interests of the federal government by overseeing who 
signed the statements, indirectly monitored polygamy through this system. The Utah Supreme 
Court acknowledged the written statements were not a prerequisite to vote, and therefore the 
board could not enforce them. However, the Court furthered that since the statements were 
invalid, the Mormon plaintiffs themselves were liable for signing the affidavits. The plaintiffs 
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  
 Murphy v. Ramsey was distinctive in that it was not a narrative about the federal 
government directly seeking out polygamists. Rather, the five Mormon plaintiffs sought justice 
for perceived slights against them. Once again, word-of-mouth testimony sufficed as evidence in 
court. One of the five Mormon defendants, Mildred E. Randall, signed the affidavit stating that 
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she did not participate in polygamy. She requested that defendant Harmel Pratt place her name 
on the voter registration list. However, Pratt, “acting under directions of the other defendants, 
willfully and maliciously refused to receive said affidavit or to swear her thereto, or to register 
her as a voter of said precinct, but on the contrary willfully and maliciously struck her name off 
the list of registered voters of said precinct, and left her name off the list of voters of said 
precinct, made at said registration.”  After this encounter, Randall approached the county 252
registration officer, E. D. Hoge, and then the commissioners, who each refused to change the 
ruling. Her anecdote demonstrated the lack of checks and balances in territorial affairs. It also 
demonstrated how the broader Mormon monitoring system, through voter registration, included 
tactics that were far less obvious than spying on households but instead depended on the 
accountability of individual federal officers. The Court decided that those who attested they were 
not bigamists should have had been eligible to vote.  253
 A month after the Murphy v. Ramsey decision, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints held a general conference in Logan, Utah, on April 5, 1885, from which many Mormon 
leaders were absent since they were hiding in the Underground.  The Church reported, 254
commented on, and published these events.  Federal officials possibly lurked at these general 255
conferences since by 1888, federal marshals had infiltrated almost every community in Utah and 
southern Idaho looking for “cohabs.”  One of the goals of this particular conference was to 256
draft resolutions for the President of the United States about the treatment of Mormons by 
federal officials in the Territory of Utah. Only two percent of the church practiced plural 
marriage by this time, and therefore “it was an act of great injustice to the ninety-eight per cent 
to be abused and outraged as they are by the high-handed action of Federal officials, because of 
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the ‘raid’ upon alleged violates of the Edmunds law.”  According to the testimony at the 1885 257
meeting of John T. Caine, who was a delegate to the House of Representatives from the Territory 
of Utah, problems for the Mormons resurfaced shortly after Congress first recognized the 
Territory of Utah in 1859. 
 Not only were representatives of the federal government invading Mormon communities 
out west, but they were propagating misleading rumors about the people back east in the states: 
“Federal officials, strangers to our faith, men having no interest in common with our people, 
were sent among us. One who disgraced the ermine he so unworthily wore, in the hope of 
warding off the disgrace his misconduct merited, spread in the east false and unfounded stories 
of ‘Mormon’ disloyalty and ‘Mormon’ wickedness. The accusations were months in reaching the 
ears of the accused.”  Caine denounced what he perceived as improvident federal officials 258
rushing into the territory: “An army was sent to chastise an unoffending people; to subdue an 
imaginary insurrection. It is not necessary to dwell on the oft-told tale.”  The opening of the 259
coal mines to non-Mormon workers inevitably “brought hosts of strangers into the Territory” 
who were initially unfamiliar with Mormon history or culture.  Caine condemned the 260
“demagogues” among them who misrepresented Mormons in publications throughout the 
country, intending to drive a wedge between the Mormons and the newcomers. From his 
perspective, “After years of effort, these agitators succeeded in having Congress pass legislation 
inimical to the people of Utah.”  261
 Speakers at the conference, including Caine, defended Mormons who were falsely 
accused of polygamy. But there were also speakers who defended polygamy itself. A man named 
Mr. Whitney believed his fellow Mormons had been unfairly persecuted as disloyal citizens and 
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religious outsiders, aligned with Jewish and Muslim people: “All through our history the general 
government has seemed to regard us less as loyal American citizens than as a dangerous alien 
element. . . . The land whose Constitution, in the language of its framers, was hoped to be broad 
enough to shelter under its mantle the Jew, the Mohammedan, the Pagan, as well as the Christian, 
has scarcely been able to tolerate, much less protect, the numerically insignificant 
‘Mormons.’”  Whitney agreed with Caine’s general dissatisfaction with how federal officers 262
supervised the Territory of Utah. He believed that for the most part, territorial governors, judges, 
attorneys, and marshals did not have the best interest of the Mormon people in mind. The 
removal of Mormons from government positions stripped them of their authority over issues that 
affected their fellow Mormons. Mormon postmasters, for example, were oftentimes “displaced 
for strangers—in some instances mere transients,” and post offices named after Mormons who 
were central to the early prosperity of the Territory of Utah were renamed without explanation.  263
 A year later, in an open letter to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives after his return from the Rocky Mountain region, the statistician and economist 
Joseph Nimmo, Jr. observed Mormon culture,  which he classified as a “conglomerate of 264
religion, trade and politics.”  Nimmo decided that it would “soon command the attention of the 265
House of Representatives” and the public.  The opinion of “loyal” non-Mormon Utah residents 266
was that “the Mormons had reached a point, where, at all hazards they had resolved by violent 
means, once more to resist the authority of the United States.”  Nimmo referenced a letter by 267
Captain Van Vliet, who had written to the Secretary of War about a speech by then head of the 
Church of Latter-day Saints, John Taylor, to an audience of four thousand people. In his speech, 
Taylor vaguely stated that only those who were appointed positions by the Lord were entitled to 
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said positions.  Capt. Van Vliet’s decision to report this speech showed the ongoing fear that 268
Mormon citizens might prioritize the interests of the Church of Latter-day Saints over those of 
the United States. Public morale about the Mormons and the potential for Utah statehood still 
required maintenance and, more boldly, a formal renunciation of polygamy itself. 
V.  The Shift from Attacking Polygamy to Preserving Monogamy  
 The high-profile polygamy case, Snow v. United States (1886), marked the rapid decline 
of polygamy in Utah and the steady progress toward statehood. Lorenzo Snow appealed three 
cohabitation indictments from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah in the United States 
Supreme Court. Snow’s daughters with different wives provided evidence in the trial. One 
daughter testified that she knew the women suspected of being her father’s wives, as well as 
where they lived, and that they all had children who used the Snow surname. Additional 
evidence included conversations with Snow, the setup of the women’s houses, and the dining 
arrangements of the involved families. 
 Lorenzo Snow’s six wives lived in one town, in which he publicly acknowledged them as 
his wives at various events. A handful of these wives testified against him. One wife, Sarah 
Snow, testified about the chronology of events and the polygamous nature of Snow’s marriages. 
When asked why her husband did not visit her as frequently as he had in the past, she responded: 
“Well, sometimes he calls and sometimes he don’t [sic] call. I do not see him as much as I did 
five years ago, for he lived right there five years ago; he does not visit me as much as he did 
when he boarded with me. Five years ago he lived right there, next door.”  When another wife, 269
Harriet Snow, was asked the same question, she replied that their relations differed from previous 
years: “A good deal; in my younger days I lived with him as wife and raised him [sic] children. 
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Now I am an old lady and I do not consider the relations binding upon me in my younger days to 
be so now. I do not live with him in the same way.”  A third wife, Mary Snow, added: “He does 270
not call so much, for the reason that he has been away from town. He does not visit me as much 
as he did a number of years ago.”  A fourth wife, Eleanor Snow, offered an anecdote that 271
implicated Snow as a polygamist: “I guess I recognized him as my husband and me as his wife 
during 1885; don’t know; the difference in our relationship the last year and formerly he does not 
live at my place. I guess the only difference is he is not in my company so much–you understand. 
Previous to that, he had visited and dined with me once in a while [sic]. When he dined with me, 
it was with me and my children, unless there was company to these family gatherings. Mr. Snow 
occupied the position as head of the family and occupies the head of the table when he is there; 
his friends all put him at the head of the table.”  The women were not hostile toward Snow in 272
these responses, nor did they offer opinions about the morality of polygamy. But their 
testimonies were considered evidence against him. Additional witnesses claimed they saw 
Lorenzo Snow in company with different wives in various settings, such as riding horses or 
visiting the theater. One witness claimed to have seen Lorenzo Snow enter and leave the gate in 
front of the home where Sarah and two other wives lived, but the witness did not see him move 
in and out of the home itself. An additional witness supplied the federal attorney with a diagram 
showing how the layout of Snow’s block and fences could conceal a person’s movement from 
one brick house to another without being visible on the street.  273
 The United States Deputy Marshal offered his recollection of Snow’s initial arrest. The 
Marshal had searched the house and found a ripped carpet concealing a small trap door that he 
believed led to other compartments sheltering some of Snow’s wives and children. Under the 
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door, he found two connected small apartments, in which Snow was sitting. Hesitant to exit, 
Lorenzo Snow allegedly claimed: “All right I am coming out. That is all right, boys; you have 
done your duty; come and take a drink with me.”  274
 The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the evidence against Snow showed “one of the most 
aggravated cases and worst examples of polygamy,” since he had one lawful and six plural 
wives, and he maintained and publicly acknowledged all of them.  Snow highlighted a shift 275
from punishing polygamy to preserving monogamy, by not only punishing polygamy when 
evidence was clearly available, but by also preventing men from “flaunting in the face of the 
world the ostentation and opportunities of a bigamous household with all the outward 
appearances of the continuance of the same relations which existed before the act was passed, 
and without reference to what may occur in the privacy of those relations.”  In other words, 276
monitoring polygamy was less about punishing criminal activity than it was about promoting 
cultural uniformity. 
 The opinion of Justice Boreman nonetheless implied that the government desperately 
collected witnesses to testify in Snow, repeating the prosecution’s strategy in previous polygamy 
cases: “It is now a part of the history of this Territory that in cases of this character nearly all of 
the witnesses upon the Government has to depend to make out its case are unwilling witnesses. 
They are generally members of different households of the defendant, under his influence, and 
also subject to a powerful church pressure to compel them to shield the accused.”  Boreman 277
also addressed the burden of proving cohabitation, indicating why the judges and justices 
accepted evidence that they might otherwise consider tenuous: “In these polygamous relations 
there never is and cannot be that intimate association and habitual attention given by the man to 
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the various women as exist between a husband and his wife in the monogamic state. 
Consequently, in the very nature of things, the proof of cohabitation cannot be made as clear as 
in the case of a monogamic marriage, simply because the facts of which proof is made do not as 
abundantly exist.”  In Boreman’s opinion, we can see how facts were stretched to convict 278
polygamists, but the lack of printed evidence drove this strategy. In addressing the discussion of 
Snow’s seventieth birthday party, the justice recounted how one witness stated that “many 
neighbors and friends outside of the Snow family” were there, and the justice then added that 
contextually, the “Snow family” referred to the various polygamous households of Snow.  It 279
was evident that the Boreman exhibited sympathy toward the older women, who were seemingly 
pushed out by younger women “to lead a more lonely life” in the polygamous system, reifying 
one view of Mormon women as victims rather than willing participators: “It is the natural result 
of a system founded in sensualism and is the same here as in every other country where 
polygamy or any other system exists to shield the lust of men.”  The opinion also revealed how 280
some central figures within the federal government viewed squashing polygamy and praising 
monogamy as a way to confirm the national morale of a progressive, civilized society. 
 Another justice, Justice Powers, wrote an opinion that showed why the Snow decision did 
not just attack polygamy but defended monogamy. Powers cited in his opinion the political 
philosopher and professor, Francis Lieber, who had suggested that polygamy led to a patriarchal 
principle “which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, 
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.”  Citing Chancellor Kent, 281
the justice continued that polygamy, which he referred to as “held in abhorrence by the Christian 
world,”  could exist without appearing to disturb the social conditions of surrounding people, 282
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but unless restricted by a law or constitution, it was within the power of every civil government 
to determine whether polygamy should be the law of social life.  283
 As a lawyer representing Snow in the Supreme Court,  George Ticknor Curtis was also 284
a constitutional scholar, historian, and publicist who defended Mormonism in court and in 
newspapers. Though not a Mormon himself, he delivered a plea for religious liberty in defense of 
the Mormons of Utah shortly before retiring.  He was a commissioner under the 1850 Fugitive 285
Slave Law that compelled northerners to send escaped slaves back to their owners, and he 
supported slavery as a necessary part of the North-South settlement.  This viewpoint possibly 286
influenced his defense of polygamy that many of Curtis’s contemporaries aligned with slavery. 
Curtis was a lawyer for Lorenzo Snow for two cases that reached the Supreme Court. The 
Washington Post summarized Curtis’s stance on the Snow ruling. Curtis believed that Snow 
should not have been punished for living and sharing a bed with his youngest and seventh wife, 
while only occasionally visiting the wives in the daytime and providing them, and their children, 
with financial support: “The arrest of such a man, he says, is an outrage, and amounts to religious 
persecution and a violation of constitutional rights.”  In other words, Curtis believed that men 287
should be able to have multiple wives as long as they did not live with all of them, and 
cohabitation could not be assumed based on the fact that men financially supported or visited 
multiple wives.  
 The Atlanta Constitution reported that Curtis pronounced “their church the most 
democratic organization in the world,” and, despite defending Snow, believed that the 
immigration of non-Mormons to Utah would more quickly eradicate polygamy, an institution 
that was already on the decline to a mere total of two thousand heads of polygamous families. 
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The article added that polygamy, “the real ground of our objection to the Mormons,” would 
disintegrate under those circumstances explained by Curtis. At the time, Utah was deemed as ill-
prepared for statehood, but would become prepared once the territory proved to “be in-complete 
accord with the spirit of our institutions, and the genius of our government.”  288
 Curtis provocatively claimed that Snow’s three convictions violated the free exercise of 
religion clause of the First Amendment.  He argued that the evidence used to convict Snow was 289
faulty. Details about the evidence, namely, how and with what intent he referred to the women as 
his wives, were thought by the opposing sides to both support and debunk the accusation. 
Additionally, Curtis pointed out that the women were made compulsory witnesses for the 
prosecution.  The wives’ testimonies constituted the majority of the evidence, along with “the 290
proof of his visits to the houses inhabited by some of them.”  The question of Mormon women, 291
who they were and how they understood their role in society, surfaced again in this case. One 
judge claimed: “We cannot, unless we meet the Mormon women of Utah halfway, and recognize 
who and what they are, we cannot accomplish anything useful.”  The judge furthered they were 292
“treating these women, many of them women of New England birth, people, at least of 
intelligence, educated in the public and private schools of our older States, as if they were a set 
of degraded beings.”  The judge’s emphasis on the New England origin of Mormon women 293
continued the tradition of distinguishing foreign from natural barbarism. Mormon women who 
came from New England might deserve, according to this rationale, more leniency and 
sympathy. 
 Lorenzo Snow, similar to previous polygamists whose cases reached the United States 
Supreme Court, questioned the legality of his grand jury. He also made a technical argument, that 
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the indictment did not define which woman was Snow’s first and legal wife.  While the 294
testimonies of each of Snow’s wives did not deny the possible existence of other wives,  the 295
ambiguity over which wife was the first wife questioned whether the federal government relied 
on unchecked facts and therefore dubious evidence to prove Snow was a polygamist. The use of 
doubtful information was amplified by the fact that Snow’s punishment was increased by the 
segregation of two related but unequal offenses, sexual intercourse and cohabitation.  Justice 296
Zane wrote in the Court opinion that the segregation of offenses tied to how Congress 
understood polygamy at the time. 
 Zane, a major judicial force in government sanctions against polygamists, “demonstrated 
considerable leniency towards those who were willing to obey the law and abandon plural 
marriage,”  particularly in comparison to the actions of Justice McKean. For example, in one 297
ruling, Zane lamented that outsiders and informants constantly monitored Mormons: “And for 
this end an army of sneaks and informers, with authority of inquisitors to intrude into the privacy 
of domestic relations with indecent questionings of children and women, becomes a necessity to 
maintain the ‘sanctity of the law!’”  He acknowledged that some Mormons gave rise to the 298
“suspicion of the horde of spotters, ever eager to pry into the affairs of their neighbors with 
prurient curiosity that there must be a plural marriage concealed in that relation, he is at once 
indicted and sentenced for unlawful cohabitation!”  Part of the justification for segregating 299
charges was that Mormon polygamists too often escaped punishment: “Congress, therefore, 
forbade plural marriage in appearance only, as well as in form, and by the example of 
punishment it doubtless intended to eradicate the example of apparent plural marriages as well as 
the plural marriage in form.”  300
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 Allowing for the segregation of charges in the legislative branch and enforcing 
segregated charges in the judicial branch represented more than a legal loophole, but rather a 
comprehensive, strategic federal campaign to eliminate polygamy. One judge dissented from the 
opinion due to the “weakness of the testimony, the immaterial evidence received from the 
witnesses,”  notably critiquing the kind and means of information used to convict Snow. The 301
Assistant District Attorney had claimed that Snow was obliged to show all the facts in his 
defense from his wives and children, but stipulated that the prosecution in turn did not have to 
present its facts because they had been “put out of the way by the procurement of the 
defendant.”  The attorney’s statement affirmed that the recollection of the arrest by the Deputy 302
Marshal and the neutral testimonies of Snow’s wives was sufficient evidence to convict Snow for 
polygamy. Snow marked a shift in the federal campaign not just attacking polygamy, but 
emphasizing the significance of monogamy by splitting the charges into intercourse and 
cohabitation, thereby punishing those who chose to even live with more than one woman, much 
less engage in intercourse with more than one woman.  
 The Snow justices’ concerns about the theological beliefs of the Mormons, aside from the 
more pragmatic implications of polygamy, meant that Utah residents were still considered to be 
potentially unprepared for citizenship. Justice Miller at one point asked George Ticknor Curtis 
for clarity about precisely what was meant by marriage within the Mormon faith: “If I do not 
interrupt this portion of your argument, I would like to explain this spiritual aspect.”  After 303
laying out an explanation briefly, Curtis returned the conversation to women and to the First 
Amendment: “I must now, as rapidly as I can, call your attention to the references which show 
historically the intent and meaning of the first amendment [sic] of the Constitution, which 
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forbids Congress from making any law ‘prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”  He argued 304
that the free exercise of religion was not limited to public worship or external acts, but that 
beliefs should also be protected if those beliefs did not harm the public.  
 The issue of women in Utah lingered in the concerns of federal officials following the 
Snow decision. In 1888, Eugene Hale of Maine informed the Senate that Mormon women in 
Utah wished to withdraw from polygamous unions a few years prior, but were financially 
dependent on their husbands. This issue intrigued the National Woman’s Home Missionary 
Society, which tried to help Mormon women through an “organized effort” that resulted in the 
Industrial Christian Home Association of Utah.  This organization consisted of both Mormon 305
and non-Mormon women who distributed applications for relief from polygamous unions, in the 
hopes that women who responded could be taught how to work outside of domestic settings.  306
Voluntary associations such as this one contributed to the comprehensive federal campaign to 
suppress polygamy: “By this appropriation Congress embarked in the work of aiding dependent 
women and children seeking to escape from polygamous relations and added the important 
words that it was done ‘with a view to aid in the suppression of polygamy in the Territory.’”  307
Relief applications were not an example of direct monitoring, but they demonstrated an avenue 
through which the federal government indirectly acquired information about Mormon men 
through women and children. They were also a means for preventing polygamy in the territories, 
as well as a way for the government to maintain relations with Mormon women and children 
while undermining the authority of Mormon polygamist men.  
 The final defeat to polygamy before its formal renouncement occurred when the Church 
challenged its status as a corporation in Late Corporation of the Church of Latter-day Saints v. 
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United States (1890). In the Utah Supreme Court three years prior, James O. Broadhead had 
characterized the Mormon Church as a corporation. One of the first acts of the Mormon-
controlled territorial legislature after Congress organized the Territory of Utah in 1850 was to 
grant the church corporate status. The church had the legal right to govern its constituents’ 
marriages, and to acquire and oversee an unlimited amount of land, money, and goods. 
Moreover, the Mormon Church became both a religious and charitable corporation that had the 
power to sue and be sued. These rights of the Mormon Church exceeded the legal powers given 
to church corporations in the states.  However, as Broadhead explained, Congress dissolved the 308
Mormon corporation in 1887 when the ordinance was disapproved and annulled.  Without the 309
corporation status, the Church was limited in terms of how much property it could own. The 
dissolution of this status was the final impetus for change to the Mormon doctrine of polygamy. 
 Examining financial records at first glance offered a simpler alternative to monitoring 
polygamy and the Mormon community more broadly, but the transcript from the Supreme Court 
of the Territory of Utah used in Late Corporation highlighted the instability of how the federal 
government continued to collect information on the Mormons in the years leading up to Utah 
statehood: “[T]he Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was organized and did buy, 
receive, acquire, and hold large amounts of real and personal property of great value in the 
Territory of Utah after the 1st day of July, 1862, the precise amount, value, or description of 
which the plaintiff is unable to state, but asked leave to prove; and the plaintiff alleges, on 
information and belief, that the value of the real estate is about two millions of dollars and of the 
personal property about one million of dollars.”  The Church appealed the dissolution of its 310
corporation status on three premises. 
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 First, it argued that the dissolution of the corporation did not obey the decision in 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), which enforced the idea that a state could not alter the 
charter of a charitable corporation unless the power to do so was evident in the original 
document. Second, the Church challenged that the judiciary, and not the legislature, traditionally 
dissolved corporations. Third, the Church argued that confiscated property should be returned to 
the individual members of the Church who had donated the property. The Supreme Court 
rejected all three arguments, stating in the opinion that the Property Clause permitted Congress to 
oversee legislative issues in the territories. The Supreme Court added that the government could 
not return the property to donors since there was no way to ensure assets would not promote 
polygamy in the future. Instead, the Court would choose the charities to receive the properties. 
This last point of transferring property and consequently undermining the influence of a 
questionable religion tied into the larger narrative of how the federal government sought to 
protect citizens from detrimental influence and prevent polygamy from resurfacing in later years.  
 Similar to the racial characterization of the Mormons in Reynolds, the Court compared 
the Mormon Church to hostile foreigners, or “Thugs of India,” who believed in assassination for 
religious purposes.  The subtle construction of who was or was not a proper American was 311
interwoven with this final landmark Supreme Court decision about what the limits of power 
should have been for religious institutions in the nation. By the decision of Late Corporation, 
“[t]he jurisprudence surrounding Mormon cases thus had begun, more and more, to institute 
Protestant scriptural and moral prescriptions” into a constitutional code.  But what hurt the 312
Saints the most in Late Corporation was its impact on their financial pockets. Four months after 
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the decision, Mormon President Wilford Woodruff issued the 1890 Manifesto declaring the end 
of Mormon polygamy.  
 Utah was granted statehood in 1896, but the debates in the years leading up to its 
statehood were lively. Some publications accused the Associated Press general manager of 
falsely representing the Mormons as part of a conspiracy to procure statehood for Utah.  313
George Ticknor Curtis, the lawyer who defended Lorenzo Snow, published his opinion in the 
New York Tribune in 1883 about, as indicated in the the headline, “the reasons for his faith in the 
Mormons,” declaring: “Now whether the discontinuance of polygamy is due to the legislation or 
to a change in the sentiments of the Mormons themselves, it has certainly taken place, as I can 
testify.”  As part of the comprehensive campaign to convert Utah into a state, the judicial and 314
legislative branches coerced Mormons to abandon polygamy and its isolated economy, practices 
that lawmakers deemed incompatible with United States statehood.  
 Even though Woodruff had issued the Manifesto several years prior, tensions between 
Mormons and the anti-Mormons in the Territory of Utah remained high in 1896, when the non-
Mormons who still lived in the valley complained they were “constantly under the surveillance 
of the polygamous church.”  In 1888, the debate over whether Utah should be granted 315
statehood continued in the Senate.  Significantly in these discussions, John T. Caine of Utah 316
argued that polygamy was a moot point for objecting against granting Utah Mormons 
citizenship, since less than one percent of the population of Utah was still polygamous. He did 
not, however, cite the source of this percentage.  Edmunds disagreed, suggesting that Caine had 317
lied about the small portion of polygamy among Mormons. 
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 This discussion showed how the source and transmission of information shaped 
governmental discussions about the Mormons. The press factored into congressional debates 
about the Mormons in the years leading to statehood. When accusing Caine of lying about the 
circumstances of polygamy, Edmunds cited editorials, including an 1888 article by Judge C. C. 
Goodwin, the editor of an anti-Mormon newspaper, the Salt Lake Tribune. Edmunds also argued 
that national safety should be a primary concern by citing a secretly circulated 1885 Mormon 
presidential summons regarding organized resistance to national law. The summons claimed the 
Mormon Church had been denied its constitutional rights and was under attack, forcing it to 
create a defense fund that united Utah Mormons with Mormon communities in Idaho and 
Arizona. The summons stated: “It is of the utmost importance to us as a people that these cases 
should be contested before the courts.”  Edmunds, in short, attempted to portray the Mormons 318
as willing to commit treason and disrupt the peace of the United States. 
 Caine retorted by reaffirming the authenticity of his account, but more strikingly, by 
arguing that past interventions in Mormon affairs were unfounded. He presented a letter he had 
written to President Cleveland about troops that were wrongfully sent to Utah based on the 
accusations of the Utah governor and an “intemperate and violently partisan newspaper,” 
controlled by the Utah governor and federal officials. This newspaper, along with the Associated 
Press dispatches, permitted “wide circulation to their deliberately manufactured falsehoods.”  319
Caine advised the President that the corrupt federal officials were unworthy to continue 
representing the federal government. 
 A year later, in 1889, the lawyer Jeremiah M. Wilson, the former United States 
Representative for Indiana, argued in favor of admitting Utah as a state before the House 
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Committee on Territories. He compared the debates over Utah to those over Idaho, which would 
become a state the following year, once Mormons of high positions confirmed they would live 
up to national law and not practice polygamy.  Before Utah could become a state, the federal 320
government required a minimum number of inhabitants. Wilson attested Utah maintained at two 
hundred thousand literate people, the least illiterate people of any Territory.  Wilson also 321
commented on the success of the Utah economy, which boasted  “vast agricultural, mineral, and 
manufacturing resources, and the intelligence, energy, and high character of her people make 
statehood of vast importance, not only to Utah, but to the whole country.”  Intelligence about 322
the Mormons had worked against polygamy, but it conversely supported their case for statehood. 
 Discussions about the Mormons preceding statehood sometimes relied on dubious and 
outdated information, as they had in early debates on polygamy. Judge McBride interrupted 
Wilson’s discussion by asking about the 1882 Commission Report, which stated that twelve 
thousand polygamists lived in Utah. Wilson responded that those twelve thousand people were 
no longer involved in polygamous relationships. Robert Newton Baskin, an appointed justice on 
the Utah Supreme Court, was despised by Mormons for his work against polygamy, but later 
helped transform Utah into a state.  Baskin challenged Wilson’s assessment of the numbers, 323
arguing that his sum of current polygamists “would not include those not on the poll-books and 
would not include aliens, nor those in polygamy under the age of twenty-one years.”  The 324
discussion dissected numerical details without coming to a definitive conclusion. 
 Shifting away from the issue of dated information, Wilson more boldly questioned the 
validity of newspaper articles as sources for arguments: “Judge Baskin referred to an article 
published in the Millennial Star, and gave the volume and page and ascribed it to Mr. Richards, 
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the father of the gentleman who has been here before you. Now, he did that same thing before the 
Senate committee, and . . . Mr. Richards corrected him and stated that his father did not write the 
article.”  Wilson eventually changed the subject from details and numbers, critiquing the 325
unsubstantiated claims that Mormons would listen to their leaders before United States 
government authorities if Utah became a state. He pointed out government leaders’ lack of 
familiarity about the Mormon religion: “It is very evident from the remarks of the gentlemen of 
the opposition, particularly of Governor West, that they do not understand the doctrines and 
tenets and belief of the Mormon people. […] This idea that there are revelations to regulate civil 
and business relations is erroneous and absurd, and not a single intense of anything of the kind 
has been or can be cited.”  Wilson rebuked the governor for blaming all Mormons for the 326
crimes of a few, to which Governor West replied, “I am not speaking of individual crimes. I am 
speaking about authorities and elders.”  West’s comment was representative of the widespread 327
fear that Mormon leaders would, as Wilson explained above, “regulate civil and business 
relations,” impeding the progress of Utah statehood. 
 West and Wilson also sparred over the number of crimes committed in Salt Lake City in 
1886, as Wilson argued that non-Mormons disproportionately committed crimes. He defended 
his claim, challenging the governor: “If that is not accurate, you have access to the records of the 
courts in Salt Lake City.” Governor West retorted: “But where did you get your information?”  328
At this point, one judge interrupted that it did not matter where he got it since the records were 
open to both parties, and Judge Baskin jumped into the conversation: “But the records would not 
show the religious complexion of the parties indicted.”  Wilson’s opponents tried to divert the 329
conversation by interpreting his argument as slandering the religious, non-Mormon majority and 
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by casting the Mormons as barbaric outsiders: “You state those facts to show the purity of the 
Mormons over the Gentiles morally?”  Wilson replied: “I only mention these statistics to show 330
that a Mormon is not a bad man or woman because a Mormon; nor is a Gentile a good man or 
woman, or better than a Mormon, because a Gentile; and to show that if the Mormon Church 
controls its people, it controls them in the direction of good morals and public peace.”  Like 331
Wilson, Justice H. W. Smith, cited at another House Committee on the Territory hearing, attested 
to the industriousness of the majority of the Mormon people: “She [Utah] has near a quarter of a 
million civilized people, who, in point of intelligence, industry, and all the essential qualities of 
good citizenship, are up to the standard of any American community.”  332
 John W. Judd of Tennessee, a pivotal figure in Utah statehood who served as a territorial 
judge and district attorney in the Territory of Utah and later the first United States District 
Attorney of the state of Utah,  defended Mormonism by drawing a parallel between the 333
Mormon issue and racial discrimination in the United States: “If they were of a different race 
something of the kind might be said with some truth: but they are American citizens, our own 
kind and kin and our own blood, with all the aspirations and ambitions of American citizens.”  334
Citing the low percentage of polygamists in Utah, he rhetorically united the Mormons and non-
Mormons in Utah, showing solidarity in a territory that no longer saw active polygamy: “[I]t is 
unfair to the Mormon population and unfair to us who live in Utah to undertake the prejudice the 
minds of the people of the United States, and of their Representatives, against the Mormon 
people by reason of a state of things which has not existed for years past and which nobody there 
now favors or upholds.”  335
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 Justice Smith corroborated Judd’s assessment, that Utah was ready for statehood, by 
arguing that Utah citizens did not just want statehood but the right to elect their own officers and 
oversee elections, “and to do it at all times with a full knowledge that Congress and the Federal 
Government have absolute jurisdiction over us.”  Certain names were blacklisted from voting 336
based on presumptions of polygamy.  One speaker offered a powerful statement implying the 337
unethical and even illegitimate use of garnering information about polygamy: “Let it be 
understood that we are not complaining of the laws but of the methods that are employed in their 
execution.”  This speaker’s distinction was significant, indicating that the system itself, and not 338
the suppression of polygamy, was a core problem in monitoring the Mormons. 
 This hearing represented the willingness of the Mormons to align their goals, in front of 
Congress, with the well-being of the United States, but it also represented a challenge to the way 
in which the federal government continued to collect information on Mormons through its 
monitoring system. Quoting the governor, Justice Smith relayed to Congress: “When the 
Mormon people declared at a general gathering that polygamy was a vital part of their religion, I 
accepted their action as a sincere expression of their views. Now . . . they have, in the same 
public way, resolved to refrain from violating the law prohibiting polygamy in the future.”  339
And they could not have been more clear, having had formally abolished polygamy two years 
prior. 
VI.  Conclusion  
 Public and governmental scrutiny of polygamy launched a wider set of criticisms of the 
Mormons and their institutions, grounded on communal practices, minimal consumption, and 
independence, “but outsiders saw instead monopoly and protectionism, and resented the church’s 
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interference with competition and a free market.”  After Utah became a state in 1896, Salt Lake 340
City developed its trade and commerce, and the Mormons turned into “capitalistic, conservative, 
pro-American individualists.”  341
 The Mormons’ quest for acceptance did not completely vanish with statehood. In 1898, 
the League for Social Service presented to Congress a list of reasons why the Mormon, Brigham 
H. Roberts, should be expelled from Congress. Theodore Schroeder, who had worked as a lawyer 
for the admission of Utah as a state, moved to New York City in 1901 to participate in the effort 
to oust Roberts, where he subsequently met radicals and the eventual members of the Free 
Speech Club.  Mormons who sought political positions issued a new wave of concern over the 342
influence of religion in the nation. Roberts met the congressional requirements, as he was at least 
twenty-five years old, a citizen of seven years, and an inhabitant of his state. But the League 
wanted to expel him by a two-thirds majority vote based on the “public morality and the general 
welfare” of the country.   343
 The League believed that Roberts was a practicing polygamist trying to reintroduce 
polygamy to the House of Representatives.  It claimed polygamy proliferated in Utah by citing 344
the Deseret News of Salt Lake City, or as the paper called it, the “official organ of the Mormon 
Church” that “gave lengthy editorial space to the defense of such lawless course, claiming that 
there was . . . a tacit understanding, not to say contract, that the dead strife (prosecution for 
polygamy) should be buried.”  The League also averred that another Mormon, Governor Wells, 345
spoke against Mr. Roberts, accusing him of polygamy.  Theodore Schroeder was a key figure in 346
denying Roberts his congressional seat, symbolizing his “dogged crusade against the Mormons 
which replaced his youthful sympathy for them.”  Reed Smoot of Utah, elected to the Senate in 347
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1903, defended Roberts’s right to serve in office as a member of the Latter-day Saints. Kathleen 
Flake has argued that in Smoot’s hearing, Protestants were the main adversaries to his cause,  348
suggesting that government and political leaders of the Protestant culture continued to evaluate 
Mormons’ Americanness even after the Latter-day Saints formally abandoned polygamy. In 
1907, Roberts issued an extensive publication on behalf of the Church of Latter-day Saints that 
suggested that Mormons were still regarded with suspicion by the public.  349
 And so, even once formal governmental monitoring had subsided, the public speculated 
about the Mormons through less systematic, objective, or evidence-based methods than those of 
the government officials. One Mormon anonymously crafted a 1910 letter entitled, “Are the 
Mormons Loyal to the Government?” as a response to a Pearson’s Magazine article about 
Mormons. Pearson’s Magazine rejected the answer, a decision that justified the Mormon claim 
that they were unable to defend their public image in printed media. Though the battle for 
polygamy ended in the United States Supreme Court, some Mormons actively pursued societal 
acceptance in mass publications: “Mormon Elders are frequently asked why the articles attacking 
the leaders of the Church, which have recently appeared in various magazines, are not answered. 
[…] Through various interviews in newspapers which have appeared from time to time the 
President and leading men of the Church have given ample answer to attacks emanating from 
magazine articles, and magazine people have frequently been appealed to, without success, to 
open their columns for such answers.”  This request for representation in media, even after the 350
Mormons of Utah were officially citizens, indicated that Protestant values continued to influence 
public opinion in the United States and separate Mormons from mainstream Protestantism. 
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 It also resonated with the long battle between the Mormons and the federal government to 
control the terms with which Mormons carried out their private and public affairs, first as 
residents of the Territory of Utah and then of Utah the state. Following the strategic campaign 
against polygamy, the Mormons were thereafter discredited and disempowered by their lack of 
representation in mass media. Many groups identified by their religion, race, or color have 
sought similar representation in the American public sphere, but not all were subjected to the 
discrimination that the Mormons endured. The distinction between belief and action articulated 
in Reynolds aimed to eliminate polygamy from Mormonism and United States society. In this 
way, the anti-polygamy campaign in the Territory of Utah paralleled the pending surveillance 
strategies of the American Friends Service Committee Quakers in the Cold War era and post-
September 11 Brooklyn Muslims.  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Chapter 3. The Quakers of the AFSC: Regulating Communism in the Cold War Era 
“As, drawer by drawer, the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are pried open by the 
Freedom of Information Act, the truly formidable capacity of the agency to sense subversion in 
the seemingly most honorable segments of American society is gradually unfolding. Paranoia on 
this scale has a certain grandeur; and if it were not that a number of good people were hurt and 
that we all paid for it in our taxes, John Edgar Hoover’s crusade of panic against treason might 
well be the jest of the century. Attend now to the proposition that the Quakers required vigilant 
surveillance.”  — The Editors of The Nation (March 11, 1978) 351
I.  Introduction  
 The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), originally called the Friends National 
Service Committee, was formed by Quakers in Philadelphia in 1917 in the throes of the First 
World War. Its goal was to provide conscientious objectors with service opportunities and to 
assist with the war-related struggles of European nations. The first gathering showed its 
proclivity for reconciling viewpoints among diverse Friends.  The organization soon expanded 352
to provide relief to communities in war or conflict zones in the United States and abroad, 
including by feeding the hungry and supporting immigrant and refugee communities. The 
American Friends Service Committee is incorporated as a charity in Pennsylvania and is 
classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a tax-deductible “association of churches.” From 
the early to the mid-twentieth century, the Federal Bureau of Information (FBI), led by J. Edgar 
Hoover, suspected AFSC members of associating with communists through their humanitarian 
projects, predominantly during the Cold War period.  
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 From 1976 to 1980, through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, the AFSC 
received its FBI files dating from 1921 to the early 1970s. The FBI collected some information 
on the AFSC from other government agencies but predominantly gathered its own intelligence 
through FBI agents and informants. Both the FBI and the AFSC underwent organizational 
transformations in the mid-twentieth century that affected the outcome of the FBI surveillance 
program. The FBI tried to understand the extent to which Quaker beliefs shaped the actions of 
the American Friends Service Committee. 
 Beginning in 1956, a comprehensive FBI Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) 
instructed FBI agents to surveil subversive individuals and groups, including the American 
Friends Service Committee. A group of anonymous activists publicly exposed COINTELPRO in 
1971 by breaking into an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, and releasing incriminating files. 
William C. Davidon, a peace activist and professor of mathematics and physics at Haverford 
College, led the break-in. His wife, Ann Morrissett Davidon, a writer, editor, peace activist, and 
AFSC volunteer, archived and annotated many of the FBI files on the AFSC. Neither of the 
Davidons held a religious affiliation. Yet they worked closely with Quaker and Catholic activist 
organizations, motivated by their commitment to peace and social justice.  Ann Davidon 353
succinctly conveyed the revelation that AFSC Quakers were under surveillance with her headline 
for The Nation, “Even the Quakers Scared the FBI.”  The exposure of COINTELPRO, in the 354
end, merely prompted the FBI to refine its objective for surveillance.  355
 These FBI files nonetheless merited close examination. They comprise the backbone of 
this chapter, which examines how the FBI surveilled the AFSC in the late 1940s to the early 
1960s. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI from 1924 to 1972, sought unlimited power to 
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identify and prosecute political dissenters. He would have to wait until the Cold War, however, as 
the FBI only acquired the capacity, and not the authority, to detect radicalism in the 1920s. FBI 
agents struggled to determine the legitimacy of surveilling the group, in particular, by 
ascertaining whether the AFSC was a Quaker organization. Mid-twentieth-century Quakers were 
part of a minority Protestant pacifist culture that contained elements of both insider Protestant 
influence, as marked by influential Quaker leaders, as well as outsider resistance to the 
mainstream Protestant establishment.  Consequently, in contrast to the surveilled Mormons of 356
the previous chapter, the FBI was constrained by its attempt to respect the religious expression of 
a high-status Quaker organization, home to influential members of society, as well as by the rise 
of civil liberties following the First World War. Much like the Mormons, neither the public nor 
the Quakers themselves unanimously viewed the Society of Friends as Protestant. As a result, the 
high status, insider community of the Quakers commanded careful consideration from the FBI. 
The AFSC saw other Protestant communities as allies, but it faced scrutiny from Protestants 
within the peace community, such as the Brethrens, who tended to avoid politics; the 
Mennonites; and other Protestant adherents of the Social Gospel who participated in reform 
activities.  The FBI tried to distinguish between religious expression and threatening action 357
when surveilling the AFSC.  
 The Mormon and Quaker case studies featured government officials who contemplated 
the ramifications of citizens practicing polygamy and pacifism, respectively. However, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter by the 1879 Reynolds decision on polygamy, the United 
States Supreme Court for the first time defined and applied the free exercise clause of the United 
States Constitution. More specifically, the decision protected polygamy as a religious belief, but 
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not as an action.  As legal scholar Paul Baumgardner has written, “Reynolds v. United States 358
stands as the most influential First Amendment free exercise case of the nineteenth-century, 
setting precedents and legal groundwork for many religion cases in the twentieth-century.”  In 359
the decades immediately following Reynolds, there was little activity in the Court on free 
exercise since there were few federal religious rights cases. Until the 1940s, most church-state 
issues emerged in state cases, but they did not invoke the free exercise clause. The Supreme 
Court cited Reynolds and incorporated the free exercise clause in Cantrell v. Connecticut (1940). 
The incorporation allowed the clause to be subsequently applied to state and local action. The 
case mentioned in chapter one, Sherbet v. Verner (1963), which defended a Seventh-Day 
Adventist’s religious belief to not work on Saturdays, was one of the first cases to substantively 
alter the Reynolds rendering on the free exercise clause.  360
 The free exercise clause was already legally defined when the FBI began surveilling the 
AFSC in 1921. Yet the FBI struggled with how to craft a policy for surveilling the AFSC using 
that definition. Allan W. Austin has emphasized Quakers’ proclivity for “translating belief into 
practice,”  a commitment that remains central to the AFSC to this day. FBI surveillance of the 361
AFSC, despite this precaution, revealed preexisting rifts among American Quakers, including 
their stance on United States foreign policy during the Cold War. The FBI stored letters from 
skeptical Quakers who offered alleged evidence of communist ties within the AFSC. Quakers 
were varied in their opinions on social issues, and in fact, “[m]any American Friends did not like 
or trust each other.”  A handful of Quakers dissented against the status quo of mainstream 362
culture: “[T]he underlying challenge of Quakerism–a call to remain in the world and practice 
what Christ preached–ensured that a certain percentage of each generation would oppose any 
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tendency to turn the Society of Friends into just another self-perpetuating synonym for ‘status 
quo.’”   363
 As early as the 1960s, some Friends became uncomfortable with what they perceived as 
leftist politics driving AFSC actions and alliances with people whom they deemed 
questionable.  They believed the AFSC should remain “a community of holy individuals” 364
committed to peace and opposed to hostile aggression.  The anticommunist campaign sweeping 365
the nation during the Cold War caused such Quakers, who already disagreed with these leftist, 
aggressive inclinations, to reconsider the AFSC.  In its surveillance of the AFSC, the FBI 366
observed this growing divide in the broader Quaker community between those who advocated 
stronger radical action at home and abroad, and those who insisted that passivity best reflected 
Quaker pacifism. This divide was made evident to FBI agents through Quaker citizen letters 
from throughout the nation questioning whether the AFSC was in fact free from communist 
influence. 
 FBI surveillance did not cause this rift in the American Friends Service Committee. But 
the exposure of the surveillance program confirmed what AFSC leaders suspected, that passive 
resistance to domestic and foreign conflicts would not achieve their organizational goals. Instead, 
they needed to include non-Quaker employees committed to social justice who were less 
resistant to aggressive radicalism that might conflict with Quaker pacifism. These non-Quaker 
employees who worked with the AFSC for longer periods helped to create continuity within the 
organization. The remaining Quakers in the organization were particularly liberal, perceiving 
other Quakers to have reneged on their organizational and theological commitment to social 
justice. 
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 This shift in demographics subtly transformed the AFSC from a Quaker organization to 
one that operated on Quaker principles. It also caused a wave of confusion among the FBI about 
the authenticity of its Quaker roots. The increasingly non-Quaker AFSC paralleled the gradual 
erosion of Quaker uniformity experienced by the Society of Friends. As noted in the first chapter, 
Quakers were among the Protestant groups “destined to maintain a separate identity” from the 
Protestant establishment.  Their message, attractive to converts and outsiders, boosted the 367
authority of the group in a short-term period, but eroded its collective solidarity over time. 
 Organizational histories of the AFSC are limited. Swarthmore religion professor J. 
William Frost examined the creation of the ASFC and its work prior to 1924 (1992); Lester M. 
Jones’s Quakers in Action (1929) focused on AFSC work abroad from 1917 to 1927; while Mary 
Hoxie Jones’s Swords into Ploughshares (1937), written from the perspective of an AFSC 
insider, lacked critical analysis and relied on fictional characters.  J. William Frost amusingly 368
recounted on choosing his research topic of the AFSC: “When I first announced that my next 
topic for research was the American Friends Service Committee, one of my Swarthmore College 
colleagues exclaimed, ‘That will be comparable to working on apple pie, or motherhood. Who 
could criticize the Service Committee?’ Well, now we know that apple pies are full of saturated 
fats and cholesterol, and motherhood should not be every woman’s destiny.”  Additional 369
publications about the AFSC were either published too early to be relevant to the domestic 
threats of the AFSC in the postwar period, or were written in such a way that raised questions 
about objectivity. Such texts include Marvin R. Weisbord’s stories of the AFSC at home and 
abroad,  John Forbes’s account of AFSC negotiations with several governments,  and an 370 371
autobiography of Clarence E. Pickett, executive secretary of the AFSC, focusing on his 
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individual work for the Committee from 1929 to 1952.  The CIA closely watched Clarence 372
Pickett, who helped to protect Japanese Americans and other foreign-born Americans during the 
Second World War. Pickett tried to mitigate tensions between the United States and Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. Allan W. Austin wrote in his monograph on interracial activism that “AFSC 
staffers chose to work within society, inviting a constant struggle to protect and maintain their 
faith while facing challenges from the secular context in which they operated.”  This statement 373
held true for the surveilled AFSC members, who sought to aid those in need in the spirit of 
Quakerism, regardless of the political implications of doing so. 
 But the American Friends Service Committee also distanced itself from a purely Quaker 
identity in order to execute radical projects. The organization did not self-identify as a purely 
Quaker organization in its promotional materials, but it also did not conceal its Quaker 
inspirations for activism in a 1979 news release following the FBI surveillance revelation: “The 
AFSC is supported by people of different faiths who care about peace, social justice and 
humanitarian service. Its work is based on a profound Quaker belief in the dignity and worth of 
every person, and a faith in the power of love and nonviolence to bring about change.”  The 374
FBI, in turn, struggled to determine whether the AFSC based its actions on Quaker principles. 
II.  The Tension Between Secrecy and Transparency 
 The AFSC claimed in a 1955 publication, Speak Truth to Power, that the Cold War 
national security state was undermining democracy, and that social, political, and economic 
reform would restore democracy and eliminate violence in the United States.  The AFSC, in 375
turn, was becoming adept at circumventing bureaucratic barriers and negotiating with foreign 
governments in the postwar period.  H. Larry Ingle has suggested that the inclusion of non-376
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Quaker employees in the AFSC during the postwar period “gradually imperiled the Quakerism at 
its base and recast it as just one more pressure group within the secular political community.”  377
 When J. Edgar Hoover became in charge of what would later become the FBI in 1924, he 
was told by Harlan Fiske Stone, the attorney general and former Columbia Law School dean who 
had appointed him, to investigate people’s actions rather than their opinions.  Hoover 378
systematically built the foundation for his surveillance system by creating what he considered 
professional experts rather than amateur enthusiasts, ironically paralleling the professionalization 
of the AFSC through hiring long-term employees over temporary volunteers. Hoover believed 
the FBI, and government agencies more broadly, needed centralized authority from its 
directors.  As Gary Gerstle has argued, this vision of Hoover’s broke from an eighteenth-379
century vision of a liberal central state that was limited in authority, as well as from the 
nineteenth-century use of private organizations as government auxiliaries to compensate for a 
weaker central state.  380
 Before J. Edgar Hoover consolidated power within the FBI in the Cold War period, many 
requests for information about the AFSC from the 1920s to the early 1950s came from local 
citizens and FBI agents. Hoover often denied requests for information from citizens. He 
reassured them that the AFSC was a “committee of the Quaker faith,” built to engage in peace 
and relief efforts at home and abroad.  In the late 1950s and the 1960s, FBI agents began to 381
systematically surveil the AFSC by reporting on meetings, demonstrations, and vigils against 
Vietnam that AFSC members attended or organized. 
 The growth of the national security state was of course not solely propelled by J. Edgar 
Hoover. During the Second World War, the FBI had used the 1940 Alien Registration Act, which 
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criminalized speech advocating for the overthrow of government, to prosecute Axis-
sympathizing aliens, and by the late 1940s, to prosecute American communists. Hoover received 
“peacetime” authority and funds following the 1947 National Security Act, which merged the 
War and Navy Departments into the National Military Establishment (NME) and created the 
Joint Chief of Staff to improve coordination between branches of armed services, the National 
Security Council (NSC), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By 1949, the annual 
appropriation of the FBI exceeded its height during the Second World War, and by 1959, its 
annual funding had doubled. 
 In response to the growing national security state, many Americans worried the United 
States would turn into a “garrison state” in which people’s liberties were curtailed. They feared 
they would lose the ideological Cold War even if the United States defeated the Soviet Union.  382
By the time President Eisenhower left office, he pointed to the military establishment and arms 
industry as “new in the American experience,” referring to how the constant state of war 
protected parts of the central state from review and accountability.  Gary Gerstle has 383
highlighted this paradox permeating the war-ridden twentieth-century United States, in which the 
judicial and executive branches expanded civil rights and liberties, but the national security 
agenda increased surveillance and secrecy.  384
 This rise of civil liberties following the First World War shaped and constrained the 
environment in which J. Edgar Hoover’s assumed his leadership position in the FBI.  Prior to 385
the ending of the First World War, the Espionage Act of 1917 had outlawed interfering with the 
draft and producing false statements that could hinder the success of the United States military. 
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Woodrow Wilson suppressed any dissent at home that might stifle democracy and freedom 
abroad. Thousands of radicals were arrested and deported during the 1919–1920 Red Scare.   386
 As a response to this political environment, Americans sought legal protections of speech 
against state repression. Two Supreme Court cases about speaking freely on communism and 
anti-Semitism initiated the transformation of free speech rights that would continue through the 
1960s. The courts carved out a sphere of individual rights and private lives, untouched by state 
and federal governments. The lawyer and later Supreme Court justice, Louis Brandeis, pioneered 
this movement. In 1920, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was renamed from the 
1917 Civil Liberties Bureau.  The ACLU tackled cases on the freedom of speech, press, and 387
eventually the newly developed right to privacy, while the Supreme Court continued to 
determine the limits of dissent in the nation.  Civil liberties, in sum, became a conceptual norm. 388
 The rise of civil liberties following the First World War was later augmented by what 
sociologist Michael Schudson has characterized as the “right to know” following the Second 
World War. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the demand for government accountability 
permeated different facets of public life, including the mass media, think tanks, and 
nongovernmental organizations. Congress curtailed excessive executive power through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which permitted the AFSC to request files from the FBI 
and other intelligence agencies.  The man behind the Freedom of Information Act was a 389
Democratic congressman, John Moss, who “appealed to the language of the Cold War” on behalf 
of Congress and the general public.  The right to know was not evident in the founders’ intent 390
for the nation, according to Schudson: “[N]owhere did the framers say or imply that ‘being 
informed’ meant that citizens should be able to demand information from those serving in 
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government.”  The founders certainly believed that citizens needed to be informed to contribute 391
to a well-functioning republic, but on the terms that they dictated and shaped for the citizenry.  392
 Approved by Congress and then signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, 
FOIA clarified the ambiguous stance of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) on the 
disclosure of government information to the public. All governmental bodies had to answer to 
FOIA, with the exception of Congress, the courts, the president, and the president’s advisors. 
FOIA made government agency documents promptly available to people who cited a 
“reasonable” need for the requested information and properly submitted the request. An 
executive agency became entitled to nine exemptions to deny a given request, including when 
information was deemed secret for the sake of national defense or foreign policy.  393
 J. Edgar Hoover, despite the rise of civil liberties and culture of transparency that 
accompanied his tenure as Director of the FBI, concealed that the FBI was spying on the AFSC 
and other organizations marked as communist-infiltrated. Even in 1973, after Hoover’s term had 
ended, the FBI broke into various organizations in the greater area of Washington, D.C., 
including the Washington Peace Center, Quaker House, and Friends Meeting House.  The 394
AFSC was surveilled by city police departments that often relied on citizen letters and 
undercover informants for their information. Informants to local FBI offices throughout the 
country provided intelligence on the AFSC, while undercover agents observed and reported on 
AFSC-related gatherings.  395
 A member of the Air Force cited Army information to imply that the AFSC had been 
“unwittingly” used by the Communist Party as a “semi-front organization.”  One informant 396
wrote to the FBI in 1966 that the AFSC was “definitely a red front” used by the Communist 
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Party to resist the United States military. This person was a Quaker who claimed to speak on 
behalf of the Five Year Meeting of Friends, denouncing the AFSC as a leftist group that used 
“Biblical and Quaker quotations” to justify anti-United States government and pro-communist 
views. The informant accused the AFSC of collecting the majority of its funds from “red 
supporters” rather than Quakers, and without providing any evidence, accused AFSC figureheads 
of being duped into supporting communism.  While AFSC leaders did not admit to espousing 397
communist views, they might not have been offended by being labeled “leftist,” as there was 
certainly a range of both conservative and liberal Quakers in the United States at this time. 
Although FBI agents surveilled AFSC gatherings firsthand and often demonstrated a concerted 
effort to provide an objective account of the Quaker group in the files, the consistent filing of 
citizen letters resembled the use of citizen testimonies to convict Mormon polygamists in the 
Utah Territory. While anonymous citizen letters did not appear in the Mormon case, polygamists 
faced similar accusations through testimonies against them at their trials from individuals they 
may have not known or known well. 
III.  Crafting a Public Image 
 Not long after its formation in 1917, the AFSC scheduled talks with members of 
Congress and other peace-oriented churches, planned trips to France and Russia, and established 
a training camp at Haverford College in Haverford, Pennsylvania. Despite these high-profile 
associations, one Quaker sociology professor had written of the original members of the AFSC, 
“It was not a group distinguished for wealth, political power, or social prestige. It was, however, 
a strong group, and particularly so after the committee was enlarged and made representative of 
the various groups of American Friends.”  The AFSC would, nonetheless, amass social prestige 398
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through the twentieth century, gradually recruiting college-educated Friends to increase its 
numbers. AFSC members made important contacts with government officials, such as Woodrow 
Wilson; Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer; Grayson Murphy, Chief of the American Red 
Cross in France; and Herbert Hoover, a Quaker raised, “birthright Friend,”  who asked the 399
Service Committee to carry out his feeding program in Germany after the First World War.  400
Herbert Hoover recalled that waiting for the spirit to move someone at long Quaker meetings had 
taught him the virtue of patience as an adolescent.   401
 Such contacts strengthened the AFSC network and forged bipartisan connections in the 
executive branch, Congress, and abroad. Bronson Clark, Executive Secretary of the AFSC, once 
remarked that the AFSC could be both “friend and critic” to the United States government, 
maintaining good relations while also criticizing some of its policies.  As Swarthmore religion 402
professor J. William Frost wrote on the topic of Quaker conscientious objection, “Friends 
presented to the government a problem to be solved: how to avoid persecution, respect religious 
freedom, and, if it could not directly enlist pacifists in the fighting, then to make their activities 
seem not subversive and even helpful to the war effort.”  This mediating role of the Quakers 403
described by Frost to maintain their connections to influential members of society while 
simultaneously objecting to war, mirrored the simultaneous insider and outsider status of the 
AFSC. The AFSC understood the need to adhere to its goals with minimal government 
criticism.  404
 The AFSC gained unprecedented prominence following the outbreak of the First World 
War when news broke that the Quaker organization would share the Nobel Peace Prize with its 
British counterpart, the Friends Service Council. The award made the AFSC more visible, as did 
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the development of the Cold War, both of which pushed the AFSC to engage with an uncertain, 
threatening world.  405
 But the development of visibility and public opinion of the organization was 
accompanied by increased external scrutiny. Twentieth-century AFSC Quakers were both 
different from and similar to the nineteenth-century Mormons in this regard. Both were subjected 
to external criticism as well as internal dissent from other Mormons or Quakers. However the 
Quakers’ insider status provided the AFSC with greater leverage than the Mormons to engage in 
political activities. Many early leaders of the AFSC had already carved out their own notable 
reputations, including Quaker historian Henry Cadbury and his brother-in-law, Rufus Jones, a 
Haverford College philosophy professor who envisioned that the AFSC could bring Friends 
closer together with the wider world.  Historian Allan W. Austin noted that “Cadbury’s and 406
Jones’s presence on the AFSC meant that the two best-known Quaker spokesmen and scholars of 
the era were intimately involved in shaping the Service Committee and its programs.”  407
Cadbury and Jones understood the importance of public perception and press coverage to the 
development of the AFSC.  
 The AFSC as a whole also understood the significance of tailoring its public image. One 
contributor to The Quaker Approach to Contemporary Problems, edited by the AFSC Public 
Relations Director, wrote that “what the Religious Society of Friends stands for has to be 
constantly re-expressed and offered to the world in concrete illustration as well as in precept, 
because it is essentially, as the title here says, an approach and not a platform.”  This distinction 408
was important in that it demonstrated how Quakerism offered a worldview predicated on 
pacifism and social justice, instead of on fixed denominational rules. Such a worldview was 
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useful for recruiting new members, Quaker and non-Quaker alike, but less useful to the FBI in 
trying to demarcate the organizational identity of the AFSC. She continued that while the Society 
of Friends was neither a relief nor peace society, AFSC activities had become associated with the 
Society of Friends in the public mind, and the AFSC became “their most modern expression” in 
the United States.  409
 The Society of Friends and AFSC were not interchangeable, but they of course shared 
institutional qualities and members. That the FBI struggled to differentiate the two, as well as 
differentiate Quakers from other Christian religions, molded the FBI surveillance strategy into 
one that was cautious and reflective. FBI officials pondered whether the religious beliefs of 
AFSC members bolstered their actions. Federal marshals and judges similarly questioned the 
religious motivations behind Mormon polygamy, yet they often cast Mormonism as a fake or 
false religion. FBI officials, in contrast, tried very hard to determine whether the AFSC was at its 
core a religious organization. While the question of what constituted a good citizen surfaced in 
both case studies, Mormons threatened the threads of nationalism and a coherent framework for 
citizenry, while Quakers’ pacifism, and their overall congruency with good citizens, threatened 
the distinction between communism and non-communism.  
 Consequently, FBI agents tried to deconstruct Quaker theology and determine the extent 
to which it shaped the Service Committee. As early as the 1930s, the FBI published a one 
hundred-page report on the American Friends Service Committee, in which one section was 
entitled, “The Tenets of the Quaker Religion.” The inclusion of this section in an AFSC report 
suggested that the FBI was trying to understand the relationship between Quakerism and the 
AFSC. The FBI agent cited a summary of Quaker theology entitled “The Faith of Friends” from 
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a 1916 booklet, The Five Years Meeting of the Friends in America, Year Book, which was “said” 
to provide a comprehensive outline of the Orthodox portion of the Friends, or the portion in the 
“ranks of Evangelical Churches.”  The booklet pointed to the primary tenet of Quakerism as 410
the relationship between the individual soul and God.  The inclusion of this section, though 411
overall neutral in its tone of trying to outline the core principles of Quakerism, resonated with the 
use of a far less neutral New York Police Department report trying to outline the core principles 
of Islamic terrorism in the twenty-first century, which we will see in the next chapter.  
 The agent also cited a 1917 Orthodox Quaker publication, The American Friend, to 
understand the “Quakers’ position regarding war” when it conflicted with the interest of the 
federal government. The agent interpreted the following general framework from a 1953 book on 
the AFSC to explain its stance on war: “We have ever maintained that it is the duty of Christians 
to obey the enactments of civil government, except those which interfere with our allegiance 
with God.”  The agent’s attention to this matter showed that the FBI took the time to consider 412
whether the AFSC was an official religious organization. The agent added that the main purpose 
of the AFSC was to help others, “to aid those in distress, particularly those who do not come 
under the care of any other agency—Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish.”  This FBI assessment had 413
a twofold effect. It legitimized the charitable intentions of the AFSC by acknowledging its 
humanitarian work. But it also acknowledged the AFSC network cared for groups that fell 
outside of Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish charities. 
IV.  Unveiling the FBI Surveillance Program 
 On July 4, 1967, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) went into effect, and in 
February of 1975, the act was amended. From late April to early May of 1975, the AFSC 
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requested files from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Air Force, Army, Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and Navy, as well as the National Security Agency (NSA), Secret 
Service, and State Department in December. The Army at first claimed it had no files, but then 
later mailed files to the AFSC. The Defense Intelligence Agency did not respond, and the NSA 
refused to provide any material. The AFSC afterwards received additional files from various 
government agencies on appeal.  One AFSC archivist commented on the difficulty of 414
summarizing the various government agency files, as they ranged from AFSC news releases to 
allegations of communist infiltration. The sheer magnitude of the files was also overwhelming 
for a relatively small organization to archive, as the AFSC received thirteen thousand pages of 
files from sixteen different federal government agencies received from 1975 to 1979.  On 415
March 30, 1979, the AFSC released a report to its members that police spying existed on a large 
scale, well beyond the parameters of the AFSC. 
 The FBI files on the AFSC revealed an interesting dynamic about how the FBI collected 
and processed intelligence. AFSC archivists acknowledged in their notes on the files that many 
FBI evaluations were fair assessments of the Quaker organization. Nonetheless, concerned 
citizen letters lacking substantive evidence to their claims had flooded the FBI. J. Edgar Hoover 
offered vague responses to these letters, explaining that FBI files were confidential and the AFSC 
did not require evaluation, but concealing that the Service Committee was in fact under the radar 
of the FBI. 
 One 1966 letter from a citizen inquired about the official FBI opinion of the AFSC.  416
Hoover replied with his standard response that he offered to many citizens, that the FBI was an 
investigative agency and did not make evaluations or conclusions about the integrity of any 
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organization, publication, or individual. However, he continued that the citizen’s concern about 
communism was “understandable” and that a general knowledge of the communist movement 
was essential for all Americans. He included with his response a few of his own texts, Masters of 
Deceit and A Study of Communism, acknowledging the AFSC was a pacifist, Quaker 
organization. Another letter from a “patriotic American” inquired about a Dayton, Ohio, AFSC 
meeting, including clippings from the Dayton Daily News on Vietnam-related talks by Steve 
Cary of the AFSC. Hoover sent his standard reply along with a copy of the “Faith of Free 
Men.”  Occasionally, Hoover included informative enclosures about the AFSC, or referenced 417
the Senate Internal Security Committee and the House on Un-American Activities Committee in 
more detailed responses. 
 The FBI files confirmed AFSC leaders’ suspicions about surveillance of its members. 
These suspicions were documented by Ann Davidon, whose husband had unveiled 
COINTELPRO by leading the break-in of the FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, in an eighteen-
page analysis of COINTELPRO: “[T]he suspicion that AFSC programs, volunteers and 
employees were under some sort of government surveillance deepened. To what degree these 
suspicions were paranoid, and to what degree they were based on reality was not known until 
1970.”  Watergate-related coverage of mass governmental surveillance in the Washington Post, 418
Washington Monthly, and New York Times revealed that the Army was feeding material on 
various civilian groups, such as the AFSC, into its central data bank. The Philadelphia Police 
Department was spying on eighteen thousand “agitators,” including an AFSC employee, while 
the Philadelphia Police Department was watching the Friends Peace Committee, a Quaker Action 
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Group, and other sister organizations. The Philadelphia Police Department did not grant the 
AFSC access to its files. 
 From 1976 to 1980, the FBI received information from other government agencies, 
including the Army, Navy, and CIA, but the majority of the information on AFSC members came 
from its own agents. For example, a 1971 letter from the Army to the FBI stated that the AFSC 
did not constitute threats to the Army, but individuals of the AFSC “were and can conceivably be 
of investigative interest to the Army when they engage in activities either with other 
organizations or individually which threaten the discipline or morale of Army personnel or 
adversely affect operators within the meaning of our Dec. 15 1970 policy letter.”  The Army 419
claimed it did not keep its own files on the AFSC, but the Service Committee found it had been 
mentioned several times in the three hundred and fifty Army centers that maintained files on 
organizations and individuals. The Service Committee had been mentioned in the following 
contexts: 1) among the organizations in the “mug books,” or groups that could cause trouble for 
the Army; 2) among the “Compendium” of the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch, which 
suggested that civil rights groups could be infiltrated by subversive elements; 3) among 
subversive persons or organizations considered to “constitute a threat to national security”; 4) on 
a computer print-out using organization codes, including one for the AFSC; 5) among a several 
volume personalities publication, which described a wide range of groups, including the 
Quakers, the AFSC, and convicted Soviet spies; and 6) within a categorized system that 
organized entries based on group ideology and activity, which used the code letter “I” for 
“Pacifists.” 
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 The Department of Defense and the Secret Service, moreover, stored correspondence 
with AFSC members, including letters about demonstrations at the White House. The Air Force 
kept files about various vigils at Air Force bases during the late 1950s. In 1953, the Inspector 
General at Lowry Air Force Base reported on “extremely controversial subjects” at the 
Washington, D.C., Lenten School of Christian Living, including an AFSC anti-racism speech 
entitled “Segregation in Washington,” causing the Air Force officer to recommend further 
investigation of the organization. The FBI was not focused on surveilling AFSC members 
involved with civil rights, however. This Air Force officer, after mentioning the AFSC anti-
racism speech, transitioned to communism by claiming that any group with the word 
“committee” in its name was “likely to be a Communist Front.”  420
  In the 1960s, the National Action and Research on the Military Industrial Complex 
(NARMIC) of the AFSC examined how corporations profited from military contracts during the 
Vietnam War around the time the FBI and Secret Service reported on numerous silent AFSC 
vigils. The AFSC had also begun sending medical aid to North Vietnam at this time. The Navy 
was particularly alarmed by the People’s Blockade of 1972, when AFSC members on canoes 
interfered with the paths of war vessels on the east and west coasts.  The Navy blamed the 421
incident on the AFSC and reported the incident to thirty-two military and government agencies. 
The Naval Intelligence Command reported afterward on the AFSC and the incident more 
broadly: “The AFSC is well organized and is apparently willing to expend the effort and fund as 
long as some visible benefit is derived.”  The AFSC would argue upon receiving this file that 422
“visible benefit” referred to any success in helping those in need. The Naval Intelligence 
Command was likely insinuating that the Service Committee pursued projects for positive 
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publicity, given its fury about the Blockade incident. Ann Davidon felt that these descriptions of 
the People’s Blockade incident were fair but tended to credit the AFSC with “more omnipotence 
and omnipresence than may often have been the case.”   423
 Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the United States Ambassador received a cable from Kissinger, 
who wrote that if the South Vietnamese government wanted to get rid of an AFSC-run 
prosthetics clinic, it could be done in the name of “Vietnamization.”  And on the financial 424
front, the IRS investigated whether such AFSC activities could jeopardize its tax exempt status. 
The AFSC had been left off the list of tax exempt agencies in the annual IRS publication for 
three years, which the IRS claimed was done so “by mistake,” but that mistake damaged the 
AFSC. It was forced to pay taxes for these fiscal years. Ann Davidon claimed that this 
misunderstanding of the AFSC by the IRS actually formed the root of the strain between the 
AFSC and federal government: 
A great deal of material, however, reflects an apparent confusion and misunderstanding 
of the nature of the AFSC on the part of government agents, and the recurrent suspicion 
that our dissenting position in regard to peace and the achievement of equal justice must 
mean that we are subversive, or being used by the Communist Party, or even under its 
control. Old allegations from the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate 
Internal Security Committee, dating back to Joe McCarthy days and earlier continue to 
live in these files, although we have long since answered these charges and others in 
government and public life have testified to their groundlessness.  425
As Davidon astutely recognized, FBI agents frequently demonstrated confusion in the files over 
the identity of the AFSC, namely, over whether it was an extension of the Society of Friends or 
an autonomous organization that the Communist Party could more easily influence, despite the 
transparency of the AFSC in its communications with the federal government. 
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 J. Edgar Hoover was the pillar for mistrust of the AFSC by the FBI, despite the open line 
of communication between the two organizations. The identity of the Service Committee and its 
religious affiliation constituted the foundation of that mistrust. Hoover tried to distinguish 
between true and false religions in a 1958 article, in which he claimed communism was a false 
religion. His sentiment echoed a letter he had penned five years earlier for Commonweal, an 
American Catholic magazine run by lay Catholics, in which Hoover responded to an article he 
believed showed “the ultimate tragedy of communism which rests in its betrayal of God, self, 
and country. It is truly the final Christian heresy.”  In 1961, he endorsed a series entitled, “This 426
Godless Communism” in Treasure Chest, a Catholic comic book distributed to parochial schools. 
And in 1970, he defended Sunday School for Christian Life, by attesting to the historical 
significance of Bible study to the collective guidance and spiritual life of the nation, which was 
necessary to undermine the influence of non-believers.   427
 In his testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), Hoover 
remarked, “I confess to a real apprehension so long as Communists are able to secure ministers 
of the gospel to promote their evil work and espouse a cause that is alien to the religion of Christ 
and Judaism,”  claiming not only that some ministers themselves supported communism, but 428
that communism was incompatible with Judaism and Christianity. J. Edgar Hoover argued that 
communist ideology threatened the religious core of the nation. His publications in religious 
media about the importance of Christian faith for the longevity of the country demonstrated his 
strategic framing of communism in opposition to a Christian democracy, a union of American 
religion and politics. 
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 Hoover was consistent in arguing through the years that in its national tolerance for 
religious freedom, the United States had lost sight of the deep religious roots of Western 
civilization. He appealed to the religious commitment of each American to stand up to the reality 
of communism in the world, uniting the two principles rhetorically in the phrase, “democratic 
faith.”  His article, though centered on the fight against communism, revealed that Hoover 429
respected religious freedom, as he wrote, “Communists have always made it clear that 
communism is the mortal enemy of Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and any other 
religion that believes in a Supreme Being.”  430
 But Hoover did not respect communism as a religious ideology, as he went to great 
lengths to eradicate it. He appealed to the religious fervor of his fellow citizens by quoting 
Lenin’s alleged declaration that communists must “fight against the inconsistencies of the 
‘Christians.’”  According to Hoover, communists infiltrated religious groups to subtly 431
disseminate their propaganda, gain respectability, and introduce a false form of peace to church 
communities: “Every possible deceptive device is being used to link the party’s ‘peace’ program 
with the church.”  Although Hoover never explicitly named Quakers or individual groups in the 432
article, his focus on peace as a link between communist and church communities was his focal 
point for detecting subversion within religious networks: “He cannot be a Marxist and adhere to 
a religion.”  Hoover’s dichotomous view of religion and atheistic communism, in fact, helped 433
to explain his troubled approach to determining whether or not the AFSC had in fact been 
infiltrated, and if so, what that meant for the religious nature of the organization. For in Hoover’s 
mind, while the ultimate goal of communism was “the utter elimination of all religion,” it would 
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never defeat religion, its most “potent foe” and the core source of strength of the United 
States.  434
 FBI agents conflated the terms “AFSC” and “Quaker” in their reports, suggesting they 
struggled to separate the religious beliefs and actions of the AFSC from its political endeavors, 
and whether such a separation was a viable divide at all. An undated memorandum from the 
Office of Special Investigation of the Air Force cited a 1938 testimony before the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), in which the speaker accused the AFSC of being a 
peace section of the War Resisters’ International, founded in 1921, that was “working for the 
suppression of capitalism and imperialism and the establishment of a new social and 
international order.”  The AFSC sometimes worked with the War Resisters’ International, but it 435
was not formally a part of it. Despite this factual inaccuracy, the FBI maintained this old file for 
its records. Preserved files permit such analyses of past phenomena. Yet saving files on the AFSC 
that proved to have no relevance to the FBI investigations suggested that the FBI had access to 
information on individuals, which the FBI could later exploit, when there was no foundation for 
investigating those individuals in the first place. This contradiction, of a government agency 
maintaining files that could give rise to unrelated investigations at a later point, will emerge in 
the following case study on the NYPD surveillance of Brooklyn Muslims.  
 In 1949 the Air Force suggested that subversive Quakers actually used the AFSC as a 
mouthpiece to conduct its pacifist affairs, a characterization of its organization that the AFSC 
fervently disputed: “American Quakers, through the AFSC, have been conferring ‘for more than 
a year’ with ‘Russian officials and important citizens of the United States’ to try to find a basis 
for establishing ‘better relations’ between the United States and the Soviet Union.”  A 1953 436
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Office of Special Investigations (OSI) document similarly reported that the Iowa Bureau of 
Criminal Investigations “considered this organization to be obstencivly (sic) sincere in their 
Quaker beliefs but that they were undoubtedly being used to advance theories harmful to United 
States policy.”  In Nebraska, the FBI office more subtly averred the AFSC was “a Quaker 437
Service Agency established for the support of the Quaker Society and the furtherance of their 
beliefs.”  The Air Force continued to grapple with the Quaker-AFSC divide in 1957, drawing 438
from an Army report that clarified the extent to which the AFSC composition was all-Quaker. 
The Air Force agent wrote down that while the members came from diverse religious as well as 
racial backgrounds, the AFSC charter instructed that AFSC leaders, namely officers and 
directors, had to be Quakers,  suggesting the importance to many government agencies of 439
establishing a link between the AFSC and the Friends. 
 However, the Air Force Inspector General once defended the Friends and the AFSC, 
suggesting that the Air Force understood the two organizations to be discrete: “The Society of 
Friends (Quakers), parent organization of the AFSC, is a legitimate religious group and can in no 
way be considered a ‘controversial’ organization. The AFSC may be exactly what it professes, a 
pacifist organization, which is unalterably opposed to force in any form.”  The Inspector 440
General’s ambivalence highlighted the challenge the AFSC posed to government agencies in its 
ability to destabilize a comfortable boundary between threatening and non-threatening, and 
communist and non-communist. It also showed the diverse sources of information filtered 
through the FBI surveillance system, which drew from multiple government agencies, that 
offered different perspectives and understandings of the AFSC and the extent of its threat to 
United States national security.  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 Confusion over the identity of the AFSC subtly showed that the FBI was interested in the 
religious nature of the AFSC, for determining whether and how it could be surveilled, as well as 
how to define it. An Air Force memorandum from 1947 reported an informant had claimed that a 
deleted AFSC name was “one of the powerful influences in Socialism and Communism. It was 
stated that [deleted] was at one time the shining light for religious inspiration of the American 
Friends Service Committee. This informer said that the American Friends Service Committee 
was alleged to be a Quaker organization but was “actually a Unitarian group,”  again showing 441
that the religious identity of the AFSC baffled the Air Force and FBI and that the AFSC was 
perhaps only nominally committed to pacifism. An additional source corroborated this claim by 
adding: “It was stated that the organization was about 15% Quakers and 85% non-Quakers.”  442
The attempt of the FBI to categorize the religiosity of the AFSC by storing this report showed the 
extent to which it ascertained the communist threat. Moreover, by aligning the AFSC with 
Unitarianism, the FBI legitimized the surveillance of the AFSC by questioning whether Quaker 
pacifism truly influenced its service activities. But the Unitarian association also demonstrated 
the earnestness of the FBI to fairly analyze the goals and theological motivation of the Service 
Committee. This characterization resonated with J. Edgar Hoover’s union of Judeo-Christian and 
democratic ideals, as expectations that non-democratic religions did not meet.  
 The AFSC would respond years later to the FBI allegations that it was a Unitarian 
organization by highlighting its all-Quaker leadership, despite having non-Quaker members, and 
by noting its connections to twenty-one of thirty-one Quaker Yearly Meetings: “It is true that 
only 20% of the staff is Quaker, but the rest are sympathetic to Quaker beliefs.”  The AFSC 443
reiterated that it included non-Quaker employees to send overseas based on their merit, rather 
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than on religious dedication. The AFSC also claimed it was creating a more diverse, 
multicultural environment by hiring minority workers.  444
 The CIA repeated the confusion over the alleged Unitarianism of the AFSC in the 1950s. 
A 1956 CIA file, reported that a group of Texas Quakers “disowned” the AFSC because the 
Committee had spiraled out of the domain of the “legitimate” Society of Friends: “[T]he 
Committee fosters liberal, unitarian religious doctrines, and that . . . [its] Institutes of 
International Relations are schools for Communistic propaganda and liberal religions.”  The 445
AFSC regional office in Texas denied the charge, but the data remained in the FBI files. The 
significance here was that agents of the FBI and CIA actively sought to understand the religiosity 
of the Quakers, so as to better predict their political actions. They also continued to justify AFSC 
surveillance by pointing to its similarities to a dangerously liberal, Unitarian organization. 
 Despite the inability of the CIA to iron out the religious origins of the AFSC, Ann 
Davidon mused that the CIA overall seemed to be “the most well-organized of the intelligence-
collecting government agencies, at least in terms of its Freedom of Information response.”  The 446
CIA sent documents to the FBI that pertained to the AFSC stance on foreign policy, including 
AFSC letters that solicited funds for overseas and domestic programs or inquired about 
international relations with countries that were not in line with United States policy; flyers that 
advocated for peace in Indochina and Vietnam or organized marches in the United States; and a 
pamphlet entitled, “The Quaker View of United States Foreign Policy.” It also monitored foreign 
broadcasts (FBIS) from Hanoi and Peking that quoted AFSC members, including descriptions of 
John Sullivan in Hanoi in 1972, Wallace Collett’s visit to Peking that same year, as well as 
Russell Johnson’s and Bronson Clark’s visits to Peking the year before.  It was evident, based 447
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on these files, that the CIA assisted the FBI with determining how the AFSC might act in foreign 
policy matters in light of the Cold War. 
 Prior to the onslaught of the Cold War and the communist threat, the FBI had 
predominantly surveilled American Quakers for their conscientious objection to war and the 
military. In this time period, the FBI was often prompted by suspicions in anonymous citizens 
letters, sometimes from Quakers, about the AFSC.  The relationship between the AFSC and 448
Russians aggravated the FBI from the very start. In 1921, an FBI agent traveled to Philadelphia 
from New York, unsuccessfully investigating AFSC cooperation with a Russian relief committee. 
Three months later, Hoover requested that a Philadelphia agent acquire information about the 
AFSC, which was suspected of providing relief not just to the Soviet Union, but to its 
“anarchistic organizations.” An unidentified Philadelphia FBI agent reported a few days later 
with many positive points about the AFSC, which it characterized as a “religious and 
philanthropic society,” including its officers, “persons of high standing in commercial and social 
circles, many of whom are devoting all of their time, without monetary gain, in the Committee’s 
undertaking to help the famine stricken people of Soviet Russia, and in their other philanthropic 
undertakings.”  The Philadelphia FBI office would come to the defense of the AFSC 449
consistently throughout Hoover’s surveillance campaign against it. 
 In the years leading up to the Cold War, the FBI was already concerned about the Quaker 
identity of the Service Committee. The FBI office and headquarters in Washington, D.C., was 
relieved to find no evidence that the AFSC had engaged in “purely political matters” or 
subversive activities in 1941.  That the FBI distinguished between what was or was not purely 450
political action foreshadowed its central concern with defining the AFSC. The FBI also 
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surveilled the 1941 Peace Caravan in Osborne, Kansas, which hosted a series of meetings 
addressing peace and conscientious objection in the community. According to the FBI, its 
observations of the Peace Caravan suggested the AFSC represented the Society of Friends “in the 
fields of social action.”  The incorporation or representation of religious beliefs in AFSC 451
actions protected the Peace Caravan from further investigation. 
 One of the most important FBI documents from the 1940s stemmed from correspondence 
between J. Edgar Hoover and Adolf A. Berle, lawyer and Assistant Secretary of State, about 
pacifist organizations. Their correspondence included a “diagram” of the AFSC and a one 
hundred-page report on the American Society of Friends.  The report was fairly objective, 452
comprising a history of the American Friends, an explanation of Quaker religious beliefs, and a 
summary of the history and activities of various subsections of the AFSC. The introduction of the 
report described the AFSC under the heading, “The Society of Friends,” suggesting the FBI 
linked the AFSC closely with the Friends relatively early on in its investigation of the Service 
Committee. The FBI agent here accepted how the AFSC intertwined religious and political 
beliefs, despite other reports insisting on distinguishing between the two: “The American Friends 
Service Committee is an organization formed by Quakers, or Friends as they are also called, and 
actually practices, in a modern fashion, the theories and teachings of the Quaker religion. It can 
be seen from this that some knowledge of the history and tenets of Quakerism should be had to 
more completely understand the purpose of this organization.”  Here, the agent explicitly wrote 453
that to understand the AFSC, the FBI needed to understand the Quakers. 
 The agent purposefully characterized the movement as exhibiting a certain form of 
Christianity that also gave women an equal place with men in the church, all of which helped the 
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FBI agent argue that the AFSC was not entirely dangerous in the United States. The agent 
characterized the organization of the Quaker church as “essentially democratic,” then describing 
how either children of Quaker parents inherited the religion. Otherwise people could request 
admittance and partake in activities of the meetings. The agent then provided a chart delineating 
the organization of the AFSC, as well as of how and where various Society of Friends meetings 
occurred, which suggested the FBI was trying to construct a clearcut framework for surveilling 
the Quaker group beyond the official meetings of the AFSC.  454
 Possibly the earliest concrete accusation that the AFSC was a communist organization 
was sent to Hoover in 1947 from the Baltimore FBI office. The report included clips from a 
confidential 1947 report, the Weekly Intelligence Summary #74,  to support its contention that 455
the Communist Party had infiltrated and taken advantage of the Service Committee. The report, 
full of many details on the AFSC, suggested that the AFSC in practice was not a “pure Quaker 
enterprise” and therefore could therefore be investigated without blatantly violating their free 
exercise of religion.  456
 Communist suspicions began to spread rapidly after this accusation, prompting additional 
investigations. In 1948, a five-page FBI report argued that within the AFSC’s relief and peace 
education activities, “many agitators and leftists are among its operating personnel” and that its 
work with Spanish refugees permitted aid to communists. The same year, an agent for the 
Philadelphia FBI researched and reported to Hoover on AFSC material from the Swarthmore 
Peace Collection at the Quaker-founded Swarthmore College. In 1949, the Seattle FBI relayed to 
Hoover an informant’s report on the AFSC Institute of International Relations in Seattle, while 
the Boston FBI reported on an AFSC program centered on China that an informant described as a 
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venue through which Communists were infiltrating the AFSC. In 1950, the New Haven FBI 
reported on an AFSC meeting about outlawing the atomic bomb, a meeting that communists did 
in fact attend.  457
 By 1949, tensions between Russia and United States had fully permeated the sphere of 
the AFSC. One memorandum from August of 1949 summarized a report of a Seattle informant 
who, after listening to the lecture of AFSC member, civil rights leader, and political activist,  
Bayard Rustin, “What There is to Fear From Russia,” contacted the FBI. The FBI highlighted the 
part of the informant’s report on the lecture that Bayard Rustin “stated that ‘we’ have no reason 
to fear Russia,”  which had been presumably marked as evidence that the Service Committee 458
was on the same side as the United States. The Seattle agent included an AFSC pamphlet that 
listed Quaker goals and principles about peace, as well as the claim that the purpose of the AFSC 
was to “affect repeal and/or avoidance of draft through religious belief.”  459
 In 1950, an FBI agent from Philadelphia reported civilian complaints that the AFSC aided 
communism through pacifist teachings. The agent contemplated communist links to the AFSC 
but concluded that while AFSC teachings “parallel in some instances the CP propaganda line . . . 
it is noticeable this group has not deviated in its teaching in the past 30 years, and it appears to be 
a coincidence that there is a parallel.”  In the early 1950s, the FBI continued to receive 460
inquiries about the AFSC from private citizens. Hoover offered his standard, vague response that 
offered little information to the concerned citizens, but several times Hoover included materials 
to citizens such as those entitled, “How Communists Operate” and “Unmasking the Communist 
Masquerader.”  
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 Citizens continued to write to Hoover with varied concerns about the AFSC, including its 
speakers, interracial camp in Texas, and anti-conscription literature. Hoover told these citizens 
the FBI did not investigate conscientious objector claims, but he did forward the letter to 
Selective Service. The Texas FBI continued to flood Hoover with inquiries about the AFSC. 
Hoover responded to the Texas office with the thumbnail sketch of the AFSC created by the 
Philadelphia office. The sketch indicated that the AFSC was a pacifist Nobel Peace Prize-
winning organization whose work sometimes paralleled the beliefs of the Communist Party. 
Average citizens, nonetheless, continued to receive Hoover’s vague reply that FBI files were 
confidential.  461
 Hoover in one instance deviated from his typically expressed suspicion of the AFSC. He 
proactively defended the Service Committee to a college professor who wrote in 1952 that he 
had heard the AFSC was “practically Communistic.” Hoover replied that the AFSC is “a 
committee of the Quaker faith . . . engaged in projects designed to promote peace and to afford 
young people the opportunity for constructive patriotic service, and to provide relief assistance in 
this country and abroad.”  This unusual response was perhaps Hoover’s attempt to rebut the 462
accusation that the FBI was insufficiently surveilling the AFSC. 
 The Philadelphia FBI informed Hoover this same year that they would defend the AFSC 
in their characterization of the group a “sincere pacifist organization . . . an action committee of 
the Quaker faith opposing military conflict, preparedness, and the drafting of men.” They added 
that the work of the AFSC paralleled that of the Communist Party in the “peace promotion field,” 
but since the AFSC had not deviated from its philosophy in thirty-five years, the parallel between 
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the two organizations was merely coincidental. They also reminded Hoover that the AFSC had 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947 for its pacifism.  463
 By March of 1954, an FBI report from Philadelphia implored Hoover to cease his 
campaign against the AFSC. Philadelphia agents were more cognizant of the community benefits 
that the Philadelphia-based Quaker organization offered to the American people. They affirmed 
the sincerity of pacifism in the AFSC while acknowledging its parallels with communism. But 
they insisted that their informants, who were familiar with AFSC members, had no knowledge of 
any communist infiltration of the AFSC. Some Philadelphia-based informants came from within 
the Religious Society of Friends itself. One informant noted it would not be out of character for 
an AFSC member to maintain contact with an individual or group affiliated with the Communist 
Party, but the Philadelphia FBI office continued to defend the AFSC. The in-depth Philadelphia 
report outlined the structure, activities, and philosophy of the AFSC, and includes copies of 
AFSC literature.  Straightforward sections on the philosophy and structure of the AFSC drew 464
from AFSC material, while other sections constituted assessments of the AFSC by FBI agents. 
The report reiterated that while the AFSC limited its corporate membership to Quakers, it was 
not an official organ of the Society of Friends.  The Philadelphia branch informed Hoover they 465
would bring the case to a “local conclusion” since there were no facts supporting communist 
infiltration. 
 Reports from other cities, including Chicago,  San Francisco,  and Houston,  466 467 468
supported the Philadelphia claim that no evidence could prove Communist Party infiltration of 
the AFSC. A few reports diverged from the majority opinion of FBI agents, however, such as one 
from Charlotte, North Carolina, which reported that AFSC member William V. Roose spoke at a 
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convention of the Christian Church in Nashville and “criticized the United States at every 
opportunity and assumed the position that Russia could do no wrong.”  469
 Despite the attempt by some local FBI offices to mitigate J. Edgar Hoover’s concerns 
about the AFSC as an organizational whole, the FBI constantly opened and closed cases on 
individual AFSC members in 1955. One report, containing a section called, “Characterizations of 
Individuals,” examined Scott Nearing, an economist and social reformer whose writings focused 
on the unequal distribution of wealth in the United States.  The FBI agent reported that Nearing 470
had claimed it was not disloyal to side with communism, which the agent attributed to Nearing’s 
“deep Quaker pacifism.”  Meanwhile, another FBI agent redeemed AFSC leader Clarence 471
Pickett as a man of “deep religious conviction” who kept with the “tenets of his religion” when 
speaking out against war. Though Pickett sometimes accepted the suspicious motivations of 
others without inquiring into them, he found “atheistic Communism repugnant.”  Finally, the 472
FBI filed an article from the communist publication, the Daily Worker, entitled “Quakers Say 
Witchhunt Pervert Gov’t.” The article claimed that Quakers from twenty yearly meetings of the 
Society of Friends, the AFSC, and the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), a 
lobbying organization founded by the Society of Friends, believed that government 
investigations into individuals’ political beliefs and government-enforced loyalty oaths 
undermined the function of the government and “‘put government above God.’”  It was clear 473
from this assessment that Hoover did not succumb to FBI agents’ pressure to cease surveillance 
of the Service Committee or specific members.  
 The FBI strengthened the secrecy and organization of its surveillance program in the 
second half of the 1950s by introducing new means for classifying information. FBI agents 
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began referring to informants in code, using the letter “T” followed by a number.  The FBI also 474
increased the frequency of investigations: in June 1955, the FBI reported that Charles F. 
MacLennan, Executive Secretary of the AFSC office in Columbus, Ohio, had partaken in a 
Columbus peace moment and mingled with Communist Party members.  A seemingly ordinary 475
report about the AFSC and Communist Party, much of the report was blacked out, and it 
preceded an increased number of AFSC investigations throughout the country. 
 The FBI also started to increasingly intercept mail in the second half of the 1950s. In 
April 1955, the United States Post Office Department seized five pamphlets sent to the AFSC 
Peace Education Office in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from British organizations. The pamphlets 
were intended to be included in a “Peace Packet” that represented the viewpoints of the AFSC on 
international affairs. One of the pamphlets, “The Camp of Liberation,” was written by prominent 
labor and peace activist, A. J. Muste, who was deeply inspired by Christian pacifism and for a 
time served as a minister for the Society of Friends before gravitating toward the more militant 
labor movement.  Muste was under FBI surveillance and corresponded with AFSC members, 476
including Colin Bell. The AFSC asked for the federal government to clarify its principle and 
policy behind seizing mail, to which the government did not respond.  In the following month, 477
the FBI intercepted correspondence between Wilmer T. Jossem, an AFSC member in Iowa, and 
an unidentified individual. In the letter, Jossem wrote that he had attended a Quaker meeting in 
Indiana at Earlham College where attendees had discussed how to establish a communal attitude 
toward the draft law. The general consensus was to encourage non-registration through legal 
instruction and support.  478
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 J. Edgar Hoover’s influence in directing the AFSC surveillance campaign in the second 
half of the 1950s, in summary, amplified. But while the FBI expanded its campaign, the AFSC 
responded with equal force. Louis Schneider, the prominent Quaker leader Schneider who 
worked for the AFSC for four decades, including as Executive Secretary from 1974 to 1980, 
refused on behalf of the AFSC to sign a security clause in a contract prepared in 1956 by the FBI 
for AFSC personnel who were working on community development in India. When asked if his 
refusal was based on his Quaker beliefs, Schneider replied that the AFSC was not an extension of 
the Society of Friends but a separate organization whose people were mostly Quakers. Schneider 
overtly stated that although Quakers opposed communism, they believed people had the right to 
believe and advocate whatever they wished, which included believing in or even joining the 
Communist Party. Schneider likely opposed signing the security clause because he saw it as 
unnecessary and insulting to the organization. He may have also opposed doing so based on the 
Quaker opposition to oath taking. Arguing that the security clause would place uncharacteristic 
restraint on the AFSC, Schneider “stated that his organization prided itself in acting 
independently of any outside controls or restrictions by the government or otherwise.”  In his 479
response, Schneider offered a direct defense of the Service Committee but also a working 
framework for AFSC members to make their own choices about future activities that may 
involve cooperation with Communist Party members. 
 Hoover frequently lied in his response to citizen letters by claiming that the AFSC had 
never been investigated, even as the FBI increased its investigations of the Service Committee in 
1956 and 1957. Hoover began to lose his perceived control over the AFSC at this time. The FBI 
Special Agents in Charge (SACs) sometimes resisted following Hoover’s assumptions, as 
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demonstrated in a correspondence between Hoover and Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Chicago 
about the 1956 Second Annual World Peace Conference in Chicago.  SAC Chicago claimed the 480
conference, which was sponsored by pacifist groups, was harmless, and that while investigations 
could be broadened by looking at both left and right-wing organizations, revelations that the FBI 
was examining religious or pacifist groups could be a “possible embarrassment” to the federal 
government.  Nonetheless, Hoover persisted with his surveillance campaign into the 1960s, 481
when the FBI even more carefully watched the AFSC and its possible ties to communists. In one 
November 1960 memorandum, an Army Intelligence Duty Officer reported on the satisfactory 
behavior of the AFSC and other Quaker organizations that were merely peacefully picketing the 
Pentagon while distributing pacifist literature.   482
 While the general consensus in this decade remained that the AFSC was not a communist 
organization, some FBI agents noted the contact between individuals of both organizations as 
well as the participation of Communist Party members in AFSC-organized events, including 
peaceful vigils and walks throughout the country, such as the Easter Peace Walk from 
Philadelphia to Washington in March 1967, or a silent vigil held in front of Seattle’s Main Public 
Library in February 1967. At these gatherings, FBI agents scanned crowds for members of “basic 
revolutionary organizations,” while collecting simple information, such as the duration of a vigil 
and the number of participants.  483
 Cracks in Hoover’s surveillance policy surfaced throughout the 1960s. Despite his 
frequent correspondence with concerned citizens, in which he repeatedly claimed that the FBI 
never investigated the AFSC, he ultimately admitted in one response to a citizen that back in 
1942, the FBI had formally investigated the AFSC.  Although Hoover’s acknowledgment did 484
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not extend back to 1921, when the FBI first started investigating the AFSC, he contradicted his 
earlier standard responses to citizens throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, when he claimed that 
the FBI never investigated the AFSC.  
 Hoover also began reconsidering the accuracy of the “CP” label. He suggested the term 
was employed too loosely in discussions of non-Communist Party groups: “[A]n increasing 
number of communications are received under the ‘Communist Party, USA’ where the subject 
matter does not pertain to the CPUSA or only indirectly pertains to the CPUSA.”  Seemingly, 485
Hoover was strategically starting to reconsider his AFSC surveillance campaign. 
 Yet whatever remorse Hoover showed in this correspondence faded to the background in 
1962, when he restored the AFSC file from closed to “pending” due to new information that 
seemingly incriminated the AFSC as communist-infiltrated. A report on a Communist Party 
meeting quoted a speaker who referred to the Quakers as a “key force in establishing united 
action in various phases of peace activities,” and they they worked “consistently” with the 
Communist Party in private but not in public.  The FBI Philadelphia office, fairly consistent in 486
its defense of the AFSC by this point, responded that there was far too much material to sort 
through and that a report would be futile since the AFSC was a pacifist organization that did not 
merit investigation.  As AFSC volunteer Helena Michie noted in a summary of the files, the 487
campaign raised “the question of whether the FBI sees itself as an instrument of change as well 
as an investigatory agency.”  488
 Whether the FBI saw itself as an instrument of change as a whole is perhaps less 
ascertainable than the fact that local branches exerted influence. It is clear, for instance, that the 
FBI Philadelphia office led the resistance to Hoover’s surveillance of the Service Committee. 
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Many, but not all, branches disagreed with the Philadelphia office. In short, local FBI offices 
clashed with each other just as Quakers and AFSC members sometimes quarreled. Some local 
offices believed that the AFSC was not a mouthpiece for the Society of Friends and therefore fair 
grounds for investigation. Another 1965 report claimed the AFSC was in fact the “social 
outreach arm of the religious group known as the Society of Friends (Quakers).”  Discord 489
within the FBI demonstrated the diversity within the organization. 
 The AFSC, much like Mormons in the nineteenth century and Muslims in the twenty-first 
century, were attacked in mass-produced publications, which oftentimes found their way into the 
FBI files on the AFSC. Prominent leaders of the AFSC were well aware of the significance of its 
public image since its formation. Accusations made beyond the coveted files of the FBI or other 
government organizations, and within publicly accessible media, forced AFSC leaders to 
consider when and how to respond to such publicly available vitriol. They were afforded the 
opportunity to respond at all given the insider statuses of AFSC members. Mormon leaders, in 
comparison, tried to respond to attacks and were obstructed from doing so given their location on 
the outskirts of American culture. AFSC leaders became particularly concerned with the 
organizational public image by the early 1950s, perhaps logically so given the growth and 
outreach of both the AFSC and the FBI surveillance campaign by this point in time.  
 The most controversial public attack against the AFSC, which the FBI maintained in its 
AFSC file and was therefore shaped by, showed precisely how the FBI continued to consider the 
AFSC a communist threat in the mid-1960s, despite the efforts of FBI agents to close the 
investigation in the mid-1950s. Suzanne Labin, the author of a Senate Internal Security 
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Subcommittee Report entitled, “The Techniques of Soviet Propaganda,” referred to the AFSC as 
a “well known transmission belt for the Communist apparatus.”   490
 Colin Bell, AFSC Executive Secretary at the time, rebutted Labin’s charge at a press 
conference in July of 1965, retorting that the accusation was “completely untrue and 
undocumented.” He wove together the piety of Quakerism with the activism of the AFSC in his 
argument, arguing that since the seventeenth century, Quakers had “prayed and worked and 
witnessed for the nonviolent ordering of human society . . . out of deep religious conviction. […] 
We have no activities to hide . . . and we are neither beholden to nor affiliated with any group, 
party, or movement in ways that are not open for all to see.”  Bell here emphasized both the 491
religious basis of the organization, as well as its autonomy from pernicious organizations such as 
the Communist Party. Bell also unraveled the conflation of the AFSC with the Society of 
Friends. He reminded the reader that, although the AFSC was formed by distinguished Friends 
and constituted over two hundred Quakers from around the nation, it did not represent any 
particular Quaker yearly meeting. Nonetheless, Bell linked the religious beliefs of AFSC 
members to the organizational stance of citizenship: “We believe that a citizen’s deepest spiritual 
insights form the true basis on which he may know how best to serve his own country and all 
men.”  492
 Two senators followed Bell with their own responses to Labin’s determined accusation. 
The first was Thomas J. Dodd, a United State Senator from Connecticut, whose speech to the 
Senate in July of 1965 was later published as, “Repudiation of Attack on American Friends 
Service Committee.” Dodd, a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which 
published the report, stated: “I wish to disassociate myself from this statement, which I never 
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saw and never approved, and which I consider most damaging and unfortunate. Although I have 
strongly disagreed with some of the foreign policy positions taken by the Friends, I have the 
greatest respect for their organization and for the remarkable humanitarian work it carries on in 
so many parts of the world.”  Dodd’s referral to the “foreign policy positions taken by the 493
Friends” indicated that even members of the Senate conflated the AFSC with the Society of 
Friends. He claimed that he approved of the study leading to the controversial publication 
because it seemed sound, but the revisions, which offered a controversial characterization of the 
AFSC, were not submitted with his approval or the approval of other subcommittee members 
before it went to the printer. 
 Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, who had offered extended remarks to the Senate on the 
previous day, was the second senator and member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 
to respond to the report.  Scott reminded the Senate he had published a statement condemning 494
the “reckless charge against one of our Nation’s finest humanitarian organizations.” He admitted 
he did not always agree with the views of the AFSC, but that he could not overlook the 
undocumented accusation made by one of his colleagues. Seemingly switching gears by 
suggesting that the AFSC needed to be surveilled, however, Scott then presented to the floor the 
“McCarthyite Report,” which cited an Evening Bulletin editorial on the AFSC: “It can get in with 
its ministrations where many other organizations cannot penetrate because it is well known to 
have no political objectives. It is the one organization nobody wants to investigate–it operates in 
a goldfish bowl.”  495
 Scott pointed out that Labin had also quoted a former FBI agent, Marion Miller, who 
infiltrated the Communist Party and testified that “much of the propaganda literature of the Peace 
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Committee was written within and distributed by this AFSC, well known as a transmission belt 
for the Communist apparatus.” Miller alleged that Communists used AFSC literature in the early 
1950s due to the respectability of the AFSC. The AFSC responded by bringing its literature of 
that time and asking Miller to identify which ones were used, but Miller was unable to do so. The 
AFSC argued, drawing from this exchange, that even if the accusation had been proven true, it 
would not have placed any blame on the AFSC itself, since it was not responsible for 
organizations that chose to draw from its teachings or practices. 
 Ann Davidon observed that by the 1970s, when COINTELPRO finally exposed the 
surveillance of the AFSC, the FBI was aware of the pacifist orientation of the AFSC and did not 
officially regard the AFSC as subversive, even though its policies sometimes paralleled those of 
the Communist Party. As a result, FBI agents repeatedly confirmed this organizational stance on 
the AFSC to its own agents and inquiring citizens. However agents continued to examine any 
possible AFSC connections to groups or individuals engaged with public demonstrations, named 
on the Attorney General’s list, or affiliated with the Communist Party or Communist countries.   496
 By the 1970s, as Davidon noted in her 1978 article for The Nation, Hoover began to 
realize that he might not prove that the AFSC was infiltrated by communism. Instead, the FBI 
added new groups to one of its other surveillance programs, Cominfil, under a different name, 
the New Left, which included the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, SDS, and AFSC. The 
headquarters of some of these groups, including the AFSC Philadelphia office, were 
mysteriously broken into in the early 1970s. From 1973 to 1975, after J. Edgar Hoover’s formal 
leadership at the FBI ended, a group of individuals undetermined to this day but suspected to be 
FBI agents, stole files from the Washington D.C. Peace Center, Quaker House, Friends Meeting 
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House, home of a Peace Center worker, and the AFSC office in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The 
AFSC reported missing files in the mid-1960s pertaining to the Black Panthers and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Moreover, an unidentified person or group of people bombed AFSC offices in 
Miami, Florida, and Des Moines, Iowa.  FBI concern about communism within the AFSC 497
redirected to fear of radicalism that spurred interracial activism of the Service Committee. 
V.  The Response of the AFSC 
 By 1968, a few years before the COINTELPRO revelation, the AFSC had become 
defensive about how the federal government divided groups into those safe or not safe from 
surveillance. In a staff meeting, the peace education secretary for the San Francisco region, Ben 
Seaver, claimed that conscientious objectors were subjected to “extreme discrimination” by the 
federal government in the questions of the Selective Service Form 150, a questionnaire all 
prospective conscientious objectors had to fill out, which included yes-or-no questions such as: 
“1. Do you believe in a Supreme Being? 2. Describe the nature of your belief . . . and state 
whether or not your belief in a Supreme Being involves duties which to you are superior to those 
arising from any human relation. 3. Explain how, when, and from whom or from what source 
you received the training and acquired the belief.”  Seaver lamented on the plight of 498
conscientious objectors: “That we should accept the right of the government not only to define 
religion, which seems to be forbidden in the First Amendment, but also that we should allow the 
government to decide that only those who met this definition had a conscience that was worth 
considering; that others didn't have a conscience.”  499
 AFSC members had always looked outward from their own networks on the question of 
conscientious objection. Yet it was not until the AFSC confirmed it was being surveilled by the 
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federal government, based on information that emerged from a lawsuit including the Chicago 
AFSC, that the organization examined how surveillance affected the wider American public. 
Consequently, the AFSC became even more radical and politically active than it had been prior 
to the exposure of the FBI surveillance program. In this way, governmental surveillance of the 
AFSC shaped its organizational structure much as the Mormons formally erased polygamy from 
their religious practices. The Chicago AFSC entered into a crucial lawsuit with ten other 
organizations and seventeen individuals, against the city of Chicago, its police, Mayor, and local 
and federal officials, for bugging its office and planting informers with permission of the 
police.  Two members of the Legion of Justice, a paramilitary organization formed to 500
undermine the peace movement in Chicago, had visited the AFSC Chicago regional office and 
secretly placed a listening device under a conference table. This information was revealed during 
the “Chicago 8” conspiracy trial that charged eight antiwar activists with the responsibility for 
violent demonstrations at the August 1968 Democratic National Convention. The AFSC then 
decided to investigate additional ways and places in which it was possibly surveilled. The 
COINTELPRO revelations of 1971 further confirmed its suspicions, and by 1975, the AFSC had 
started to receive its FBI files from the FOIA requests. 
 The AFSC joined two additional lawsuits in Baltimore and Detroit, in which newspaper 
reports revealed the police had been keeping files on civilian groups, including the AFSC.  501
Following the COINTELPRO revelation in 1971, the AFSC joined the Philadelphia Resistance 
and eighteen other organizations on July 14, 1971, in a civil suit against Attorney General John 
Mitchell and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The lawsuit was settled out of court in December of 
1975. Plaintiffs paid the costs and the FBI was ordered to stop illegal tactics.  502
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 After the AFSC discovered the information about its Chicago office, it conducted a 
survey of its regional and national staff members to find more evidence that the AFSC was under 
surveillance. It found various pieces of evidence, including the fact that a house guest of an 
AFSC staff member turned out to be a member of the Chicago Police Department who appeared 
at the Chicago conspiracy trial. Additionally, in Texas, a peace education AFSC staff member, 
who offered draft and military counseling near an Army Base, asked to see his personal file at the 
Military Intelligence Office. Though told he had no file, four people walked into the office, all of 
whom he had previously seen under different disguises and aliases at the AFSC office. Finally, 
the AFSC survey documented FBI suspicions that the break-in of the Media FBI office, revealing 
COINTELPRO, was connected to members of the AFSC.   503
 Americans learned from COINTELPRO that the FBI files, which were sent anonymously 
to newspapers and organizations, including the AFSC National Action and Research on the 
Military Industrial Complex (NARMIC), instructed police departments on how to gather 
intelligence, maintain positive relations with citizens, and prevent riots. In retaliation to this leak, 
the FBI broke into the house of an AFSC employee who had transported copies of the received 
files to a printer. The AFSC pursued this intrusion in court, and the case was settled five years 
later, after J. Edgar Hoover had already passed away. As a result of the settlement, the defendants 
were awarded costs and promised the FBI they would no longer engage in such illicit actions.  504
The recently published book, The Burglary: the Discovery of John Edgar Hoover's Secret FBI, 
revealed the identities of the individuals, led by William Davidon, who exposed Hoover’s 
Counterintelligence Program: “[T]heir actions had dealt the first significant blow to an institution 
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that had amassed enormous power and prestige during John Edgar Hoover’s lengthy tenure as 
director.”  505
 As an organizational response to COINTELPRO, the AFSC launched the Board Level 
Task Force on Government Surveillance and Citizens’ Rights in 1975, which later prompted the 
Campaign to Stop Government Spying and raised awareness about government surveillance of 
groups that were deemed dissident or subversive. The Campaign to Stop Government Spying 
was comprised of three foci: Requests for AFSC Files, Litigation, and Education and Action.  506
Of particular grievance to the AFSC was the fact that it had consistently notified the government 
of its activities throughout the twentieth century, particularly those that involved public 
demonstrations or protests of government policies: “Such federal and police conduct can only be 
justified by a state which fears and distrusts the people and which values First Amendment 
principles by word but not by deed.”  If transparency and cooperation could not prevent 507
unlawful government intrusion, then it remained unclear to the AFSC as to what could.  
 In individual responses to COINTELPRO, AFSC members reacted differently, some with 
“naive openness, others with excessive secrecy, but to what extent their feelings may have been 
paranoid was never certain,” according to Ann Davidon.  She boldly suggested in an AFSC 508
report: “A government which considers itself at war not only with half the world but with 
perhaps half its own people is not one conducive to peace. […] Without becoming an American 
Civil Liberties Union, AFSC can nevertheless use legal means as one form of such education in 
matters affecting AFSC’s legal rights. It can use its own case as an example, with care to become 
neither self-righteous nor self-preoccupied. […] In general AFSC can try to create a climate of 
public opinion which is of its rights.”  Her opinion that the AFSC could employ legal means 509
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was shared by the leaders of the Service Committee, who joined lawsuits and formed the 
Campaign to Stop Government Spying. But Davidon’s insight marked another shift in the 
identity of the organization as a whole. Much as the Cold War had prompted the AFSC to hire 
non-Quaker employees, the COINTELPRO revelation prompted the AFSC to become even more 
politically active and resistant to government invasion than before, by engaging in legal actions 
against perceived injustices. 
 Further demonstrated in Davidon’s observation, AFSC members were well aware of their 
precarious position in the eyes of the government. One AFSC press release, authored by Paul E. 
Brink, noted that its activities had brought the Service Committee “from time to time into 
conflict with those who confuse[d] dissent with disloyalty, and who believe[d] that efforts to 
achieve better international relations must be ‘communist inspired.’”  Brink alluded to the 510
nuanced relationship between the AFSC and the federal government, which wearily considered 
the Service Committee to be a “genuinely religious, humanitarian organization”: “Since our 
earliest relief work we have often been investigated by the FBI or the Attorney General’s office, 
only to be inevitably ‘cleared’ as a genuinely religious, humanitarian organization. We have 
never allowed this miasma of suspicion to deter us from following the dictates of conscience, and 
we have always sought to dispel the climate of opinion which encourages the investigation of 
private and humanitarian groups such as ours, as well as of legitimate social change and political 
groups.”  Brink’s press release even asked for reformation of the FBI and CIA on behalf of the 511
AFSC. He implored Congress to prohibit actions that had “brought the intelligence community 
into disrepute,” and claimed that the CIA and FBI were so compromised that they were “beyond 
salvage.”  Brink cited Quaker ideals to summarize his stance: “Believing in the Quaker ideal of 512
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an open society in which all are free to promote peace, equality, and justice without fear, the 
American Friends Service Committee unhesitatingly adds its voice to those which say that the 
CIA and the Internal Security Division of the FBI must be abolished.”  513
 Louis W. Schneider, the Executive Secretary of the AFSC at the time, supported Brink’s 
outrage against the federal government: “The bulk of the pages collected indicates an 
inappropriate intrusion by the government into the beliefs and activities of the AFSC. It indicates 
no legitimate interest on the part of the government. Some of the surveillance is patently 
illegal.”  Schneider also criticized the National Intelligence Act of 1979 in front of the Senate 514
Select Committee on Intelligence, suggesting that the bill provided no restrictions on targeting 
United States citizens abroad, and that the government justified illegal methods for collecting 
information and protecting the nation against espionage and terrorism. Schneider posited a more 
subtle critique of the National Intelligence Act, that it did “not address the pretext of the past 
wherein groups could be surveilled because they might in future years develop into a group 
capable of engaging in a criminal violation.”  515
 The AFSC suggested to other groups around the country that they should be cautious of 
state and local agencies, which the AFSC found to be central to the intelligence network of the 
federal government.  This insight foreshadowed the decision of the New York Police 516
Department (NPYD) to surveil Muslim Americans in the post-September 11 era. The AFSC, in 
other words, was quite astute in its assessment of the extent to which surveillance permeated all 
levels of United States government, and it assisted other organizations that were surveilled for 
alleged subversive activities. Staff of the Government Surveillance and Citizens’ Rights 
programs were sent to work in five cities that the AFSC believed to be most subjected to 
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repressive surveillance: Baltimore, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Jackson, and Seattle. After three 
and a half years of work in these cities, the AFSC members published a report summarizing their 
findings: “Local, state, and federal agencies, joined by private and quasi-private groups, 
coordinate their surveillance, and share information, misinformation, and opinions. This 
‘intelligence’ activity remains largely uncontrolled, and poses a grave threat to constitutional 
rights of freedom of expression, due process, and privacy.”  For example, the AFSC issued a 517
“Report on Philadelphia Police Abuse Project” as part of its citizens’ rights program, which 
began in August 1977 to help various groups work together against police abuse in the city and 
facilitate conversation with city officials and members of the police force. The objectives were to 
place as many groups as possible into a network that demanded accountability of police and city 
officials, and to empower victim communities by giving them more agency over how certain 
decisions affected their communities. Among many tasks, the staff of this program prepared 
testimonies for hearings of the State Assembly’s Subcommittee on Crime and Correlations, 
which had that year been considering legislation to prevent police abuse.  
 The AFSC members who worked on Government Surveillance and Citizens’ Rights 
programs further emphasized that the intimidation, dossier keeping, and surveillance tactics of 
the government particularly affected the poor, as well as blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities, 
and had generally inhibited lawful dissent against injustices. Louis Schneider commented on 
governmental surveillance tactics on behalf of the AFSC: “The expansion of the police 
intelligence apparatus has been marked by an absence of clear-cut guidelines and effective 
oversight, which has left intelligence units free to expand their spheres of operation far beyond 
the limits of criminal investigation.”  Schneider argued there should not have had been a 518
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double standard for how the government treated American citizens at home compared to how it 
treated Americans or non-Americans abroad, foreshadowing a major criticism of PRISM in the 
post-September 11 era. He also called for the regulation of data collected in computer systems.  519
Schneider went one step further, calling for greater examination by citizens, officials, and media 
representatives alike, to prevent the infringement of citizens’ rights.  
VI.  Conclusion  
 J. Edgar Hoover tried to restructure the FBI by centralizing his authority within the 
organization. His intention backfired, however, as agents from offices around the country 
challenged Hoover’s stance on the threat that the Service Committee posed. The Philadelphia 
FBI office in particular resisted Hoover’s surveillance of the AFSC Quakers. Their resistance can 
be attributed to the insider status of both Quakers and AFSC members in American society, 
which would have been particularly evident to FBI agents based in Philadelphia who maintained 
personal or undercover contacts with the leading figures of the Service Committee and the 
Society of Friends. The efforts of Quaker and AFSC activists would ultimately unveil 
surveillance of numerous citizen groups that the FBI worked so hard to conceal. 
 The AFSC, in turn, was shaped by the rise of civil liberties in the postwar period, as well 
as by its Quaker-rooted commitment to social justice. The organization consciously hired non-
Quaker members who identified with Quaker ideals in order to professionalize the organization 
through long-term employees, and to promote the radicalism necessary to execute projects 
abroad, sometimes at the expense of unrelenting pacifism. AFSC members suspected that its 
organization was under surveillance, but it was not until the “Chicago 8” trial and later the 
COINTELPRO revelation that their suspicions were confirmed. The Service Committee 
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underwent a second major reordering to focus on its own legal defense, as well as the defense of 
other surveilled organizations, following the exposure of mass governmental surveillance in the 
1970s. It not only continued to engage in radical activities, but it began to mobilize and partake 
in legal defenses against unjustified governmental spying of citizen organizations. 
 Governmental surveillance of the American Friends Service Committee offered a glimpse 
into how the fear that communism had permeated the Quaker group coerced government 
agencies to surveil a highly respected, socially acclimated, religiously affiliated organization. 
Despite the bewilderment articulated by many AFSC members about their surveillance, the FBI 
files revealed that FBI agents did not all blindly follow J. Edgar Hoover’s prescription to cure the 
alleged communist invasion of the Service Committee. Many FBI agents, in particular those of 
Philadelphia and at times Hoover himself, displayed nuanced, thoughtful attempts to deconstruct 
Quakerism and trace the relationship between the Society of Friends and the American Friends 
Service Committee. Yet his prudent agents, aware of the rising demand for civil liberties by the 
American public, realized that disaster could ensue should it later be revealed that the FBI was 
wrongfully surveilling a respectable, lawful organization. That disaster would have multiplied if 
the boundary between the Society of Friends and the AFSC was found to be less than clearcut, 
given the legal and cultural protections of the freedom of religious expression in the United 
States. 
 J. Edgar Hoover did not live to see the unwinding of the secrecy of his once protected 
organization. But the legacy of the American Friends Service Committee would persist through 
its campaign to cease government spying and to protect those who were less willing or able to 
protect themselves. The FBI files that William C. Davidon and others dispatched to the nation 
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did not end government surveillance of American citizens. American Muslims would resume this 
fight over forty years later, this time against a local government agency, the New York Police 
Department. AFSC retaliation against localized FBI surveillance, such as through its Campaign 
to Stop Government Spying, foreshadowed the imminent threat not just of federal, but also local 
and state government surveillance. 
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Chapter 4. The Muslims of Brooklyn, New York: Predicting Terrorism After September 11 
“You’re going to have to watch and study the mosques, because a lot of talk is going on at the 
mosques. And from what I heard, in the old days, meaning awhile ago, we had great surveillance 
going on in and around mosques in New York City.”  — Donald Trump on Morning Joe 520
(November 15, 2015) 
I.  Introduction  
 Ten years after the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Associated Press exposed the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) surveillance of Brooklyn-based Muslims, prompting a 
national discussion about the infringement of civil liberties.  A handful of the surveilled 521
Brooklynites in Raza v. City of New York filed suit in June 2013 in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York. The case was settled in January 2016. The Raza 
plaintiffs argued that they were targeted by the NYPD because of their Islamic beliefs and 
affiliations. The plaintiffs, backed by a number of civil liberties groups, argued that the NYPD 
violated the United States and New York State Constitutions by discriminating against 
individuals based on their religion.  Subsequently, the NYPD observed the communities of 522
those individuals. This chapter analyzes the Raza transcript to understand the NYPD surveillance 
program. The transcript indicates how the NYPD reconciled its understanding of Islam with its 
surveillance program. In contrast to the prior two cases, this case study is an example in which a 
government agency tried to predict action by monitoring religious expression, rather than 
surveilling criminal activity. 
 In addition, there were obvious differences between the social context of this case and 
those of the first two cases. The Islamic identities of the Raza plaintiffs contributed to their 
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outsider status, which was similar to the outsider status of the Mormons but quite distinctive 
from the insider status of the AFSC Quakers. The NYPD surveilled Brooklyn Muslims in a 
comparatively pluralistic culture compared to the cultures of the Mormons and AFSC 
Quakers.  The Mormons and AFSC Quakers tried to build their organizational identities against 523
the Protestant origins of their respective institutions. The Muslim Raza plaintiffs, in turn, 
augmented their outsider status by practicing a non-Protestant religion. 
II.  Radicalizaton 
 The 2007 NYPD report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, was 
prepared by two Senior Intelligence Analysts in the NYPD Intelligence Division and graduates 
of the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA): Mitchell D. Silber, 
a SIPA lecturer, and Arvin Bhatt, an economic affairs officer for the U.S. Department of State. 
NYPD police officers used the report to predict radicalism. Police Commissioner Raymond W. 
Kelly characterized the report as an attempt to examine how the “intention” for conducting 
terrorism “forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case 
studies.”  Silber and Bhatt developed a theoretical framework to predict all forms of radicalism 524
based on the specific details from just a handful of terrorism cases. The case studies they selected 
were three homegrown terrorism cases in Lackawana, New York; Portland, Oregon, and northern 
Virginia; and two New York City-based cases. 
 The Radicalization in the West report was the primary written source of authority for the 
NYPD surveillance program. NYPD personnel used the report to train officers in detecting 
potential terrorists who held Islamic beliefs or engaged in Islamic practices. The report alleged 
that “[e]nclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim often serve as ‘ideological 
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sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.”  It dissected a complex goal, detecting terrorism, 525
into a four-phase process. Critics of the report claimed it condoned religious and racial profiling 
through observing characteristics that offered no consistent connection to terrorism. As Aziz Huq 
argued, the report drew conclusions about “the meaning of religious conduct” based on five cases 
that showed connections between religious conduct and terrorism, while ignoring millions of 
cases that lacked the connection.   526
 Based on the Radicalization in the West report, officers were expected to think broadly 
about the possibility that anyone could be a terrorist, including college students, members of 
middle-class families, unemployed people, new immigrants, second and third generation 
immigrants, and criminals. The report identified “radicalization incubators” such as mosques, 
cafes, “cab driver hangouts,” nongovernmental organizations, student associations, hookah bars, 
butter shops, and bookstores. It identified at least two-hundred and sixty-three “hot spots” that 
were owned or attended by Muslims. 
 Commissioner Kelly added that the NYPD prioritized understanding what drove and 
defined the radicalization process, effectively stating that the surveillance program was based on 
tracing the evolution of the terrorist, rather than surveilling terrorists themselves. Silber and 
Bhatt wrote that before a rise of terrorist attacks around the world in the early 2000s, they would 
have studied the planning of an attack, but they instead focused on “a much earlier point–a point 
where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a 
process of radicalization.”  In other words, they aimed to predict terrorism before suspected 527
terrorists even developed their plans. 
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 Silber and Bhatt pointed to jihadi-Salafi ideology as the motivation behind radicalization, 
which they argued drove young Western-born or residing men and women to carry out acts of 
terrorism in their home or host countries. They included a few sentences on the history of the 
larger Salafi movement, stating that the goal of the Sunni revivalist movement was to create a 
pure society modeled after a literal reading of the Quran, and after seventh-century Arabian 
social practices. Moreover, they wrote that implementing sharia law and a worldwide Caliphate 
were two goals of Islamic terrorism, and that contemporary Saudi Wahhabi scholarship, which 
justified these goals, promoted intolerance toward unbelievers. Silber and Bhatt claimed that the 
Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb, who believed Islam was under attack from the West, shaped 
the political dimension of jihadi-Salafi ideology.  In summary, the authors did try to outline the 528
religious and political dimensions of this ideology, showing an attempt to understand Islam as 
part of creating a surveillance system for the NYPD. Therefore, they rightfully did not ignore 
religious belief in their report. Yet in providing NYPD officers with the subsequent four-phase 
model for detecting terrorism, they did not successfully integrate a comprehensive understanding 
of the religion into the resulting instructions used and expected by police officers. 
 The core of the report, which the NYPD removed from its website after the Raza 
settlement, centered on four distinct phases of radicalization as follows: pre-radicalization, self-
identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. Silber and Bhatt acknowledged that individuals 
sometimes abandoned the radicalization process, and that they did not always follow the phases 
in a linear manner. Nonetheless, they claimed that those who passed through all four phases were 
likely planning or implementing a terrorist attack.  The report encouraged intervening early in 529
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the radicalization process, prior to the planning phase.  This instruction led to the profiling of 530
many individuals who possessed no real connections to terrorist activities.  
 Silber and Bhatt defined stage one, pre-radicalization, as the point of origin of individuals 
preceding the radicalization process, “before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi 
Islam as their own ideology.”  They claimed that most of these individuals had unremarkable 531
lives and ordinary jobs prior to that process. In stage two, or self-identification, individuals 
began to explore Salafi Islam while moving away from their old identities and toward those of 
like-minded people. Silber and Bhatt characterized the motivation for this stage as an economic, 
social, political, or personal crisis that disrupted individuals’ beliefs and opened them to “new 
worldviews [sic].”  532
 In the third stage of the report, called indoctrination, individuals strengthened their beliefs 
by fully embracing Salafi Islam and militant jihad, often under the direction of a “spiritual 
sanctioner” who advocated jihad.  While acknowledging the role of this leader, Silber and 533
Bhatt emphasized the importance of group identity in this stage. In jihadization, stage four, 
members of the group of like-minded people accepted their obligation to participate in jihad and 
began planning attacks. This final stage could occur only over a few weeks or months, while the 
first three phases generally transpired over two to three years. They also privileged the 
communicative role of the Internet in this framework, claiming that the Internet provided direct 
access to extremist ideology, functioned as an anonymous virtual meeting place, and enabled 
jihadists to acquire information on their targets.  Silber and Bhatt argued that these four phases 534
were evident in several case studies they reviewed.  Yet even if they accurately developed a 535
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framework from preexisting terrorist cases, the authors did not thoroughly consider whether the 
framework was discriminatory or useful for predicting future terrorist cases.  
 The fact that Silber and Bhatt brandished their report as a “tool for predictability”  536
suggested that the NYPD surveillance program was fundamentally distinctive from the 
monitoring systems of the previous two case studies, which did not attempt to predict subversion. 
Moreover, the content of the report indicated the lack of knowledge within the NYPD about 
Islam, despite the authors’ attempt to outline the political and religious dimensions of jihadi-
Salafi Islam. For example, the NYPD report pointed to beard growing as one indicator of 
radicalization in several case studies. Some Muslims wear beards to honor the Prophet 
Mohammad, based on the Hadîth, or reports on the sayings of Muhammad passed along from 
generation to generation.  However, Muslim men and women around the world differ in how 537
they reconcile their hairstyles with their religious beliefs, disagreeing about the requirement of 
wearing beards or veils at all. Islamic studies scholar Ingrid Pfluger-Schindlbeck has argued that 
hair manifests in Islamic societies either in religious texts, such as the Hadîth or Qur’an; 
institutional rules about the sexual body; or forms of sacrifice revealing an asexual human 
body.  Growing the beard, in short, is a form of Islamic religious expression that varies across 538
Islamic traditions, and more importantly, does not correlate with radicalization.  
 The fourth phase of the report suggested that the NYPD had been moving away from 
surveilling action and increasingly toward preemptive surveillance, in which government agents 
probed the Raza plaintiffs on their thoughts on politics and current events. Faiza Patel of the 
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law argued that the report flagged religious belief as an 
indicator of radicalization, quoting the report: “Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology […] guides 
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movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis for action.”  Elizabeth 539
Goitein at the Brennan Center suggested the NYPD and FBI agents have both looked for 
“ideological indicators,” including seemingly innocuous acts such as wearing Islamic dress or 
receiving religious education abroad. They designed intelligence gathering practices around these 
ideological indicators, such as by placing informants inside of mosques.  Patel similarly 540
suggested that gathering intelligence on Muslim Americans relied upon a “religious conveyer 
belt” model, in which suspects emerging from a personal grievance or crisis, to fervently 
adopting a religion, to adopting radical beliefs, to terrorism.  541
 The assumption that Islamic terrorists could be detected through four stages of 
radicalization reflected a point made by Islamic scholar William A. Graham, that there is no 
single entity of Islam but “many Islams” in distinctive local and regional contexts.  While the 542
NYPD framework was arguably useful for police officers to conduct their jobs, a minimally 
basic understanding of the diversity within Islam would have better allowed the NYPD to fulfill 
its counterterrorism operations without infringing on the civil liberties of Muslim Americans. 
The reliance of NYPD officers on preemptive surveillance was markedly distinctive from the 
system for detecting polygamists in the Territory of Utah or from the cautious approaches of FBI 
agents to detect communist affiliations of the AFSC. The Supreme Court assessed the theological 
dimensions of polygamy after officers in the Territory of Utah had already collected information 
about polygamists. The FBI considered the relationship between Quakerism and communism 
simultaneous to its surveillance of the AFSC. The NYPD, on the other hand, used a 
predetermined report that was finalized well before its surveillance of Muslims. 
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 Through its surveillance program, the NYPD simplified how to detect radical Islam with 
the intention of protecting national security. Law professor Geoffrey Stone argued in 2011, two 
years before the Raza “Complaint” was filed, there was “no definitive precedent, or even close to 
definitive precedent,” on governmental surveillance of mosques chilling religious expression.  543
The absence of a legal precedent for this issue has made Raza all the more significant. 
Previously, according to legal scholar Aaron Baker, this form of “intelligence-led policing” 
meant that if police possessed information that an act of terrorism was more likely to be 
committed by a person of a certain race, they did not discriminate by policing individuals of that 
race more than those of other races. Intelligence-led policing, prior to Raza, permitted racial and 
religious profiling.  544
 The plaintiffs in Raza, listed below, included three citizens, two mosques, and a Muslim 
non-profit organization:   545
1. Hamid Hassan Raza, an imam at Masjid Al-Ansar, was under NYPD surveillance since 
2008. He led daily prayer services, hosted religious classes for the mosque community, 
and offered spiritual and personal counseling to congregants.  
2. Masjid Al-Ansar, a Muslim house of worship founded in 2008 in Brooklyn, was under 
NYPD surveillance since its founding. It is registered as a tax-exempt non-profit 
organization under the name Al-Ansar Center, Inc. It hosts daily prayer services, provides 
religious education and counseling to congregants, and fosters a religious community 
with a focus on Muslim youth.  
3. Asad (“Ace”) Dandia, a Brooklyn resident, had been under surveillance since at least 
March 2012. He was a student at the City University of New York and the co-founder and 
!192
Vice President of Muslims Giving Back, a charity organization.  
4. Muslims Giving Back was under surveillance since at least March 2012. It is an 
organization that engages in charitable activities, such as collecting donations from 
members and community members to provide food and assistance to low-income New 
York City residents, “in furtherance of Islam’s central tenet of charity and assistance to 
the needy.”  It also conducts outreach and awareness about Islam.  546
5. Masjid At-Taqwa, a Muslim house of worship founded in Brooklyn in 1981 and 
incorporated under the name, Masjid At-Taqwa, Inc., was under surveillance since at least 
2004. Like the first mosque plaintiff, Masjid At-Taqwa holds daily prayer services, 
provides religious counseling and education to congregants, and tries to create an 
inclusive religious community.  
6. Mohammad Elshinawy, a Brooklyn resident, was under surveillance since at least 
2004. He taught lectures, classes, and sermons about Islam for about eleven years at 
various Muslim institutions throughout New York City. 
The fact that two mosques were plaintiffs in this case highlighted the significance of Raza to 
Muslim American communities beyond those directly affected in New York City. Islamic studies 
scholar Ihsan Bagby has noted the importance of United States mosques, which have “served as 
the primary vehicle for the collective expression of Islam in the American Muslim 
community,”  symbolizing the existence of Islam in United States society. Governmental 547
surveillance of mosques for this reason was particularly damaging to the collective spirit of 
Muslim American communities around the nation. 
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 The plaintiffs insisted that the defendants violated the following: 1) the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for targeting and discriminating against the plaintiffs for 
practicing Islam, without providing a legitimate government interest while stigmatizing Islam; 2) 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution Right to 
Free Exercise of Religion, for placing a burden on the plaintiffs’ ability to practice Islam without 
offering a generalized policy for surveilling religious institutions other than Islamic ones; and 3) 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, for stigmatizing the plaintiffs, targeting their 
beliefs and practices as opposed to those of any other religious group, and inhibiting their 
abilities to practice their faith.  The defendants included the following:  548 549
1. The City of New York, which had been responsible for the “policy, practice, 
supervision, implementation, and conduct of all NYPD matters and was responsible for 
the appointment, training, supervision, and conduct of all NYPD personnel”;  550
2. Michael R. Bloomberg, the Mayor of New York, who had supervisory authority over 
the NYPD; 
3. Raymond W. Kelly, the Police Commissioner for New York, who also had supervisory 
authority over the NYPD; and  
4. David Cohen, the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence for New York City as of 2002, 
who had supervisory authority over the Intelligence Division of the NYPD and 
previously worked for the CIA for thirty-five years. 
As listed above, the NYPD was not the only defendant under scrutiny for its surveillance 
program. The NYPD, though it operated without external constraints that ensured the program 
!194
was constitutional, did not exist in a vacuum during the period it surveilled Brooklyn Muslims. It 
was subjected to the local politics of New York and to post-September 11 federal politics. 
 The precedent for surveilling American citizens to ensure public safety was well in place 
when the NYPD developed its surveillance program. Weeks after the attacks on the World Trade 
Center, the George W. Bush administration expanded the authority of the federal government to 
surveil citizens through the jurisdiction of the 2001 Patriot Act. The act restricted checks and 
balances, including judicial oversight and the ability to challenge searches in court, which were 
meant to protect the public from governmental overreach. The attacks on the World Trade Center 
tested core American values, including the freedom of speech, the right to privacy, the protection 
from unreasonable search and seizure, and due process of the law.  The expansion of NYPD 551
counterterrorism programs after the September 11 attacks was not unjustified, but it undermined 
the protection of citizens from unwarranted spying.    
 Yet the NYPD did face a major constraint in the immediate aftermath of September 11: 
the Handschu Guidelines. The Guidelines, devised from a 1985 civil suit settlement, restricted 
police investigations. After the September 11 attacks, the rules articulated in the Guidelines were 
weakened in 2003 and then restrengthened with the Raza settlement on January 7, 2016. We will 
first turn briefly to the Handschu Guidelines, and we will then examine the details of the Raza 
case and settlement. 
III.  The Handschu Guidelines 
 The Raza settlement was linked to an earlier federal case, Handschu v. Special Services 
Division, which was settled in 1985 but resurfaced in 2007 when the NYPD was accused of 
violating the agreement for videotaping two political demonstrations. When the Handschu 
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lawsuit was first filed in 1971, the activists of the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI 
had not yet broken into the FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, to expose COINTELPRO until 
later that year. In Handschu, protestors challenged the way the New York Police Department 
surveilled and gathered information on legal political protest activities and public expression, 
including by using informants, interrogation, and infiltration. Opponents of these practices, 
including the War Resisters League, the Gay Liberation Front, and the Black Panther Party, 
argued that the NYPD violated the First Amendment. 
 Handschu was settled in 1985 through the Handschu Guidelines, which offered three 
primary rules for lawful police surveillance of public expression.  First, the settlement 552
constructed a threshold for establishing an investigation. NYPD officers had to provide “specific 
information” about imminent criminality before launching investigations of protected speech or 
other activities. Second, the NYPD agreed to only use undercover officers when they were 
crucial to the investigation, and to avoid maintaining files on individuals with no connections to 
crime. The third rule established authority over the NYPD. Officers had to submit investigation 
requests to two NYPD Deputy Commissioners and one mayor-appointed civilian.  In summary, 553
according to the original Guidelines, the NYPD could investigate criminal activity, but not 
political activity. If the activity was a mix of criminal and political activities, only one section of 
the NYPD could investigate that activity based on a criminal predicate, and under the approval of 
the three-person authority.  554
 In 2003, Deputy Commissioner David Cohen, a top CIA director who was hired by the 
NYPD after the September 11 attacks, argued that the strictness of the Guidelines hampered 
NYPD “efforts every day.”  He rationalized that, although an activity might be legal, it could 555
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precede a terrorist attack. The NYPD petitioned the court to abolish the Guidelines. In response, 
a federal district judge ordered the Guidelines to be revised, but not eviscerated. First, the NYPD 
was not required to provide evidence of criminal activity prior to investigating Muslim American 
or immigrant communities, thereby lowering the standards set in the Handschu Guidelines. 
Second, the revisions removed the three-person review board previously established in 
Handschu. From that point on, the board could only review NYPD investigations after they had 
already been opened.  Additionally, only the Commissioner of Intelligence had to sign off on 556
investigations. In lieu of the Handschu Guidelines, the NYPD adopted the post-September 11 
Department of Justice surveillance guidelines, provided to the FBI to conduct antiterrorism 
investigations.  The NYPD, in summary, relied on the 2003 overhaul of the Guidelines for its 557
new surveillance system that was later challenged in Raza v. City of New York.   558
 Critics of the 2003 revisions to the Guidelines did not take issue with police surveillance 
itself, but the surveillance of peaceful protestors and lawful citizens. The 2003 Guidelines would 
once again be revised in 2016 with the settlement of Raza v. City of New York. The Handschu 
lawyers joined the Raza lawyers to bring the original motion against the NYPD after the 
Associated Press reveal, and at the end, to weigh in on the Raza settlement. They claimed that 
the surveillance of Muslims violated the consent decree of Handschu, and that the Guidelines 
should have protected New York City residents from the religiously-based surveillance 
experienced by the Raza plaintiffs.  
IV.  Raza v. City of New York 
 A. Collection of Information 
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 Contemporary government agencies collect information about potential terrorists at the 
local, state, and federal levels. The post-September 11 era, however, has not been distinctive in 
this way, for localized sources of intelligence were equally important in the Mormon and Quaker 
case studies. The NYPD spied on Muslim communities in the greater New York City area, 
including regions of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, by using various tactics to 
collect information and then enter data into NYPD intelligence databases.  559
 The NYPD conducted its Muslim surveillance program since at least 2002, under the 
directions of the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, David Cohen, and his Intelligence 
Division. The program consisted of: 1) the Demographics Unit (renamed the Zone Assessment 
Unit); 2) the Intelligence Analysis Unit; 3) the Cyber Intelligence Unit; and 4) the Terrorism 
Interdiction Unit. Cohen oversaw the development of the program and hired Lawrence Sanchez, 
a CIA analyst, to handle the intelligence section. Sanchez claimed that one objective of the 
NYPD was to “protect New York City citizens from turning into terrorists,” or to effectively 
detect terrorism before it even emerged by identifying behaviors that were “potential precursors 
to terrorism.”  Sanchez’s description indicated the NYPD embraced preemptive surveillance 560
tactics. Under Sanchez’s and Cohen’s directions, the NYPD began to map where Muslim New 
Yorkers lived in the city, based on data from the 2000 United States census. 
 NYPD tactics for collecting data included: 1) mapping Muslim communities; religious, 
educational, and social institutions; and businesses in the greater New York City area through the 
NYPD Demographics Unit, which identified neighborhoods occupied by twenty-eight 
“ancestries of interest,” including “American Black Muslims,” but excluding Coptic Christian 
Egyptians or Iranian Jews; 2) taking photographic and video surveillance from cars outside of 
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mosques and on light poles aimed at mosques, and recording license plate numbers of cars 
parked outside of mosques during services; 3) directing police informants who were selected 
from arrestees, prisoners, or suspects, known as “mosque crawlers,” to attend services at 
mosques and report the content of sermons and names of attendees, provide photographs from 
inside the mosques, and employ a “create and capture” method of “creating” conversations about 
terrorism and “capturing” the responses for the police; 4) instructing police “rakers,” or teams of 
NYPD officers in civilian clothing, to blend into Muslim communities and collect information on 
those communities, including within restaurants and businesses; 5) maintaining intelligence 
databases of daily reports on the lives of Muslim New Yorkers; and 6) surveilling websites, 
blogs, and online forums. Police officers surveilled religious services and monitored 
conversations of congregants and leaders in mosques without having leads on any 
wrongdoings.  In August 2012, the Assistant Chief of the NYPD Intelligence Division, 561
Lieutenant Thomas Golati, claimed under sworn testimony that during the six years of his tenure, 
conversations overheard by members of the Demographics Unit did not lead to a single criminal 
investigation.  562
 Undercover rakers, or plainclothes officers, entered neighborhoods with a certain 
proportion of Muslims of “ancestries of interest” to surveil public spaces such as bookstores, 
bars, and nightclubs. Mosque crawlers were informants who worked or lived in Muslim 
neighborhoods, monitoring sermons, conversations, and imams during Islamic gatherings, while 
recording conversations about current events and collecting lists of mosque attendee.  Islamic 563
sermons, or khutbahs, were particularly helpful to Muslim Americans in dealing with anti-
Islamic actions and sentiments after the September 11 attacks.  The NYPD even created spaces 564
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to attract targets, including by establishing a sports leagues to spy on Muslim youth and noting 
where Muslims received haircuts. They labeled certain mosques as “Terrorism Enterprises,” 
which permitted them to investigate any visitor of those mosques, and to monitor and record 
speech and sermons.  565
 The NYPD targeted over two-hundred and fifty mosques in New York and neighboring 
states. Each mosque was characterized by its ethnic orientation, leadership, and group 
affiliations, either deducted from outside surveillance or from inside the mosque itself. After 
consulting with rakers and informants, the NYPD then identified fifty-three mosques of 
particular concern, each of which received informants and plainclothes officers. However, Cohen 
intended to place an NYPD source in every mosque within two-hundred and fifty miles of New 
York City, and did so in many of them. The NYPD also placed video cameras outside of 
mosques, where they collected license plate numbers of attendees. 
 Beginning in 2003, the NYPD located Muslim New Yorkers based on a list of “ancestries 
of interest,” including “American Black Muslims” and twenty-eight other countries or regions 
associated with the global Muslim population.  It used United States census data and 566
information from I-9 immigration forms and government databases to find people associated 
with such “ancestries of interest.” If the NYPD examined Iranian communities, for instance, it 
would mark Jewish or Christian people or institutions as not of interest to the NYPD.  It reused 567
this system to analyze other ethnic communities. Whether the NYPD used this strategy 
intentionally, or inadvertently because of limited resources, the result was that Muslims were 
surveilled specifically over non-Muslims. 
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 While many Muslims were surveilled by the NYPD, certain individuals were singled out 
for “real or perceived stronger devotion to their faith or to particular Islamic beliefs.”  NYPD 568
officers travelled to “hot spots” with particularly strong “devout clientele,” and they targeted 
influential individuals. This strategy resonated with the initial policy of focusing on influential 
Mormons of the Utah Territory before officials shifted their focus to a wider range of Mormon 
people. Some NYPD informants instigated inflammatory conversations with Muslim New 
Yorkers. The plaintiffs argued this tactic was an invasive form of entrapment. 
 One technique, “create and capture,” occurred when an informant “created” a 
conversation about a controversial topic, such as terrorism, and then “captured” the response in a 
report for the NYPD. Following his third arrest on misdemeanor drug charges, nineteen-year-old 
Shamiur Rahman worked as an informant for the NYPD. Rahman believed he was heroically 
protecting New York City. He received one and a half thousand dollars per month to monitor 
conversations in mosques and among Muslim youth, listen for buzzwords such as “jihad” or 
“revolution,” report “radical rhetoric,” take pictures of imams and congregants inside of 
mosques, collect cell phone numbers of congregants, and photograph the names of people who 
attended study groups and classes on Islam. He attended the 2012 Muslim Day Parade in 
Manhattan and photographed people. He also listened to a 2012 February lecture at the John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice. Rahman was instructed that the Muslim Student Association 
members of the college were “religious Muslims” and that the “NYPD consider[ed] being 
Muslim a terrorism indicator.”  None of this collected information related to criminal activity, 569
according to the plaintiffs. 
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 Rahman admitted to his informant status once he believed the work was “detrimental to 
the Constitution.”  When he informed the NYPD the Associated Press had contacted him, he 570
stopped receiving text messages from his NYPD handler. Rahman claimed he never saw any 
criminal activities during his time as an informant.  The Raza case did not deny the right of the 571
NYPD to protect citizens from possible terrorist attacks emanating from Islamic networks, but 
the settlement altered the conditions under which it could execute surveillance programs, as will 
be explained at the end of this chapter.  
 Up until the 2013 Raza complaint, the NYPD continued to use officers and informants to 
surveil mosques and Muslims, thereafter filing away that information. Michael Bloomberg, then 
Mayor of New York City, stated that the NYPD would move forward with the surveillance 
program even though no other religious institution or public institution was surveilled.  Three 572
key themes emerged from the transcripts of the case: 1) whether or not the plaintiffs were 
preemptively targeted based on their religion; 2) how information was stored and circulated by 
both the NYPD and the plaintiffs; and 3) how the NYPD defined Muslim in the timeline of the 
surveillance program.  
 B. The Testimonies 
 The plaintiffs of Raza argued that the NYPD had “engaged in an unlawful policy and 
practice of religious profiling and suspicions surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers” that had “a 
false and unconstitutional premise: that Muslim religious belief and practices are a basis for law 
enforcement scrutiny.”  They added that the Intelligence Division of the NYPD “singled out 573
Muslim religious and community leaders, mosques, organizations, businesses, and individuals 
for pervasive surveillance that is not visited upon the public at large or upon institutions or 
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individuals belonging to any other religious faith.”  The ACLU specified that the 574
discriminatory Muslim surveillance program caused religious leaders to censor their speeches in 
mosques as well as in private religious counseling, and to record their sermons as a potential 
defense against future allegations by police officers or informants. Some religious leaders cited 
decreased attendance at mosques and increased suspicion of new congregants as NYPD 
informants. One charity and religious leader claimed his ability to raise funds was limited due to 
rising fear about surveillance within his community.  575
 The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the NYPD program, their “religious goals, 
missions, and practices [were] profoundly harmed.”  They gave the example that religious 576
leaders and mosques among them had “curtailed the religious and personal guidance that they 
provide to congregants for fear that this guidance might be misconstrued by NYPD officers or 
informants, resulting in additional unjustified scrutiny, or worse.”  Leaders and mosques also 577
started to record sermons out of fear that statements would be taken out of context by NYPD 
officers or informants. “Plaintiff religious leaders’ ministry, expression, and study have been 
significantly chilled.”  Moreover, diminished attendance at the two mosques frightened 578
constituents that new incoming people were informants. The plaintiffs argued that this 
“suspicionless [sic] surveillance” violated their constitutional rights of equal protection and free 
exercise of religion. They also sought an end to the NYPD surveillance program, despite the fact 
that the NYPD had allegedly destroyed relevant surveillance files by the time of the lawsuit,  579
perhaps out of fear of prosecution for illegal surveillance. 
 The Raza plaintiffs further argued that the signs the NYPD used to detect radicalization, 
including Islamic clothing, beards, and alcohol abstinence, condoned profiling Muslims based on 
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their religious beliefs and practices. To date, the Supreme Court has not defined religious belief, 
even though it distinguished belief from practice in response to the nineteenth-century Mormon 
polygamy cases. In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court confirmed what religious 
belief did not constitute: recognition of a Supreme Being (Torcaso v. Watkins (U.S. 1961)) or 
origin in a traditional or organized religion (Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment 
Security (U.S. 1989)).  The nuanced, case-by-case basis by which the Supreme Court has 580
grappled with issues of religious belief paralleled the struggles of government agencies 
monitoring the Utah Mormons, AFSC Quakers, and Brooklyn Muslims. Territorial officials, FBI 
agents, and NYPD officers of each case, respectively, pondered over whether polygamy, 
communism-linked social justice, or Islamic terrorism accurately reflected the beliefs of the 
majority of each religious community. Much like the ongoing debates in the Supreme Court 
cases, these case studies have shown that the evolving definition of what did or did not constitute 
religious expression has shaped how government agencies define religion, and consequently, 
how they surveilled the religious organizations deemed threatening. 
 Imam Hamid Hassan Raza, more commonly known as Imam Raza, documented the 
effect of the surveillance program on his role as an imam at the mosque, Masjid Al-Ansar, in the 
complaint.  Concerned about the effects of surveillance on his community and his own legal 581
rights, Imam Raza began recording his sermons on videos in case he was accused of something 
he did not say or that was misinterpreted out of context. He upgraded the video equipment of the 
mosque with funds from the mosque, and a congregant volunteer built a sound system to ensure 
clear, high-quality recordings of the sermons as a defense against potential allegations. Just as 
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the NYPD scouted preemptively for terrorism, Imam Raza defended himself preemptively from 
terrorist accusations. 
 Imam Raza recalled an incident in 2009 when NYPD officers, out of uniform, asked him 
for his driver’s license. A year later, when his mosque received books from another mosque that 
was shutting down, two plainclothes NYPD officers approached him. They claimed they were 
responding to a complaint about the transportation of bags into the mosque and a double-parked 
van in the front. They wanted to investigate inside the mosque. In 2011, plainclothes NYPD 
officers claiming to represent the Department’s community affairs branch stated they wanted to 
“get to know the community.” This incident prompted the mosque to sponsor a few workshops a 
year later informing congregants of their civil rights, which the plaintiff mosque leaders argued 
detracted from the normal activities of the mosque.  582
 In 2012, Imam Raza met newcomers he suspected were potential informants because 
their interest in Islam seemed insincere. According to his account, one nervous, heavily breathing 
man claimed he wanted to become a Muslim. The man openly recorded Imam Raza with his 
phone, asking him about his views on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and whether Muslims 
should interact with Christians and Jews. Suspicious of this exchange, Imam Raza responded that 
he was more interested in local affairs, and that Muslims should live peacefully with Jews and 
Christians. Another newcomer that year was confrontational during a student practice exercise of 
a workshop about how to invite people to Islam. This individual was Shamiur Rahman, who later 
admitted on Facebook to his role as an NYPD informant. 
 Imam Raza became increasingly fearful with the occurrence of each of these incidents. 
As a result, he altered his religious sermons, teaching practices, and counsel on religious topics, 
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especially those pertaining to current events that might be perceived as controversial by the 
NYPD. One interpretation of the concept “jihad” is an internal struggle that does not lead to 
harm or injustice to another Muslim or non-Muslim person, according to Imam Raza. The term 
became an NYPD buzzword associated with the radicalization of Muslim youth. Imam Raza 
stated that in a surveillance-free environment, he would discuss with his congregants how jihad 
“concerns the internal and universal struggle for human self-improvement, that is a struggle in 
which all human beings are engaged, and that it is the most important struggle of Islam.”  The 583
misinterpretation of “jihad” is but one example of how the Radicalization in the West report 
oversimplified and misinterpreted Islam. An Islamic understanding of jihad as a struggle 
connects to the importance of understanding the Islamic sermon, the khutbah, as something other 
than a means for recruiting terrorists. During khutbahs, Muslims addressed their experiences of 
being Muslim in the post-September 11 era, while imams, or prayer leaders, offered 
interpretations of such challenges according to Quranic principles.   584
 Imams play a critical role in fostering dialogue among their constituents. For this reason, 
the NYPD officers or informants who entered mosques to collect information violated the 
religious expression of the preacher and listeners in the khutbah. Moreover, personal 
connectedness within Islam is central to the isnâd paradigm, which is derived from the Hadîth. 
The isnâd paradigm is a collection of reports attributed to Muhammad and other first-generation 
Muslims that claim to relay the opinions and practices of Muhammad and other members of the 
original Islamic community. The isnâd paradigm is based on a scholarly community, a hierarchy 
of transmitters who relay information from the Hadîth reports across generations. This paradigm 
for studying Islamic texts is considered necessary for credibly discussing Islamic matters, as it is 
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the means for realizing the ittisâlîyah, or the personal connectedness that validates the Hadîth 
reports as tradition.  Upon learning of the Associated Press release, many practicing Muslims 585
felt obstructed from participating in this communal sharing of knowledge central to their religion 
in fear of entrapment in an NYPD scheme. 
 Imam Raza actively dissuaded congregants from discussing religious concepts or current 
events, limiting their range of speech. He felt his active repression of free discussion within the 
community, particularly among Muslim youth, undermined his duties as a religious leader and 
educator. He also started listening to Arabic-speaking instead of English-speaking Islamic 
scholars. Since fewer NYPD officers could understand Arabic, they were less likely to surveil 
such lectures. He started distancing himself from new congregants, fearful that they were 
actually informants, as well as from groups of young worshippers that were susceptible to 
eavesdropping. He encouraged congregants to stop socializing in between prayers. The absence 
of informal social interactions resulted in a distrustful, uncomfortable atmosphere for his 
congregants. He also was forced to mediate disputes between congregants about accusations of 
newcomers being NYPD informants.  
 All of these obstacles, Imam Raza claimed, detracted from his teaching and ministering. 
He considered leaving his position as an imam altogether for the safety of his family. Raza added 
that when the Associated Press reported on the NYPD Muslim surveillance program in 2011, the 
public revelation only worsened the situation for Masjid Al-Ansar. Weekday prayer attendance 
declined drastically from about twenty to two or three people.  
 The Muslim surveillance program affected not only religious worship, but also charity 
work, including helping the homeless, finding homes for families, donating money to families in 
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need, and fundraising for other charitable activities.  One such organization and plaintiff was 586
Muslims Giving Back, founded in 2011 originally as Fesabeelillah Services of NYC, Inc. 
(FSNYC), along with one of its leaders, plaintiff Asad Dandia, who identified his charity work as 
a significant part of his religious practice and a step toward becoming a better Muslim. FSNYC 
hosted small events, invited speakers to a local mosque, and discussed the significance of charity 
in Islam. Most members were college-aged male students.  
 Asad Dandia first interacted with Shamiur Rahman, the NYPD informant, in October of 
2012. Rahman had sent Dandia a Facebook friend request in March of that year, inquiring about 
getting involved with the FSNYC organization to become a better Muslim. Dandia had accepted 
Rahman's friend request because they had mutual friends on the social networking site. In 
addition to joining FSNYC, Rahman began attending Dandia’s mosque in Brooklyn and meeting 
Dandia’s network of friends, family, and colleagues. Rahman would ask people for their phone 
numbers within minutes of meeting them and would try to take photographs with or of them. 
Rahman offered the NYPD a photograph posted on Facebook of twenty-five young people at an 
FSNYC meeting. 
 Dandia, after hearing from a friend about the potential infiltration of FSNYC by an 
informant, stopped publicizing FSNYC events on social networking sites. Moreover, FSNYC 
members became less active due to fear of surveillance, and the organization offered fewer 
events with the exception of hosting a former rapper who converted to Islam, after which many 
members ceased attending FSNYC-sponsored events. Dandia created a new group called 
Muslims Giving Back that Rahman started to attend, as well. The group purchased food to 
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donate to needy families in the community, and it created a bulletin board inside of the mosque, 
Masjid Omar, with photographs of charity work in order to gain legitimacy for the program. 
 In September 2012, Rahman initiated several conversations about controversial current 
events, including the attack on the United States consulate in Benghazi and the Syrian revolution, 
prompting many members of Muslims Giving Back to suspect he was an informant. The 
following month, Rahman’s admission that he was an informant stigmatized the charity 
organization, preventing Muslims Giving Back from reaching its prior level of community 
involvement. The mosque asked Dandia to remove the bulletin board and cease soliciting 
donations from community members after Friday prayers. Since then, Muslims Giving Back 
struggled to raise funds for food donations, recruit or communicate with new members, or 
maintain a sense of community.  
 The surveillance experience of Masjid At-Taqwa, another Brooklyn mosque plaintiff, 
resonated with that of the first mosque, Masjid Al-Ansar.  Aside from prayer services, the 587
mosque offered classes on religious topics and religious or personal counseling. Imam Siraj 
Wahhaj led the Masjid At-Taqwa since its founding in 1981. The NYPD installed a surveillance 
camera pointed at the entrance of the mosque in 2004 or 2005 that made the congregants 
uncomfortable and anxious. At first, congregants started leaving immediately after prayers 
instead of socializing afterward, and eventually they started avoiding the mosque completely. As 
Islam encourages communal prayer, the plaintiff argued the video camera impeded the 
congregants’ ability to participate in an important part of their religion.  
 Additionally, Imam Wahhaj claimed that he lost time allotted to his normal duties in order 
to ease the minds of immigrant congregants who feared they would be deported or blocked from 
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getting legal permanent residency. When the mosque leaders asked the NYPD to remove the 
camera, they responded by simply moving it across the street. With the remaining camera, the 
religious community became suspicious that the NYPD was placing informants or plainclothes 
officers inside the mosque, and leaders began to ask newcomers about their backgrounds with 
previous mosques and inform their current congregants of possible informants. As in Masjid Al-
Ansar, leaders of Masjid At-Taqwa began recording their sermons and lectures. They also started 
including third-party witnesses in religious counseling conversations that ordinarily would have 
been private. The informant Shamiur Rahman tried to infiltrate Masjid At-Taqwa, but he left the 
community after being told that his questions about Osama bin Laden and the September 11 
attacks would ban him from the mosque. 
 The 2011 Associated Press publications about the NYPD Muslim surveillance program 
mentioned one informant who inquired about a plane crash in Manhattan in October 2006. It also 
described how the NYPD collected reports from officers and informants about the reactions to 
the crash of various imams and congregants in Brooklyn, Queens, Corona, and Jersey City, 
including this mosque, Masjid At-Taqwa. After the Associated Press report was published, the 
mosque decreased the number of social activities and bonding activities that were traditionally 
central to its community. 
 Moustafa Bayoumi, an associate professor at Brooklyn College who published an account 
of Muslim American experiences during the War on Terror, was initially thought to be one of the 
targets of the NYPD. Bayoumi was described as “a lecturer at Brooklyn College” in the 
Associated Press report. However Mohammad Elshinawy, one of Bayoumi’s former students and 
collaborators on a book about Arab Muslim youth in Brooklyn, was actually the final plaintiff 
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against the NYPD. Elshinawy responded to Bayoumi’s question of what it felt like to be 
surveilled: “‘Apprehension . . . To what degree is this going to affect me? . . . There’s no reason 
why we should consider ourselves second-class citizens. . . . I’m born in this country like 
anybody else.’”  The Terrorism Interdiction Unit (TIU) claimed that Mohammad was a threat 588
“due to the fact that he is so highly regarded by so many young and impressionable 
individuals.”  NYPD officers followed his daily movements around the city, including to the 589
diamond district where he and his fiancé shopped for an engagement ring.  
 Mohammed Elshinawy was distinctive from the five previous plaintiffs in that he was not 
affiliated with a specific institution. He worked as a volunteer speaker and lecturer at various 
Islamic institutions in New York City.  Elshinawy first suspected he was surveilled in 2004 590
while studying at Brooklyn College. Attendees at his lectures and congregants at mosques 
warned him that the NYPD had questioned them about him. He was approached by people he 
suspected and later confirmed were NYPD officers or informants. 
 One such suspected informant was a man named Bilal, who often attended his lectures 
but fell asleep within minutes, claiming to record the lectures for information that he would not 
have been able to acquire otherwise. Bilal openly stated he wanted to “do something” for Islam 
since talking was not enough, and he tried to instigate conversations with Elshinawy. One 
confirmed undercover NYPD officer, who used the name Kamil Pasha, attended several 
community events with Elshinawy. In 2008 or 2009, another man informed Elshinawy that the 
NYPD had offered money in return for reports on Elshinawy’s lectures, and the informant 
Shamiur Rahman was sent to a few of his lectures. NYPD officers in uniform approached 
Elshinawy, as well, asking to question him about a missing person. 
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 As a result of all of this, Elshinawy altered content from his lectures that might be 
considered inflammatory or controversial to an NYPD agent. He suggested in the complaint that 
the surveillance program hindered his ability to communicate his religious beliefs to individuals 
or audiences, hold study circle in public spaces, or communicate with people he did not already 
know. Certain people stopped attending his lectures or associating with Elshinawy altogether, 
including longtime friends. He claimed his new reputation hindered his professional 
advancement as a formal leader within organizations he had worked closely within, including the 
Masjid Al-Ansar mosque that he helped to establish. The board members cited his long beard, 
youth, and characterization as a Salafi scholar to be problematic, given that the NYPD viewed 
those characteristics as indicators of terrorism. Even informal involvement became difficult for 
him, as he worried that the mosque would ask him to leave at any disagreement. His damaged 
reputation prevented his ability to advise Muslim youth, which he cited as part of his religious 
duty as a Muslim.  
 The defendants, comprised of the City of New York, Michael Bloomberg, Raymond 
Kelly, and David Cohen representing the NYPD, answered the plaintiffs’ complaint by denying 
the majority of the one hundred and sixty-four numbered paragraphs throughout the entire 
complaint, with some partial exceptions to a few points that will be noted here.  Often in their 591
answers, the defendants denied “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of allegations set forth,” but they repeatedly admitted that they indeed had conducted 
surveillance of the plaintiffs and their associations.  The defendants denied the plaintiffs’ 592
allegations that the Radicalization in the West report religiously profiled Muslim Americans, but 
they admitted the report was in fact published by the NYPD. They also claimed to have used 
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publicly available United States census data and government information to identify ethnic 
communities in New York. While data from the United States Census Bureau is in fact in the 
public domain, the NYPD still could have used that information to target plaintiffs based on their 
religion, in the same manner that public Facebook activity or Amazon Wish Lists can signify 
Islamic affiliation. 
 The defendants further admitted that Shamiur Rahman was in fact a confidential 
informant for the NYPD who sent pictures and attended events for the NYPD. Their answers 
continued on in this vein, admitting a few factual points but denying “any implication that the 
NYPD conduct[ed] unlawful surveillance of any institution or individual.”  In other words, the 593
fundamental dispute centered on whether the aforementioned surveillance tactics were or were 
not legal. The NYPD denied they knew the “thoughts or emotions” of Imam Raza and Masjid 
Al-Ansar congregants or of Dandia, and they did not know that Imam Raza was a religious 
leader at Masjid Al-Ansar.  The defendants denied possessing enough information to form a 594
belief about plaintiffs’ conversations or interactions,  or enough information to know what 595
religious leaders at Masjid Omar did or said.  They also stood by their claim that the security 596
camera placed outside the second mosque was nothing more than a “clearly-labeled general 
purpose security camera.”  Conclusively, the defendants alleged that they acted lawfully within 597
their jurisdiction.  598
 Hina Shamsi of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), along with New York Civil 
Liberties Union and the CLEAR Project of CUNY Law School, represented the plaintiffs.  The 599
court asked a few questions to clarify the plaintiffs’ claim that the NYPD’s surveillance policy 
was motivated by discriminatory targeting:  “[E]ven assuming the police department had an 600
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unlawful program of suspicion with surveillance of Muslims, isn’t that irrelevant if the City has 
reasonable suspicion to investigate these particular plaintiffs?”  In other words, the court asked 601
the plaintiffs to clarify their distinction on when the city had the right to investigate plaintiffs, if 
it was Shamsi’s position that the none of the facts could constitute reason to investigate the 
plaintiffs. Shamsi responded that the defendants went beyond permissible investigation by 
scrutinizing innocent congregants and religious speech while treating the mosques as terrorism 
enterprises. This response highlighted the main argument of the plaintiffs: that the NYPD hinged 
on preemptive surveillance and discrimination against Muslims and Islam. 
 The defense retorted that the case would have been over if they could prove there was a 
legitimate purpose for the activities of the NYPD concerning the six plaintiffs. Shamsi responded 
that a great deal of public information demonstrated the “suspicionless” nature of the 
surveillance program that used “religion as a proxy for criminal suspicion.”  The court asked 602
again for clarification, seeking confirmation that Shamsi believed all law enforcement regarding 
the plaintiffs was simply a “result of their religious affiliation,” with which Shamsi agreed.  603
Shamsi compared the infiltration of the mosques based on suspicion of one criminal to 
investigating the entirety of St. Patrick’s Cathedral based on one attendee, crossing institutional 
boundaries to the now established religion of Catholicism: “[T]hat doesn’t mean that St. Patrick’s 
Cathedral can be turned into a terrorism enterprise by which wholesale surveillance can be 
conducted of the religious speech that is there and of the congregants that are there.”  Shamsi 604
here attempted to invoke sympathy for the plaintiffs’ argument of religious profiling by 
comparing the surveillance of a mosque to the surveillance of a Christian community. 
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 The court adjourned for the day following this comment, after responding that there were 
multiple plaintiffs in the case, and not one single establishment such as the St. Patrick’s 
Cathedral, seemingly missing the point of Shamsi’s comparison: that Christian groups under 
surveillance might receive more respectful treatment than have Muslim communities. According 
to Shamsi, the NYPD informant Shamiur Rahman indicated that his NYPD handler had 
instructed him to conduct surveillance of the Muslim Student Association, “not because it was 
doing anything wrong but because the NYPD just wanted to make sure that it wasn’t doing 
anything wrong and Rahman said that he never saw anyone he spied on do anything illegal, not 
even littering.”  Rahman’s admission supported the plaintiffs’ argument, that the NYPD was 605
engaging in preemptive surveillance.  
 In addition to debating the main argument, a second key theme was whether the NYPD 
surveillance program was legal. The plaintiffs and defense discussed how information was 
preserved within the NYPD, and what kinds of information should be physically and verbally 
handed over to the plaintiffs to make their case. This discussion resonated with the AFSC 
Quakers’ FOIA requests for their FBI files, since the AFSC had to justify its request for 
information. The defense claimed that when they asked the plaintiffs what documents the 
plaintiffs were looking for, the plaintiffs could not specify, which made search incredibly 
burdensome to the defense since not all NYPD documents were stored electronically. The 
defense perhaps responded in this way to rebut future legal claims such as those made in Raza.  
 The plaintiffs retorted that they were not expecting the defense to search through fifty 
thousand documents.  The clerk pondered over what they could to do retrieve the information, 606
and which databases they would search to see if the names of the plaintiffs surfaced.  This 607
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debate not only demonstrated how much information the NYPD had amassed, which implied 
they collected some data without specific reasons, but it raised the question as to how future 
surveilled religious groups should navigate similar First Amendment claims. The defense 
responded that it would be difficult for the defendants and NYPD personnel to look at hundreds 
of names in documents authored by many different people, many of whom were no longer 
NYPD employees, and determine at what point in time they believed these people to be not be 
Muslim.  The defense also stated that investigations in post-September 11 New York would 608
naturally have a “disparate impact upon the Muslim community.”  In discussing which people 609
would be relevant to examine amongst the NYPD personnel, Shamsi asserted on behalf of the 
plaintiffs that the people who conducted surveillance at the ground level were relevant in the case 
to determine whether there was a discriminatory intent in how the practice was carried out.  610
 As a compromise, the judge ordered the NYPD to send plaintiffs any surveillance reports 
relevant to their respective investigations.  At the time of this mandate, the NYPD held 611
approximately two hundred and eighty thousand documents.  There were roughly twelve 612
lieutenants supervising detectives during the time period or surveillance.  The judge agreed to 613
grant the plaintiffs the detective-level information, as well as information from undercover 
officers, but not the confidential informants’ information.  614
 The defense pointed out that Raza was the first case in which a judge ordered information 
from the NYPD, thereby insinuating that the plaintiffs’ request was not reasonable. The defense 
argued the request was unprecedented “where the scope of information that is currently being 
made available has ever been done before,” and they should consider whether that type of 
information from the intelligence bureau would be considered.  While the plaintiffs agreed that 615
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the case was not ordinary, they disagreed that it was rare such information would be available for 
a case in which a confidential informant swore publicly that he was investigating people based 
on their religion.  “That is the crux of this lawsuit,” Shamsi said.  That is, plaintiffs suggested 616 617
they had been surveilled because of their religion, rather than because of evidence of 
wrongdoing. The distance of Islam from the prevailing Christian, albeit pluralistic, culture, 
contributed to the discrimination the Raza plaintiffs faced. Shamsi added it would be important 
to know not just the summary of the information, but also the directions given to informants and 
other employees of the NYPD surveillance program: “Because that shows how the practice is 
being carried out on the ground and whatever information gets fed up we’re entitled, I think, to 
look at and query and test what information was being used to surveil our clients.”  618
 The defense and plaintiffs additionally discussed when economic injuries manifested 
within the NYPD surveillance program.  Cheryl Shammas spoke for the defense that only 619
Muslims Giving Back claimed it suffered economic injuries, and that the only financial loss 
Masjid Al-Ansar endured was the cost of a video camera, used to record sermons and avoid 
suspicious accusations.  The NYPD had requested financial information from Muslims Giving 620
Back to probe into possible terrorist conduct.  The defense rationalized this request by claiming 621
Masjid At-Taqwa had transferred funds to foreign terrorist organizations.  622
 Gorski, speaking for the plaintiffs, stressed that the dispute had to be decided based on 
what the NYPD actually knew at the time it conducted surveillance. Otherwise the NYPD would 
be justifying surveillance after the fact, and its surveillance strategy would have been 
preemptive.  The defense believed the plaintiffs were trying to make their case based on the 623
irrelevant “veracity of facts that may be contained or are contained in the NYPD documents,” 
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rather than on whether the information the decision-makers possessed at the time of surveillance 
legitimated law enforcement.  Once again, this discussion of financial injuries dovetailed with 624
a discussion of preemptive versus substantiated surveillance.  625
 Aside from debating whether the NYPD Muslim surveillance program was preemptive or 
based on factual evidence, or how information was stored and circulated, a third key theme to 
emerge from the Raza case was how to define a Muslim. These two points were related: defining 
Muslim was relevant to determining whether officers had engaged in preemptive surveillance. 
Much like the monitoring systems of the Utah Mormons and AFSC Quakers, government 
agencies could not avoid at least considering how they were defining and shaping religious 
expression by selecting, defining, and analyzing individuals or organizations they deemed 
subversive. The judge in Raza questioned how the plaintiffs and defendants would agree upon a 
definition for “Muslim” in the case. The judge suggested that they use the criteria, “believed to 
be Muslim or believed more likely than not to be Muslim.”  The defense contested this 626
characterization, questioning whether it was feasible that the NYPD officer at the time believed 
the person whose name was redacted to be more likely Muslim than not Muslim.  We see 627
resonances with the Mormon and Quaker case studies, in terms of the surveilling agents 
discerning the core values of the religions. The plaintiffs were content with the definition, but 
requested that the judge add a third possibility, “believed not to be Muslim,” in order to 
differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims.  This third category would allow the 628
plaintiffs to speak to how NYPD police officers omitted surveillance targets who were probably 
not Muslim. This category would refine their argument about religious profiling. 
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 The plaintiffs presented a few additional requests, all of which were denied by the judge. 
First, they requested information concerning the holding of information about individuals and 
organizations not part of the investigation,  or in other words, that were not surveilled targets 629
but were surveilled within a larger network of people. The judge did not see the relevance of 
other investigations. The plaintiffs responded they were relevant to determining whether their 
personal investigations were part of a broader policy of surveilling Muslims. Second, they 
requested documents and statistics indicated in the number of criminal charges that resulted from 
surveillance, given that the NYPD claimed often in the mass media that it was successful in 
thwarting terrorism. The judge also denied this request.  630
 The plaintiffs did succeed, however, in receiving policy documents related to the 
formation of the demographics unit that provided the NYPD with information about different 
communities in New York City that might be radicalized.  The policy documents explained the 631
standards of the intelligence division for surveilling websites, blogs, and other online forums.  632
The plaintiffs then requested documents explaining the process by which the intelligence 
division decided a certain community, religious group, or mosque was of interest, but the judge 
ordered that they narrow their scope since any organized crime group could fall into that 
category.  633
 The main conclusion of the defense was that the plaintiffs failed to provide “any credible, 
indisputable evidence to substantiate their allegations” of “threat of harassment or reprisal by the 
NYPD,” or proof that NYPD surveillance resulted in “any of their speculative harms.”  The 634
defense also claimed the plaintiffs blocked defendants from obtaining necessary documents 
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about the plaintiffs and “critical discovery,” or evidence that would allow them to defend 
themselves against the “baseless claims and allegations set forth in the Complaint.”   635
 The plaintiffs, in turn, maintained the defendants were trying to justify their 
investigations after the fact and probe for more names of potential terrorists without having 
reason to interrogate about said people.  The NYPD defense asked the Muslim plaintiffs to 636
identify “hundreds” of worshippers, volunteers, donors, and other New York Muslims to the 
NYPD. The plaintiffs claimed they initially avoided pursuing the lawsuit to protect the 
additionally named Muslims from NYPD surveillance, and they conceded that they would 
provide the identities of people whose testimonies were relevant to the defendants’ case. What 
remained uncertain was whether the defense had the right to probe further.  The plaintiffs 637
maintained their stance, that turning over their files as evidence for the defense to strengthen its 
case would increase NYPD scrutiny of the plaintiffs, and therefore should have been rejected as 
speculative.  The plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to show a “compelling need for any 638
of their many, wide-ranging requests.”  639
 The defense retorted that the plaintiffs’ claim that the request by the NYPD for certain 
records would retroactively prove their surveillance was “illogical.  The defense explained that 640
holdings documents about plaintiffs’ arrest histories would help show if their arrest histories 
contributed to the financial harms they attributed to the NYPD surveillance program.  641
 In 2014, in response to the public pressure from the exposure of Raza, the NYPD 
disbanded its Demographics Unit, later renamed the Zone Assessment Unit, which created maps 
and collected information on Muslim communities in the New York City area. In January 2015, 
NYPD Commissioner William Bratton announced the new counterterrorism and 
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counterintelligence unit, the Strategic Response Group, that merged three hundred and fifty 
officers from anti-terrorist enforcement and crowd control of political protests. The SRG, which 
was criticized for monitoring protests, was not addressed in the Raza settlement of January 7, 
2016.  642
 C. The Settlement 
 As part of the 2016 settlement, the NYPD agreed to reforms to protect Muslims in New 
York City from unreasonable surveillance. The NYPD had previously conducted its 
investigations without any independent oversight that regulated systemic misconduct in its 
surveillance operations. The New York City Council had held some jurisdiction over the police, 
but generally did not investigate intelligence operations.  Additionally, prior to the settlement, 643
the Department of Investigation (DOI) was able to monitor the NYPD, but responded to 
executive orders investigating only corrupt or criminal activity. The Civilian Complaint Review 
Board (CCRB) and the Internal Affairs and the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (IAB) 
reviewed complaints against individual police officers, but these processes did not address 
systemic abuse within the NYPD.  Consequently, Raza was crucial to the story of government 644
monitoring of religious groups in the United States. The settlement revised the rules for 
surveillance that were written in the COINTELPRO environment of the 1970s from the previous 
chapter, when government secrecy clashed with civil liberties, and that were later modified after 
the attacks on September 11.  
 The Raza settlement offered the most comprehensive revision of NYPD surveillance 
since the Handschu Guidelines were introduced. When NYPD officers were first revealed by the 
Associated Press as working undercover in mosques, the Police Commissioner responded that all 
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undercover officers and informants simply responded to leads as permitted by the modified 
Handschu Guidelines. But the nature of the alleged leads remained unclear based on the lack of 
evidence supporting the Commissioner’s claims. It was also unclear whether the NYPD 
complied with other parts of the Guidelines, including the rule that it could not keep information 
it collected on investigations unrelated to terrorism or criminal activity.  645
 The most prominent aspect of the 2016 reforms to the Guidelines, as part of the Raza 
settlement, was the creation of a civilian representative position within the police department to 
review proposals of open, close, or extend investigations of political or religious activities. The 
civilian representative position, appointed by the mayor, was created to serve a five-year term on 
the Handschu Committee, along with various NYPD officials. The representative will provide 
input before any investigation is opened or extended, and will record and report violations of the 
Handschu Guidelines to the Police Commissioner. The Commissioner, in turn, will investigate 
the violations and report back to the representative. What was particularly striking about this 
settlement was the emphasis on transparency of information, as the representative will 
accordingly have access to all of the information that the NYPD uses to pursue religious or 
political investigations. The representative should be able to prevent the NYPD from claiming 
that it lost information relevant to future investigations, as it had done in Raza. The civilian 
representative will report methodical violations to the judge from the Handschu case. The 
settlement also expanded the authority committee reviewing NYPD investigations to eleven 
people, from the original three-person committee of the 1985 Handschu Guidelines. 
 Additionally, as part of the settlement, the defendants were prohibited from conducting 
investigations based on race, politics, religion or ethnicity as the motivating factor. Officers were 
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ordered to cite factual information about unlawful activity before investigating political or 
religious activity, as well as about the possible repercussions of such investigations. The 
implication of this settlement was not that any surveillance is unconstitutional, but that barriers 
were necessary in order to cite some evidence of criminal action prior to opening an 
investigation. The settlement limited the use of undercover or confidential informants to 
situations where police officers cannot acquire the necessary information in an effective, non-
intrusive way. This stipulation, however, left an ambiguous space within which undercover 
officers or informants can continue to infiltrate mosques or other legally assembled groups of 
Muslims. In other words, even if the revised Guidelines discourage preemptive surveillance, 
NYPD officers can surveil Islamic culture rather than a specific belief deemed criminal or 
indicative of an imminent terrorist attack. 
 The 2016 changes to the Guidelines also stopped open-ended investigations by 
introducing time limits and periodic reviews of ongoing investigations. Finally, the NYPD was 
ordered to remove the Radicalization in the West report from its website and formally renounce 
its continued use in NYPD investigations.  Beyond just assisting New Yorkers, Hina Shamsi, 646
Director of the ACLU National Security Project, proclaimed: “It’s also a win for the rest of the 
country as it marks the first time that any meaningful safeguards have been imposed to prevent 
discriminatory surveillance of American Muslim communities. At a time of rampant anti-Muslim 
hysteria and discrimination nationwide, this settlement sends a forceful message throughout the 
country, demonstrating that law enforcement can and must do its job without resorting to 
discriminatory practices.”  As much as the settlement can be marked as a success for the 647
plaintiffs and their lawyers, the accountability of the mayor-appointed civilian representative to 
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New Yorkers remains unclear. The provisions of the settlement may not result in any pragmatic 
differences in NYPD surveillance practices.  
V.  Pluralism 
 The settlement of Raza, though profound and far-reaching in its implications, may not be 
the final word on the surveillance of Muslim Americans in the immediate future. Hassan v. City 
of New York, a lawsuit in pre-trial litigation that was filed against the NYPD for the surveillance 
of Muslims in New Jersey revealed by the same Associated Press release, is to date an active 
federal case, but it made progress in October 2015 when the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the February 2014 dismissal of the case by the United 
States District Court. Ruthann Robson, a law professor at the CUNY School of Law, summarized  
the key points of the opinion of the Third Circuit. While neither the Third Circuit nor the 
Supreme Court had ever considered whether classifications based on religion should lead to 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, “it has long been implicit in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions that religious classifications are treated like others traditionally subject to 
heightened scrutiny, such as those based on race.”  Heightened scrutiny of these classifications, 648
in other words, meant that race and religion received extra attention in Supreme Court decisions. 
The Third Circuit acknowledged national security interests played a unique role in these cases, 
but added “it is often where the asserted interests appears most compelling that we must be most 
vigilant in protected constitutional rights,” thereafter citing two Supreme Court cases regarding 
Japanese American curfews and internment during the Second World War. 
 Concluding with the statement, “We are left to wonder why we cannot see with foresight 
what we see so clearly with hindsight—that “[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] not 
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race, creed, or color,”  the Third Circuit opinion for the New Jersey-based Muslim case 649
demonstrated a gradual departure from the case of the Utah Territory Mormons, where the 
Supreme Court justices focused on protecting religion when not threatening the greater moral 
good, to this contemporary unsettled case of New Jersey Muslims, rhetorically linked here to 
racial minorities. Governmental monitoring of religions in order to tolerate religious expression 
while maintaining the interests of the greater society surfaced in all three case studies. 
 The Utah Mormons, AFSC Quakers, and Brooklyn Muslims resented discriminatory 
policies that shaped the monitoring systems that observed them. Mormons reacted by fleeing to 
the Underground, while the AFSC Quakers were baffled that the FBI surveilled them, given their 
direct communication with government officials. Research on surveillance of Muslim Americans 
has found that targeting Muslim Americans without explanation or respect undermines the 
willingness of community members to cooperate with counterterrorism operations.  In the case 650
of Raza, the discriminatory policies of the NYPD undermined its uninhibited freedom to conduct 
surveillance in utter secrecy.  
 As shown throughout the case studies, most explicitly in the Mormon case, the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment prevent the United States government from interfering with 
religion, as well as from promoting or favoring a specific faith, but they do not protect religious 
beliefs in all circumstances. Legal scholar Kent Greenawalt has suggested that in certain 
contexts, tensions arise between the two clauses. For example, by offering exemptions to those of 
certain religious beliefs, the government may be establishing a religion by favoring it.  651
 The NYPD surveilled contemporary Muslim Americans through a new, predictive model 
unlike those used by the federal marshals or FBI agents of the previous two case studies. Yet the 
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Raza plaintiffs live in a comparatively pluralistic United States. Mormons, though considered 
outsiders, began their path to cultural acceptance in America when the Church of Latter-day 
Saints formally relinquished polygamy. The Mormons were classical outsiders, but they adhered 
to a religion that was born and bred within the United States. The AFSC Quakers’ unrelenting 
commitment to social justice weakened national opposition to communism. Yet Quakers were 
already placed firmly within a Protestant, insider umbrella when the American Friends Service 
Committee was under surveillance in the twentieth century, and they were analyzed with far 
greater carefulness and thoroughness by the FBI. 
 Muslims, in turn, have lived on the margins of American civic life since well before the 
September 11 attacks. The place of Islam in the United States has a long, complicated history, 
dating back to the sixteenth century. Zareena Grewal has argued that Americans have 
appropriated the timeless discourse of the “Muslim World” from “Colonial Europe’s moral 
geography of the Orient,” and this narrative corroborates the gap between legal and social 
citizenship.  Surveillance policies in the United States, according to Grewal, are devoid of race 652
in language but identify people racially.  Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im has added that citizenship 653
is not monolithic, as it surfaces in many spaces, “in voluntary associations, community 
organizations, trade unions, newspapers and media, and educational and religious institutions.”  654
The explanation of citizenship as not just legal and political, but also cultural, helps to explain 
why certain minority groups exist but are not perceived by the public as wholly integrated in 
United States culture. 
 As a religious minority in the United States, but a religious majority of the world, Muslim 
Americans have faced their own distinctive path in the United States in comparison to Muslims 
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of other nations. Legal scholar Khaled A. Beydoun argued that American Islamophobia is 
distinctive from British or French Islamophobia.  Within the United States, the racial, national, 655
and socioeconomic diversity of Muslim Americans reflects the diversity of experiences among 
them. Yet often these individuals are grouped together by broad categories to facilitate the 
surveillance programs of municipal, state, and federal agencies. The NYPD did map out 
individuals of particular nationalities, but it also relied on its four-phase model to assess all 
potential Islamic terrorists under one lens. 
 State action against Muslims, including the passage of the U.S. Patriot Act and the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, facilitated private animus against 
Muslim Americans.  Beydoun has argued that state-endorsed Islamophobia is perpetuated by 656
both private and public actors, including citizens, state agencies, corporations, and police 
departments: “Anti-Muslim animus is deeply rooted in American halls of power and popular 
consciousness.”  The ramifications of this post-September 11 Muslim surveillance campaign 657
peaked with Raza v. City of New York, and they have touched upon all facets of daily lives, 
particularly those of less wealthy Muslim Americans. The current model for antiterrorism and 
national security policing in much of the nation, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), links 
radicalization to Islamic piety and surveils targets’ associations and political speech, including 
critiques of American foreign or domestic policies in physical and virtual spaces.  Officers 658
attempt to build trust through CVE in Muslim American communities that are plagued with 
poverty and racism, where people more heavily mistrust police and government officers.  659
 Beydoun’s research on the intersectionality of race and socioeconomic status of Muslim 
American communities is important for understanding this chapter’s focus on one specific, 
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localized case of the surveillance of Muslim Americans in Brooklyn, New York. The Muslim 
Brooklynites of Raza are in this way distinctive from the Mormons and Quakers of the first two 
cases, when government agencies monitored individuals throughout a wider range of space. 
Beydoun emphasized that Islamophobia is not static but a “dynamic system whereby lay actors 
and law enforcement target Muslim Americans based on irrational fear and hatred” that is both 
societal and state-sponsored.  Local and federal police tend to concentrate surveillance 660
resources on low-income communities, where the perils of Islamophobia are amplified.  661
 Counterterrorism efforts increased throughout the country in the decade following the 
attacks on the World Trade Center, and it should be noted that the revelation of the NYPD 
Muslim surveillance program marked just one of many counterterrorism programs throughout 
the nation. However, the NYPD counterterrorism and intelligence operations were larger and 
more comprehensive than those of other municipal police departments. In 2010, the NYPD 
possessed a budget of over one hundred million dollars for counterterrorism and intelligence 
alone, as well as one thousand officers distributed between the counterterrorism and intelligence 
units.  
 In this way, the protagonists of Raza and marginalized Mormons were distinctive from 
the insider AFSC Quakers, who took it upon themselves to defend other groups once 
COINTELPRO was revealed. Less affluent Muslim Americans, often concentrated in large cities 
like Detroit, New York City, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia, often lack the resources to defend 
themselves, and they are reluctant to report hate crimes in fear of retribution and future 
surveillance by police departments that they already do not trust.  These socioeconomic factors 662
amplified the detrimental effect of the NYPD Muslim surveillance program that, once exposed, 
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revealed the flawed effort of NYPD officers to implement an accurate understanding of Islam in 
the surveillance program. Growing beards and visiting mosques more closely resembled how the 
majority of American citizens engaged with their respective religions than how terrorists 
prepared for acts of Islamic extremism.  
VI.  Conclusion 
 The Raza settlement will not protect all future religious expression, particularly in 
counterterrorism operations. Surveillance will continue, but under the tightened and refined 
Guidelines. The settlement introduced greater constraint over how the NYPD conducts 
surveillance of political, religious, and racial minorities. The judge from Handschu listened to 
New York City citizens discuss whether they found the settlement terms satisfactory during a 
public fairness hearing on April 19, 2016.  The plaintiffs from Raza expressed their overall 663
satisfaction with the settlement with some additional comments, such as those of Asad Dandia 
from Muslims Giving Back. Dandia reiterated that his organization was stigmatized after the 
Associated Press reveal. Perceived stigmatization by the hands of mass media distinguished this 
case study from the Quaker case study, in which the media revelation of FBI surveillance 
empowered the AFSC. Barbara Handschu, the primary attorney from Handschu after whom the 
Guidelines were named, stated she was unhappy that the settlement did not go further, but she 
reluctantly accepted them as a vast improvement from the amended Guidelines of 2003.  
 Several Muslim American citizens of New York City voiced some concerns to the Raza 
judge. A representative from the Arab American Center of New York in southwest Brooklyn, 
another program targeted by the NYPD, claimed that students affiliated with its center chose not 
to engage in political activities as a result of NYPD surveillance. One new contribution of the 
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fairness hearing not explored in Raza was, consequently, how chilling religious expression can 
subsequently chill political activities. A second contribution came from a representative of the 
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), who suggested that the proposed Guidelines should 
apply to NYPD databases, including cameras and towers used to collect information. The 
NYCLU representative elaborated that access to such information will sustain investigations 
without evidence of terrorism, effectively violating the revised Guidelines from the Raza 
settlement. He rightfully pointed to the ongoing question of how information is collected, stored, 
and used by surveilling agents as media evolve rapidly, and whether the existing laws or 
frameworks, such as the revised Guidelines, appropriately account for all forms of information 
collection and not just that which relies on the physical presence of a government agent. 
 External review of surveillance imposed by the 2016 settlement offered accountability 
that was unavailable to the nineteenth-century Mormons or to twentieth-century AFSC Quakers. 
Both groups would have benefited from external monitoring of the government agencies 
themselves, in the case of the Mormons, due to the questionable approaches used by federal 
officials in the territories, and in the case of the Quakers, due to disagreement among FBI agents 
throughout the country about the necessity of the AFSC surveillance program. The surveilling 
agents of all three cases demonstrated varied attempts to understand the religions they were 
surveilling. 
 Part of the invasiveness described by the Muslim plaintiffs in Raza can be attributed to 
the expansive surveillance capabilities of contemporary techniques. But many contemporary 
surveillance programs still rely on age-old forms of monitoring, such as eavesdropping. The 
nuanced aspect of this case study was not that media are now more advanced, but that parts of 
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the NYPD surveillance system, such as the NYPD report and the provocative questions posed by 
the informant to various Muslim Americans, attempted to predict or instigate action. Trying to 
predict action, rather than monitoring action itself, presents a far more ambitious project for 
government agencies. In trying to predict terrorist actions, the NYPD gravitated toward 
comprehensively surveilling Muslims and Islam rather than surveilling a specific activity, such 
as polygamy, or basing investigations on evidence of specific criminality, such as the alleged 
communist activities of AFSC members. 
 Government agencies in all three case studies surveilled religions under suspicion of 
polygamy, a form of religious expression, as well as communism and terrorism, perceived by the 
agencies as connected to a religious expression. The Raza settlement showed the continuing 
importance of constraints on government surveillance. Such constraints allow government 
agencies to examine potential criminal activity while still protecting the religion itself. The 
government agencies of all three case studies showed varying concern about the theologies of 
each religion, understanding the need to distinguish between religion and religious expression. 
The Supreme Court protected Mormonism, but not polygamy. FBI agents highly respected 
Quakers, but not communism. The NYPD, though perhaps the most ill-informed of the three 
government agencies about the religion they were surveilling, focused on curtailing Islamic-
inspired terrorism by surveilling Islamic religion institutions instead of criminal activities. In 
each of the case studies, government agents’ varying efforts to understand the religions of the 
communities they were monitoring did not neutralize the resulting limitations to religious 
expression within those communities. Yet these case studies do suggest that government agents 
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have been more introspective in monitoring religious institutions while balancing state interests 
than critics of contemporary government surveillance practices might assume.  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Chapter 5. Conclusion: Religion, Media, and Surveillance 
I.  Overview of the Main Contributions  
 The decisions of government agencies while monitoring the Mormons of the Utah 
Territory, Quakers of the American Friends Service Committee, and Muslims of Brooklyn, New 
York, shaped the religious expression of these groups. Cultural norms, along with three 
distinctive ideological threats, formed the government monitoring systems in each of the case 
studies. The Mormons abandoned polygamy. The AFSC Quakers changed their institutional 
identity by withdrawing from their cordial, transparent correspondence with federal government 
officials about their social justice-related activities. Alternatively, they fought legal and political 
battles against government spying of other organizations and of themselves. The Raza plaintiffs 
limited their religious expression to the mosques, and avoided broader discussions about Islam or 
politics in formal or extracurricular gatherings. The NYPD surveillance system weakened the 
doctrinal practices not just of Brooklyn Muslims, but of the many Muslims throughout the nation 
who feared government spying. This final chapter highlights three main contributions of this 
research. It then revisits the central themes of the case studies, concluding with suggestions for 
future analyses of surveillance, religion, and media in the United States. 
 This dissertation has contributed to the growing research on religion and media. Existing 
work tends to examine the relationship between religion and media within and beyond religious 
denominations. Such foci include online churches, televangelism, religious radio, religious blogs, 
faith-based video games, and spiritual rock music. These examinations are two-fold: organized 
religion is expressed through various media, including radio, Internet, and television, or 
characteristics of religion, such as ritual, belief, and community, are expressed through media 
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produced outside of organized religions, such as the The Oprah Winfrey Show.  Alternatively, 664
as argued by renowned communications scholars James Carey and Stewart Hoover, we cannot 
think of religion and media as distinct phenomena, and they are better studied at their 
intersection.  Carey boldly stated, “Religion is perhaps the most neglected topic in 665
communications.”  He explained that while religion has always been present within media 666
studies, it has largely been neglected because of the increasing centrality in universities of the 
Enlightenment, science, and empiricism, and the widespread dismissal of religion as a temporary 
phase of human history. 
 According to Carey’s explanation, religion was displaced in at least three ways in media 
studies: by the secularizing force of media; by the separation of religious topics in mass media 
publications, such as in the religion page of the newspaper; and by the idea that media, which 
provided individuals with ritual, narrative, and meaning, replaced religion in the realm of the 
sacred.  Religion, as he notes, has nonetheless persisted in contemporary societies. Scholars of 667
religion and media therefore disagree that media displaced religion in these three ways. This 
dissertation adds that religion and media research might consider an understanding of religion 
that falls in between denominational and non-denominational characterizations. The surveilled 
communities were affiliated with a specific denomination, but government agencies 
contemplated how those affiliations shaped their public activities, outside of denominational 
boundaries. The surveillance of religious communities in the United States has considered how 
government agents assessed the impact of religious beliefs on the actions of the surveilled 
communities. 
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 Second, this dissertation provides a window into how certain religious groups 
communicate in the face of adversity. The phrase, strategic communication, refers to how 
organizations utilize communicative efforts to carry out an agenda, but it can be employed in 
diverse contexts. Communications scholar Monroe Price has used the phrase, “the new strategic 
communication,” to describe how individuals or organizations utilize pervasive technologies to 
surveil targets, affect opinion, and spread influence, noting that contemporary pervasive 
surveillance is not a new phenomenon.  Price points out that the behaviors of religious groups 668
offer vivid portraits of strategic communication.  The Mormons used strategic communication 669
in their unsuccessful attempt to frame polygamy as their religious belief. The AFSC Quakers of 
the mid-twentieth century thought clearly about how to portray themselves in the public sphere, 
which in turn affected how the FBI approached surveilling them. Brooklyn Muslims in the Raza 
case strategically argued that the actions of the NYPD officers obstructed their religious 
expression, while the NYPD in turn framed its surveillance program as legitimate and necessary.  
 Both states and religious groups, in summary, employ strategic communication to achieve 
their goals.  The three case studies show that religious groups respond to state limitations on 670
free expression in the public sphere by strategically communicating, or advertising, their beliefs 
and principles.  Government agencies, in turn, employ their own internal strategic 671
communication methods to regulate and manage ideologically disruptive religious expression. 
The Utah Mormons coerced the Supreme Court to distinguish between religious belief and 
action, which inadvertently undermined their own claim to polygamy, but provided a clearer 
framework for future monitoring of religious expression. The AFSC Quakers helped drive the 
movement that demanded more accountability from the Federal Bureau of Information. The Raza 
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plaintiffs, finally, altered the process through which the NYPD opened and pursued criminal 
investigations related to terrorism.  
 In the contemporary age, religious expression has become increasingly central to 
international movements that threaten national security. In response, states have adjusted their 
discourse and reactions, such as by spreading messages that diminish the influence of those 
threatening religions.  The NYPD subtly employed this strategy through its report on 672
radicalization that broadly aligned Islam with terrorism. United States politicians and officials 
who support “moderate Islam” or “Enlightenment-friendly forms of Islam” at home and abroad 
also use this strategy to mitigate the influence of fundamentalism.  673
 Governmental support of preferred forms of Islam has contributed to the broader United 
States policy of surveilling Islamic expression at home. The centrality of surveillance to 
modernity was important to Anthony Giddens, who saw surveillance as a phenomenon of the 
nation-state, and whose work is helpful in expanding how researchers consider surveillance 
issues: “The expansion of surveillance in the modern political order, in combination with the 
policing of ‘deviance,’ radically transforms the relation between state authority and the governed 
population, compared with traditional states.”  In other words, the expansion of surveillance in 674
society followed the expansion of the administrative capacity of the state. Through this 
development of surveillance with the nation-state, administrative power entered into the 
mundanities of daily life and interactions. Surveillance made possible the creation and control of 
information.  Giddens is among a handful of scholars who understand surveillance as a neutral, 675
non-panoptic process that focuses on both the constraining and enabling effects of data 
collection. This understanding contrasts with the panoptic theories of surveillance, in which 
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surveillance is negative and always connected to repression, discipline, and power.  The non-676
panoptic approach to understanding government monitoring best fits this research in order to 
account for the nuanced approaches of the government agencies to understand the religious 
communities they were assessing. However, it should be noted that some Mormons engaged in 
Foucauldian self-monitoring in response to the government monitoring of the Territory of Utah. 
 Third, this dissertation demonstrates the significance of focusing on specific communities 
of surveilled targets rather than entire communities. While it is obvious that big data surveillance 
has transformed the way individuals utilize the Internet, scholars should continue to examine 
earlier forms of institutionalized surveillance in order to better understand the current ethical, 
legal, and cultural issues with which we are grappling in the post-September 11, post-Snowden 
era. David Murakami Wood has written that surveillance research has largely focused on four 
periods of the twentieth century: the late 1960s and early 1970s, associated with the end of the 
Vietnam war; the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, characterized by Thatcherism and Reagonomics 
driving surveillance in the workplace; the mid-1990s until 2001, characterized by the rise of 
closed-circuit televisions used for surveillance in urban areas; and the post-September 11 era.  677
Wood has also argued that surveillance analyses should focus on how surveilled places are 
constructed,  since surveillance operates at different socio-spatial levels.  The focus on 678 679
specific communities in this dissertation aligns with this reasoning, circumventing the 
reductiveness of the ubiquitous phrase, surveillance society. 
 We should also not inflate the significance of twenty-first century media used for 
surveillance over much older, more mundane forms of monitoring, such as eavesdropping, which 
in some ways may be more effective than electronic surveillance. As John Durham Peters has 
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written, media such as clocks and calendars measure, control, and constitute time, much as 
towers assess, control, and constitute space. Such fundamental media have historically been used 
to monitor, regulate, organize, and observe targeted people: “These media—so fundamental that 
they sometimes are not seen as media at all—negotiate heaven and earth, nature and culture, 
cosmic and social organization and define our basic orientation to time and space. As such, they 
are among the most profound technologies of political and religious power and control.”  680
Media integral to contemporary surveillance belong to Peters’s category of calendars, clocks, and 
towers used for spotting enemies, which he refers to as logistical media, or media that establish 
coordinates of space and time.  681
 While these three examples of logistical media are quite different from one another, 
cultures rotate around all of them: “They belong to a neglected category of media that are so 
fundamental that they rarely come into view.”  In many ways, the media used in the 682
surveillance systems of this dissertation share more characteristics with the mundane, naturalized 
calendar than with the Panopticon itself. While calendars, clocks, and towers are rooted in 
ancient civilizations, they are also integral to contemporary daily media. Google, for example, 
functions as our desktops, calendars, maps, and indexes, among other communicative and 
organizational media. “New media,” in other words, “return us to old media.”  To better 683
understand emergent media used for surveillance, we should return to earlier surveilling, 
logistical media, so as to better prepare ourselves for the days in which surveillance becomes 
increasingly less evident. Both the large-scale and minute logistics of each of the three 
monitoring systems revealed the central concerns of each case study: that is, how each 
government agency grappled with religious expression. Focusing on specific examples of 
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surveillance, such as of particular religious denominations, rather than random groups of people, 
permits us to avoid simplistic analyses of government surveillance. Scholars can instead research 
how government surveillance affects specific groups, rather than the aggregate represented by 
big data.  
II.  Summary of the Main Themes  
 One of the main themes of this dissertation was how the distinction between insider and 
outsider social status shaped the monitoring systems and, in turn, indicated the extent to which 
the religious communities would retaliate. Polygamist Mormon leaders of the Utah Territory 
retaliated against government monitoring by hiding in an Underground system. Despite their 
efforts in the Supreme Court, they did not maintain the power or reason to continue their cause. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Mormons desired statehood more than polygamy.  
 Quakers of the AFSC were unaware of FBI surveillance until well after its beginnings in 
1921. The AFSC first learned it was being surveilled by government agencies when its Chicago 
regional office joined a lawsuit against the city of Chicago. The AFSC Quakers initially engaged 
in “forced self-monitoring,”  as characterized by James T. Richardson and Thomas Robbins, by 684
willingly yielding information about their activities to the FBI to maintain an open chain of 
communication. Yet they did so well before they were aware they were under surveillance. The 
AFSC later altered its method of communicating with government agents, and eventually 
retaliated in 1975 with its own internal government surveillance activist group, the Board Level 
Task Force on Government Surveillance and Citizens’ Rights in 1975, which later created the 
Campaign to Stop Government Spying. The AFSC provided legal assistance to other groups that 
the FBI surveilled. 
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 The plaintiffs in Raza v. City of New York fought against the NYPD surveillance practices 
in court. Though the plaintiffs succeeded to some degree with the settlement, the NYPD never 
admitted its surveillance program targeted religion or suppressed religious expression. Although 
the Raza plaintiffs confirmed their overall satisfaction with the settlement terms, many Muslim 
New Yorkers, including a few who feared joining the Raza lawsuit, expressed additional 
concerns about continued government surveillance of Muslim Americans at the April 2016 
Fairness Hearing. 
 A second theme of this dissertation was the distinction between religious belief and 
action by government agencies, and how religious belief shaped action. Mormon polygamists 
coerced the Supreme Court to first distinguish between belief and action. In the early years of 
FBI surveillance of the AFSC, FBI agents sought to understand the tenets of Quakerism, as part 
of a larger investigation as to whether and how the Society of Friends related to the Service 
Committee. Months before activists exposed COINTELPRO after breaking into the Media FBI 
office, the Handschu Guidelines emerged, which protected New York City citizens from police 
surveillance of lawful public expression. The Guidelines were weakened in 2003 after the 
September 11 attacks, and then restrengthened with the 2016 Raza settlement to protect political 
and religious activities. 
 Critical to this theme of distinguishing between belief and action was the point at which 
the government agencies primarily evaluated the religious expression of the monitored 
communities: after the collection of information in the Supreme Court, in the case of the Utah 
Mormons; during FBI surveillance, in the case of the AFSC Quakers; and prior to NYPD 
surveillance, in the case of the Brooklyn Muslims. The differing points in which government 
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agents considered the theological components of religious expression correlated with the 
distribution of power within the government agency itself. The authority of federal government 
agents was decentralized in the Mormon case study, particularly given the physical and cultural 
distance between the Territory of Utah and the rest of the nation. Since much of the effort by 
federal marshals and officers focused on simply observing the Mormons and trying to track 
down polygamists, it was logical that they were not the government agents to thoroughly 
consider Mormon religiosity. Instead, Mormon theology was analyzed subsequently in the 
United States Supreme Court. J. Edgar Hoover sought to centralize power within the FBI, but he 
faced resistance from various regional FBI offices, in particular the Philadelphia office. Many of 
these agents throughout the long, twentieth-century surveillance of the AFSC attempted to work 
through the relationship between Quakerism and the AFSC. In the case of the NYPD, officers 
received their instructional report from two externally trained individuals who worked 
temporarily for the NYPD, but have moved onto other positions since the production of the 
report. NYPD officers sought out signs of religiously-motivated radicalization as delineated by 
the report produced prior to NYPD surveillance of Brooklyn Muslims. 
 A third core theme of this dissertation was the collection of information within different 
environments of civil liberties. Officers of the Utah Territory relied on spying and eavesdropping 
to gather the information later used to prosecute Mormon polygamists in court. Yet Supreme 
Court justices made a concerted effort to offer polygamy a fair trial. FBI agents surveilled AFSC 
Quakers by spying, but they were overall cautious and at times defensive in their approaches to 
surveillance. Brooklyn Muslims suffered the most intrusive means of collecting information at 
the hands of the NYPD officers, whose usage of the Radicalization in the West report, 
!252
informants, undercover cops, and video cameras was permitted by the erosion of the Handschu 
Guidelines in 2003. The NYPD surveillance system veered toward preemptive surveillance, in 
which officers tried to predict, rather than suppress, terrorism. A predictive model for 
surveillance raised new questions about the erosion of civil liberties in post-September 11 
American society, which was propelled by the erosion of the Handschu Guidelines that the Raza 
plaintiffs had sought to correct.  
III.  Looking Forward 
 Government agents understandably investigate criminal activities, such as the sexual 
abuse of children by Catholic priests. Yet government monitoring of religious institutions is 
unjustified when there is no proof of criminal activity. James T. Richardson and Thomas Robbins 
have explicitly considered the relationship between religion and government surveillance, 
claiming that surveillance of religion in the United States has increased as religious groups have 
become more involved in society. They argue that political leaders and governmental bureaucrats 
may assume they have a responsibility to know what religious entities are doing, particularly 
when they receive public funds or offer services typically provided by the government.  The 685
lack of transparency enabled corruption in some religious communities. 
 Yet the three case studies have emphasized the need to consider how and when 
government agencies collect information on religious communities whose activities are 
considered threatening. The ethics of how government agents collected information in the 
Mormon and Quaker case studies were considered, as was the preemptive collection of 
information about Muslim Americans by the NYPD. Government agencies such as the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can gather information 
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through surveillance and monitoring about religious groups whose actions fall within the 
jurisdictions of the agencies.  However the IRS and FDA generally identify the foci prior to 686
investigating, as opposed to debating the problem of religious expression within the surveillance 
system, as we saw in the Quaker case study, or substituting an indicator such as beard growth for 
religious expression, as we recall from the Muslim case study. In the United States, the 
presumption is that a religious organization is a voluntary association that benefits from 
independence from government control, oversight, and finances. But the increasing role of state 
and federal government agencies surveilling and regulating religion challenges this 
presumption.  687
 Researchers of surveillance of United States religious institutions could examine 
surveilled religious communities that were not analyzed in this research. Additionally, they might 
investigate to what extent, if at all, government agencies considered mass media portrayals or 
public opinion of the religions that they were monitoring. Third, they might research how 
government agencies surveil the religious expression of non-citizens living within their borders, 
or of their own citizens living abroad. As cultural beliefs and ideas are increasingly 
communicated in and across digital environments, this latter focus on transnational surveillance 
will become critical for government leaders, policymakers, and citizens alike. 
 Finally, future scholars might consider how to approach topics of religion and media from 
beyond the transmission or ritual models, by recognizing the nuanced ways in which religion 
manifests itself in society, as well as by recognizing the contribution that is gained by analyzing 
heavily studied social phenomena, such as surveillance, through the lens of religion. Throughout 
the research and writing process, I struggled with my own personal investment in this research in 
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the ways I analyzed the evidence and articulated my claims, closely considering every word and 
phrase to strive for objectivity. Impassioned newspaper or policy articles about government 
surveillance are necessary, particularly since those individuals who are surveilled might lack the 
agency to initiate their defense without public support. Yet scholarly investigations of 
surveillance should avoid polarized language in order to fairly analyze the monitoring methods 
of the government agencies and, simultaneously, the actions and beliefs of the surveilled 
religious communities. By doing so, we can engage in more compassionate transnational 
societies, in which religious expression may or may not be recognizable to our twenty-first 
century eyes.  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